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Introduc tion
{Ill}
Studies on the Adaptation of Irish Industry, as the title implies,
Is a collection of articles around the theme of industrial adaptation. Considerations
of size of the volume limit the r~mge of problems and issues which can be
i~aclded. It may be sald that we should have dealt with problems facing the
individual compaay oi" industry as the Irish economy moved from protection
to free trade; or we should have developed the issue of the role of finance
In adaptation or of the importance of faotor markets in enoouraging a particular
¯ type of industry. We deelded however to confine the paper to discussion of some
aspects of adaptation which we considered important and relevant, and for which
statistics were available.
The changlng international trade environment and its relattonsMp
to Imdustrial adaptation is examined, particularly the dependence of the
necessary economic expansion on large increases in exports and imported
materials. The expansion of import substitution is considered a valid
polldy in view of the under-utiltsatton of labour in Ireland. A search is
made for commodities production of which might be increased, bearing in
mind. the assumption that such production will tend to increase exports and
decrease competitive imports. There should be expansion in processed meat
as compared with live animal exports;cheese, vegetables, fish exported in
greater quantities; motor vehicle and machinery parts should be developed.
The methodology used in the paper could be applied in the search for products
In large and increasing world demand.
The question is posed whether physical investment at great
cost has been overdone, when priority might have been given towards labour-
intensive rather than capltal-intenslve industrles, towards more efficient
replacement machinery, more competent workpeople, in fact greater examination
"of all facets of the situation before becoming involved in a net increase in fixed
capital stock. The macro analysis suggests that there are many elements
conducive to growth in real GDP other than net increase in capital stock.
Increasing capital intensity is a world problem wlth especially grave
implications in Ireland wlth its endemically high rate of" unemployr~nt.
The extent to which industry and other autonomous economic
activity creates service type and other induced employment is discussed.
"[he constancy of the percentage employment in manufacture to total non-
agricultural employment at 25 in 1951 to 27 in 1976 is remarkable. The
validity of the multipler approach is questioned. Emphasis is placed on the fact of
association rather than causation, implied by the autonomous-lnduced theory.
It is argued that what is involved is the income mult|plier. Expenditure of.
income takes over in the long run wlth equal inductive effect.
A consistency model is presented which suitably elal~orated
could be used to show if general policy at macro level is feasible, e.g.
given an increase in output, the implications for the dlstrlbut;on of income
be’tween profits, wages etc. may be estimated. The model is extremely
sensitive, showing immediately whether a given policy might be pursued
or rejected. The model favours a 15 per cent annual increase in the volume of
manufacture.
"l’l~e final section of the paper comments that tl~e amount
of total grants made by seml-state bodies to industrial development was less
than 2 per cent of GNP or 4 per cent of general government expenditure in 1976;
(v)
an mnount considered inadequate having reg,~rd to the magnitude of the problem.
The report concludes with repeated emphasis on manpower as
distinct from income and profit, priority in Govermnent expenditure to the"
reduction of Unemployment, and import substitution in the interest of employment
and balance of payments.
¯This is primarily a stati~ieal paper, based on data from well-
"known soul;ces. Apart from inference based on statistics for the recent past,
Inthe spirit of Broadsheet we venture into policy recommendations. Policy
determlnatLon involves the future, hence uncertai,lty. Nevertheless it is
rational to propound polLcy, in the light of past experience modified by changes,
whether deliberate or unebntrolled but expected in the future.
From the narrow viewpoint of the paper, the statistics are the
more hnportant, indeed really all that matter. Our recommendations are
based on our statistical findings; they are not "proved by statistics" - little
of general importance in the social sciences can ever be - but neither are
they contradicted by the statistics. Least of all do we presume to show how
these recommendations are to be implemented. We would be well content if
nearly all our recommendations were accompanied by a question mark. Even
after more thoroughgoing investigation than our own, different policy decisions
can vaiidly be made. Our hope is that we have raised some of the right questions
and that our statistical findings will narrow the scope of discussion.
There are elements of paradox, even contradiction in our
recommendations pertaining to manpower, production volume, import balance,
physical capital, import substitution, and others. We try to eliminate these
faults or at least indicate our consciousness of them, but we must InquLre Lf’
i
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paradoxes mid contradictions are not inherent in any socio-economic system.
On one point in our philosophy for the nation we are adamant;
from previous studies on unemployment: economic policy should be based
primarily on employment. That so mm~y of the labour force should be quasi-
perm.-mently unemployed is, to our thinking, intolerable, a statement we do
not accompany with a query mark. This forthright asseveration will be regarded
by thinldng citizens as a truism, since invariably all statements about industrial
development are accompanied by estimates of gains or losses of employment.
This, however, is a far cry from basing policy on employment.
But in tlds attitude there is major paradox. Ireland’s is a market
economy Impelled by the profit motive, with planning playing but a small part.
Invariably in private sectors and to a large extent in the public sectors, maximization
of profit or minimization of loss is paramount. Labour is regarded as a cost
like any other and, with earnings largely outside the control of mmmgement,
reduction in numbers employed is a holy and wholesome end, in the interest
of efficiency, labour productivity, survival, competitheness, the lot, with
a ldnd word for labour only as something like an afterthought. In our several
studies on unemployment, (of which the present is really a continuation) we
have had no hesitation in recommending a policy of direct employment (mainly
by the State) if a sizable dint is to be made in quasi-permanent unemployment,
even if this is inconsistent with the tenets of a market economy and optimisation
of national income. We take the view that permanent unemployment is
Inconsistent with human dignity which takes precedence of national economic s.
But here is paradox with a vengeance. The answer may be compromise.
So this paper is not all academic in rely sense of the term.
We want only to be useful in the mundane sense.
-1
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1:1 Committee on Industrial Organisat[on Reports on Manufacturinga."
¯ Industry and Comparisons with the Present
I~irst we summarise without comment the main findings of the
,
Committee. Then we compare realisation with the somewhat gloomy forebodings.
Finally we comment .very generally on the degree of success that has attended
the labours of the investigation teams, m~d ask if this a priori excellent idea
of expert investigation of economic activity be resumed and, if so, with what
modifications in the light of experience.
The Committee on Industrial Organisation (CIO) wa.s appointed by the
Irish Government in June 1961 to make "a critical appraisal of the measures
that might have to be taken to adapt Irish industry to’eonditions of mere intensive
competition in home ,’and export markets, to undertake an examination of the difficuit[es
which might be created for particular industries and to formulate positive measures
of adjustment and adaptation". The Committee was set up when Ireland was
considering the possibility of membership of the EEC and at a thne when there
was also an International movement towards conditions of freer trade.
To examine the problems of Irish industry the CIO org~mised
survey teams to make detailed studies of 22 industries. "The survey teams used
published official statistics and discussed aspects of the industries with relevant
organisations, e.g. trade unions, government departments. The greater part of
the Information contained in the Reports came from answers to a comprehellsive
questio.nnaire relating to all aspects of the firm: capital mad buildings, labour,
raw materials, management, markets at home and abroad, future prospects
both at firm and industry levels. The final report of CIO emphasises that
"The information obtained by these methods is subject to the limitation that it represen~
generally managements’ own assessment of the situation".
The surveys covered a wide range of types of Industry, with fairly
marked variations in the size and number of firms In each particular industrial
A Synthesis of Reports By Survey Teains on 22 Industries. Committee on
Industrial Or£anisattoa. Stationery Office 1965 (Pr. 7883) Fina[ Rcport
Qommittec on IHdustriaI Or~anis___~at_ionA Stationery Office 19(;5 (Pr. 8082)
group. Most of the firms employed under 500 people, although five firms employed
over 1,000 eaSh and many employed iess than :tO people.
: Firms were mainly orgalg.sed as private companies; there were a
considerable number of private firms and of the total 1,100 firms sampled, about
86 were public companies.
Industries were concentrated noticeably in Dublin and to a lesser
extent Cork. It was found that widely scattered location of firms could be a
sig,/ficant disadvantage. There was a great dependance on imported raw materials
¯u
and components for industry. The Assembly of vehic.les and Wireless was very
reliant on imports although some of the parts were home produced,¯ Pottery,
Electrical equipmentl .Paper firms, chemicals and Fertilisers used raw materials
which were ahnost all imported. The Chocolate industry was in the happy position
of obtaining the bulk of its raw materials from home sources.
Most of the other industries could use raw materials either home or
foreign produced. The home-produced materials were generally protected by
tariffs on the imported supplies. The Footwear and Gowns industries were
unhappy with the tariff system, Claiming that home produced basic materials
were not similar in quality and design to those avail,-fl~le fro.m abroad. The
Printing industry suffered through delays in the granting of import licences,
while Irish paper was not always readily available. Prices for Irish steel m~d
¯ wire were claimed to be between 15 and 30 per cent higher than for imported
materials; in fact 75 per cent of the raw material needs for steel production was
Imported. The Furniture and Leather industries clahned to have trouble with
Irish raw materials in the case of Furniture, the Irish wood was said to be
hnperfectly dricd and in the case of Leather,hides were sub-standard.
There were special problems connected with the textile industries,
namely, Co{ton, Shirts, Miscellaneous dlothing, Gowns, Knitwear, Wool, Readymade
qlottfing and Men’s outerwear, iKost of the wool.for spinning., was hnported. The
survey teams investigating these industries found problems due to lack of variety
of materials from home sources, higher prices for Irish than for imported raw
materials. Irish firms suffered greatly from an inability togive large enough
orders to benefit from quantity rebates; the small size of Irish firms thus
constituted a definite .disadvantage.
Transport clKficulties, whether for raw materials or for finished
products were importm]t. All industries stated that costs were high and freight
services, clearance of goods, and deliveries suffered from excessive time lags.
Such complaints made were not always substantiated.
The total labour force of the 22 industries in 1961 was over 82,000
workers and m~ additional 3,500 outside piece workers employed in Knitwear
and Other clothing industries.
Labour relations were generally good with few restrictive practices
e~eept in Printing and Furniture.’ These practices were due mainly to insistence
ca traditional demarcation lines leading to lack of flexibility and higher costs. In
some industries, managements had to cope with a multiplicity of unions.
There were staff recruiting difficulties in 12 industries employing
chiefly female labour. Difficulties were also encountered in recruiting skilled
workers due to emigration to the UK where wages and social welfare benefits
were higher. Training of operatives was not possible in many of the small and
scattered Irish industries.
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Product.~vity in the industries was generally lower than for other
European comltries. "The reasons for fl~is lie mainly in less capital intensive
. "~
methods of production, smaller scale and less efficient production methods and
in poorer training rather than in the worker himself."
At the time of the survey many managements were not aware of the
existence of Technical Assistance Gr,’mts and therefore made little use of such
ald’s. There was not sufficient concentration on sales and marketing particularly
in exports. It is possible that because of thirty years’ protectfon policies, industries
had become accustomed to a protected home market ,and were unable to adjust
to the realities of a competitive scene.
Plant and machinery in many firms were found to be out of date,
with little spare capacity and consequently inefficient. Buildings tended to be
old and unsuitably designed for expansion.
Production runs were short and there were frequent changes from one
type of product to another making production c’ostly arid inefficient and lowering
the effective utilisation of capacity. The report comments that for example in the
case of the Vehicles industry, "frequent changes to different types 6f car are
not necessarily of great" significance in increasing costs since jigs cml be changed
quite easily; but the small scale of production, and therefore virtual impossibility
of using flow production teclmiques, increases costs," The wholesale price of
small and medium cars was consequently £40-£120 per ear higher than in the
UK (exclusive of taxes’ ).
In all the industries surveyed there was protection of the home market
In the form of tariffs or quotas, the most usual tariff being 75 per cent and
50 per cent preferential. The home market was therefore virtually free of
r
competition from abroad. As a result there was less need for management to
concentrate on excellence of design, marketihg, sales or expansion. Due to the
¯ small size of the home market much production was undertaken on a scale less
than optimum, remHting in a low degree of specialisation as firms diversified to
provide as large a proportion of ilome demand possible.
i
All industries had exports but they were significmlt in only some.
On/y a few firms in most industries had any export experience, however. The
report gave five basic reasons for the low level of export expansion: (i) lack
of incentive to e;xpoz-t because of the lfighly protected home ma~-ket; (ii) lack
of information and contacts outs~.de Irelmld and failure to use information
avallab]e, from, for example, Corns Trachtala; (iii) small Irish firms were at
a disadvantage when in competition with established industries abroad; (iv) the
cx/stence of tariff and quota restrictions in other countries; (v) in the majority
of industries costs including production mid distribution costs we~:e hig]{er than
in many competing countries.
The survey teams and managements of the firms attempted to assess
the effect of freer trade on Irish industry. It was expected that in all industries
except Fertiliser, foreign competition would make some gains in the Irish market.
The Fertiliser industry had already made plans to inject new capital into plant
and machinery In an effort to meet the changing structure of the market. The
television boom was expected to maintain the Wireless industry, "however", the
report states, "longer term prospects are not so encouraging since the home market
will reach saturation point just as tariffs are substantially reduced, causing
probable losses in sales."
Other industries expected varied amounts of losses. It was hoped
that I’rinting could maintain employment at: the prev~ling level, in spite of some
loss; in the Chocolate industry only marginal losses were expected. Cocoa’
,
bm%ns at the time could be imported into Ireland free of duty whereas Britain and
the EEC were not In such a favourable position. The Chemical industry was very
diversified but in most cases it was hoped to maintain markets: Leather and
Gowns industries val-led;some expected to lose most of their sales and some to
retain most. Footwear manufacturers were faced with problems arising from
the rate of technological development abroad.
Cdnsiderable losses in the home market were expected by most other
of the 22 industries including Cotton, Paper, Shirts, Miscellaneous clotlfing,
steel% Knitwear, Pottery, Electrical equipment, Wool, Readymade clothing,
Paper products and Men’s outerwear. Several firms expected to go out of
production completely while others hoped to arrange mergers, rationalise or
o
concentrate on special orders. The Motor vehicle assembly industry was considered
impossible to save~ "Here the survey team concluded that the entire industry
would go out of production in free trade conditions. The industry, which is
largely under the control of foreign firms, only came into existence because of
¯ the imposition of a virtual protfibition on the import o£ completed vehicles. The
disappe~’trance of this restriction would remove all reason for separate assembly
over here and the parent companies are therefore likely to cease production in
Ireland entirely or to use the Irish firms merely as distributive outlets".
The Report concludes that "it is likely that a considerable number of
small firms would go out of production in free trade conditions and that through
mergers the scale of production of the remainder would increase nearer to an
optimum size" and " ...... it is useful and important that the possible outside
magnitude of the problem should be fully realised in order to ensure the best
planning of preventive and adaptive measures". ¯ ¯
The survey teams recommended Several adaptation measures which
would enable industries to meet increasing competition from abroad both in home
and overseas markets, including structural organJ.sation, new
Investment planning, examination of market possibilities and employment.
"7--
Adaptation Councils should be set up to help firms witll tile problem involved
In structural organisation and co-operation;" the Councils to be concerned
with the following:-
(1)    promoting standardisation and speeialisation, developing a
competitive product policy, encouraging mergers or gToup
co-operation;
~1)    improvement of dESign; "’
, .
Oil) promoting ml awareness of the benefits to be derived from
Industrial research;
Or) joint marketing arrangements ranging from informal agreements
to formally constituted groups; joint participation in market
research, trade exhibitions, promotional campaigns;
(v) joint purchasing;
(vl) factory design and worldng conditions;
(vli! Improved training of operatives and other personnel;
(vili) problems of worker redundancy, re-training and re-settlement
of workers.
¯ The survey groups realised that for some industries the setting up of
Adaptation Councils could be difficult. Where there was not a tradition of co-
operation a great change in the attitudes of manufacturers could be necessary;
the difficulties to be surmounted by firms faced with free trade, were so great
that enormous efforts were deemed necessary.
I
J
¯ .. "’In the case of 15 industries, which made estimates,
"total complete modernisation of plant and buildings" would cost approximately
£16-£18m, excluding the cost of new factories and processes. The cost of
Improvements would be highest in Printing £4 rn, Chocolate £2¼m. and in
Cotton, Steel, Knitwear and Wool (about £i. 5 million each). The raising of
such capital sums could be a very serious problem for many of the firms. ’
In spite of fl~e urgency for adaptation m~d modem~isation, only 4 out of file
22 Industries had made any positive pl.%ns at" the time of the survey. There seemed
to be no sense "of urgency on tile part of most titans, despite the fact that the
time period between decision to invest, delivery of equipment m~d full utilisation
of it is, in some cases, a long one".
Home demand was analysed "under the assumption that the growth target
adopted by the Govermnent of a 50 per cent increase in gross national product
behveen 1.960 and 1970 is achieved". The basic price elasticity effects told the
’ further impaot of income elasticity on the final demand pat±erh were assessed.
Home demand for all products should increase if GNP increased. The proportional
size of increase in demm~d brought about by increases in income levels can be
estimated.
C.’E.V." Leser’s* 1962 and 1964 work on income elasticities provided informadc
.for final consumption goods; esthnates for the producer goods industries were madcb:~
the survey teams. Between the anticipated growth of home demand and hnprov[ng
competitiveness as a result of adaptation,it was hoped that future prospects for the
22 Industries were reasonably favourable: "Apart from the Vehicle industry," which
is likely to cease production in conditions Of freer trade, the only industries likely to
o.
stiffer substmltial losses in the home market by :~970 are Cotton and Footwear".
Estimates showed an expected increase of 25 to 66 per cent in the Wool, Chocolate,
Gowns, Paper, K~uitwear and Electrical Equipment industries; while the other
industries were expected to remain steady or to shotv modest increases. It was
stressed, however, that extra home income would be spent on Irish goods only if they
were competitive. Therefore, esthnates were valid only if the adaptation and
lnodernisation measures recommended, were implemented.
The survey teams cmphasised the need for the speedy exp,-msion of e.x2)ort
markets. Such emphasis wmfld imply a considerable ch,’mge in mmmgement
attitndes. The reasons giveu for a $’cueral low level of exports were: "lac]~
¯
)*C.E.V. Lcscr, "Demand ]]eiationships for Ireland", ESRI I ublication Series,4, 19(
C.E.V. Lcser, ’"A Further Analysis of Irish IIousehold Budget Data, .1951-1902,
ESRI Publication Series, 23, 1964.
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of hlterest, lack of lulowledge, not enough advert:ising or good design, tariffs
and other factors out of the control of Irish industry (e. g. transport costs) and
finally, and most important higher levels of costs".
Co-operation in developing export markets was recommended " -: ’v/f,
either between Irish firms or through international voluntary co-operative arrangements.
Co-operation with firms abroad could make available to Irish firms the benefits
of m~-u:keting experience and hlowledge of local conditions in the foreign markets.
A reasonably high degree of externM association existed already in the Wireless,
Chemicals, Chocolate and Electrical equipment industries. The Chocolatecrumb
firms exported 90 per cent of their production, which could be ex~panded bythe
collaboration of firms with An’B~rd Bainne and Coras Trachtala whose ex%~ertise
would provide help in opening and expm~ding markets in Continental countries.
Great Britain and Northern Ireland were expected to continue as
predominantly important markets; other market possibilities were in the h[iddle
and Far East m~d Africa. Hosiery and Knitwear were suggested as suitable 15roducts
for marketing in Germany, Hollmld m~d Belgium.
The importmlee of adaptation measures in order to maintain employment
was reinforced by an estimated 2!, 000 reduction in employment before 1970 in all
but two or three industries representing over 25 per cent of total employment in
the industries surveyed if adaptation measures were not undertaken. If adaptation
measures were taken total unemployment in the surveyed industries was estimated
at 5,000. The firms, in which unemployment was expected to be greatest were,
In the Cotton, Footwear, Vehicles, h~[iscellaneous Clothing, Steel and Leather
Industries.
The fifth IJlterhn CIO Report (1964) estimated possible total redundancies
In all industry covered by the Census of Industrial Production as 10,600 if adaptation
measures were taken but 34,500 if rationalisation was not implemented: "In
the circumstances, even if there is a subst,’mtlal net increase in industrial employment
at the same time as a certain amount of rcdunda~Icy, a sizeable number of
redundant workers may bo unable to get alternative work. Older
* Ccrt~n Aspccts o[ l~cdundaney. Fifth interim Report Committee on Industrial
Organis~tt[on. Stationery Of[ice 196,i (Pr. 78,i6).
workers who become redundant are likely to present a special problem. Worker s
whose skills have become obsolete may also.be difficult to place, unless they
t
are sufficiently adaptable to absorb uew skills."
The final summing up of the survey teams’ reports; ,, ....
the reports make it clear that, if the adaptation measures recommended are
undertaken speedily and energetically, the prospects of freer trade for Irelm~d
}
..,I
are much better than appeared : .... But it should be emphasised that the
m~certainties with respect to future developments in both home and export
markets are so great that the estimates given should be treated with caution¯
The co-operative action recommended in large areas of production and marketing
requlres considerable changes in attitude by the Irish businessman and will
o~ly be effective if l}e is prepared to make such chm~ges."
7 ’" ’.°" ..... ¯ .............
s¯
The Committee on Industrial Progress (COIP) Reports
The Committee was appointed in 1968 "to assess the progress made
by h’ish industry in its preparation for free trade conditions, wlth particular ret:erence
to marketing and product poIicles."* The assessment was made on the basis of
surveys carried out in 13 of the 22 industries reported on by the ClO. Thhteen
reports were issued and the final report was published in September 1972.
The 13 industries studied were: Women’s outerwear, Fruit and
vegetable processing, Hosiery and Knitwear, Metal trades, Paper, paper products,
printing and publishing, Tanning and dressing of leather, Men’s and boys’ outerwear,
Electrical mach}nery apparatus and appliances, Footwear, Woollen and worsted,
Shirtrnaklng, Cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery, Furniture. The majority
of the firms covered in the survey were established for some tlme and tended to be
largely dependent on the home market; the remainder were newly established
"export only" firms and firms which had considerable exports.
*General Report Cqmmlttee on Industrial Progress, Stationery Office, Dublin.
Prl. 2927, 1973.                            .
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The General Report of COIP sumrnarlses ihe reports on the indlvldual
industrles. In addltlon to assesslng progress made by flrms recomrnendatlons are
made for improvement in output, exports, employmentt management, rnarketlng and
product policy. Output, exports and employment were Found to have experlenced
substantlal growth from 1963 to 1971~ volume of manufaeturlng output in that
perTod increased by about 58 per cent, industrlal exports at constant 1963 prTces
increased by 200 per cent; from 1963 to 1970 employment in rnanuPacturing industry
increased by over 17 per cent but’decreased sllghtly durlng 1970-71.
The General Report commented: "Industry in general is now better
able than inthe 1960s to meet and to take advantage of free trade. " The warnlr~g
is gTven~ however, that while ]ndlvldual firms were improvlng, some were not and
the latter would probably not survlve in condltlons of free trade. The suggestlon
was made that firms whlch were unable to adjust successfully to changing conditlons
should participate in "measures of ratlonallsatlon including mergers with other fh’ms".
The effects of technological advance and product development in
h’ish manufacturing industry were stressed and the necesslty for industry to implement
structural and attltudlnal changes to meet such changing conditions. Consequently,
changes in employment patterns follow. In EEC countries "about 200~000 jobs
..
a year are affected by purely internal shlfts withln indlvldual sectors of industry."*
For example, a loss of one mTlllon jobs was experienced in decllnlng industrTes in
"EEC countrles during the ten year perlod 1958-’68 due to shifts wlthin industrial
sectors and the closedown of firms; there was however a net increase~ at the same
time of r{early 2 milllon jobs. The necessity for adjustment was crucial because of
the hlgher proportlon of people leavlng the land and the hlgh unemployment rate in
Ireland, factors whlch underllne, "not only the need for new job creatlon but the
importance of the rnaxTmum endeavour by exTstlng industry to take ever/step wlthln
its power to ensure that it can adjust to the new market situation. Table 1.1. gives
the maTn features of sectors surveyed by COIP and is reproduced from the General
I
Repori-.
e
* Op.clt. page ./0
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CIO ,’tad the Present
There have been many clm~ges in "the international scene which
had m~ impa6t o11 Irish industry since the CIO :Reports were issued in fl{e early
1960s, in particular the preparation for and entry of Ireland into the
European Economic Comlntmity (on 1 Jmmary 1973) with the consequent reduction
In hnport duties; on most products duties have been abolished completely.
has. been a gl:eat ..inc{-ease- in the prices of oil and other "basic energy; .
in addition there has been a world recession m~d a large decrease in the value
of the pound sterling. Such external factors would .......- .,
In themselves, have had a profound effect on Irish industry;" had there not been
a wide measure of adaptation Irish industry could not have survived. But Irish
Industry has managed to survive and in some aspects to thrive ..          -- .     ’".
.. . :.;. -     . .’." ".
in spite of the difficult external factors to which it was subjected.
There
The CIO Reports examined 22 industries. Four of these, namely,
Wireless, ..television, .telecommunications,. Paper products, h{en’~ protective.
.
clothing, B~}shmakh~g;’-are included arnongs.t the 18 industries, asterisked in
.¯                    ..
Tables 1.2 and 1,3. Ts]~le 1.1, reproduced from the General Report of COIP,
Is co lppr_ehensive and scarcely requires special comment, except that it relates
to a period preceding our entry into EEC.
o
The principal differences between "the CIO analysis of prospects for
the industries surveyed and actual average percentage ehm~ges ¯between 196 0 and
1973 are given in Table 1.4-. In the last two colunms of the Table, CIO’s views
are summarised.
The analysis of aggregate industriai growth rate by industry In the
period 1960-1973 shows the growth of industry both by the expansion of surviving
firms and the appearance of new firms. D. McAleese (1977)~’ distil)guishes the
trends for old and new manufacturing firms In his study of IDA grant aided industry.
Some firms within industrial sectors have adapted and prospered, others, unable to
adapt, have fMled. CIO comments are dated ea. 1965, which means that the *
considerable development of new industry could not fully have been antlcipated.
* Dermot McAleese, A Profile of Grant-Aided Industry. IDA, Dublin, 1.977
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Main Features of Sectors Surveyed
|,..]..
_., ;.~ ..... : .......
~....~ .................... :--:-
F,_
L7
E,,
L.i
El
1
INDUSTP.Y
Won~’$ Ou[¢rwe..~r    ,.
Fruh and Vesetabl¢ Pta-
~ssing , ¯     . ¯     ¯ ¯
l{oslery and l-~Jtwcxr ..
M¢ta| Trad~ (part of) ..
paper Pap.cr Products.
Printing and Publish ng
Mob’s nod Boys’ O~ter-
wear
TannlnR and b$css~r,g of
I~a:hcr"
Elect Heal Machinery
Appar~’,t~ and AppH-
&ng¢$      ¯.      °¯      °.
~GOtW¢~r .. .. ..
Woollen ~,nd Worslcd (e~-
¢ludMg c..’pcts and ¢arp:t
yarns)    ..     ¯¯     .¯
Shlnn~k|ng ....
Fu~txkur¢ ¯¯ .¯ ..
Cocoa¯ Chocolal¢ and
¯ Sufar Corffc¢tionery . ¯
NUMBER OF F’IRMS
1N SECTOR
i~t time of which par-
,urvcy ticipalcd -
138 94
1.~ 15
68 61
11S 66
75 $?
14 12
$$ 39
27
47 42
33 131
136 73
33      l:;t
TRENDS 1963-1971
OUTPUT
wl~ .,j Volume
+153% +60%
+134% +90%
+Ig3% +178%
+3~6% +S9%
+111% " N.A.
+7~%    +~%
÷~1%
+223% +73%
+7%
+i8% -t-6%
+$6% -F 24~,
4s~% -i~6%
q, 333;
--~-~PORTS      ]
1
Value Volume
+104% -I-66%
+,{15% N.A.
(from 11% to
24% of outpu~
¯ value)
+333% N.A.
(from 18% to
2g~ of output
vaJue)
+677% N.A.
(from 16% to
:27% of output
valt~)
+~% N.A.
(from 153’= to
14~= of output
value)
+2OO% + ~4%
+106% +735.
+105% N.A¯
(from 21% to
&0% of output
value)
+i~0%     +~6%
+102~ +75~
+187% +60%
+300% N.A.
(from 3% Io’~%
of output value)
* 149%      +$$~
COMPETING IMPORTS
Value Volume
+:oo% +..~,)o%
+ 167~ N.A,
(from 18% to
23% of home
market value)
*9O0% N.A.
(from I1% to
32% of hom~
mMl;ct val0c’l
N.A.
(from o~er ~0%
to over 40% of
home market
value)
.4.172% N.A.
(from 29% to
33% of home
mar l:ct value)
+ 1,4~%     + 5~0%
Very ]lille Of im;5on.~ arc directly.
con~pctitivc s.,’iih [Lc l)p’:s and
quahiies ptodL~’J:d here.
¯ The output and export trends are tho.~ i’n the maln sector (bovine tam-=lag) which repr"~nlr, ov~ 90~ of output.
+275% N.A. ’
(from 21% to
38% of home
marl.el volt, c)
f
l.lnl;’l severe quota restrict~on:~
on im )or;$ were Ifficd in mid-
1970, imports v.er¢ ncgl,gible.
Since then thcy have risca
rapidly to 205" of home market
by value and 30% by volume.
+900%
+322%
--~%
+9O0%
N.A.
(from 9% io
20% of home
m.~kc t value)
-1-S92%
EM PLaY M ENF
1969 .    1~71
6,500 6,200
(e~t.)
.o
9.4C.0     !:,900
7,6OO 7.S03
16.0.40 15,900
5,~X) 4,5:0
1.263 4300
11,090    10.6’5.3
f,400
5riO0 .{.gO0
2,36O 2,400
(~t.)
3.650 3,450
4,600 4,’/20
~j
Jlt was not found ncCCssary to approach all tim :L,m~ in the industry..
i; r’~~~,",~. <~r~.,~ .=’~’~.-’" .....
{;!: ....
i
i"
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Table 1,’2: Index numbers of volume of pioduetion and employment° in manufacturing industry. 1960. 3066. 1973. 197~
Base: Year 1953 as 300 "; ¯
l Bacon                          107 332 148 19.7
Slaughtering 1’16 269 485 553
Creamery, butter etc. 308 177 316 394
C~nnlng, fruit, vegetables 68. 130 211 186
Grain milling 111 126 159 166
Flour° biscuits, etc. 83 122 193 157
"Sugar, cocoa, chocolate etc. 100 121 133 114
[~j
Margarine 98 128 147 140
MiscellanEous food incl. fish 147 237 459 703
Distilling " 76 112 ].96 ~50
- .Malting 323 124 212 825
Brewing 111 116 161 150
Aerated. mineral waters 118 192 414 464
,
Tobacco 84 8’2 108 116
"Woolletl & worsted 138 170 272 277
F "Linen & cotton 220 266 296 236l Jute, canvas, etc. 194 229 ~92 695
i ~loslery 139 225 601 633
l 1 *lSoot, shoe 116 152 139 105
*},~en’s, boy’s clothing 82 93 19.2 ll0
t~j
"Sift::making 126 172 196 153
%qomen’= girl’s clothing 128 194 283 292
"Mhcellaneous clodtlng 123 141 154 105
}dade-up textiles 172 257 492 447
~i Wood, cork Sl 140 195 203’ "Furniture etco 117 157 232 236"Paper° paper products 181 212 415 876
"Printing, publlsh/ng 126 159 9.07 202
Fellmongezy etc. 101 134 151 172
F’~ %ca:her, leather subs. 126 173 192 86"Fertl liters ~48 890 725 638
i J Oil prdnts etc. 118 1(33 264 ~46
"Chemicals 178 493 1313 2112
.".W . Soap etc. 112 139 1713 122
*" tGI ~.s~, pottery 1,f5 217. ~80 400
Clay p:oducts, cement 136 265 531 504i ~
. Metals 170 804 ~54 521
*Electrical machinery 209 287 464 448
FI "Manufacturing Electrical machlncP] 233 626 928 1159Ship,boa:building 147 183 257 ~28
t. " Raihoad equipment 64 45 35 ~2
~toad vehicles 172 199 271 234
tmi
Other vchicl~ 81 138 170 142
¯
Miscellaneous manufacturing 227 422 809 984
M~mfaeturlng industry Volume of production Employment
1960 1966 1973 1976 1966 1973 1976
." 131 127
219 327
131 178
139 146
98 ’96
92 67
93 68
89 113
273 496
90 $9
79 45
108 100
104 145
81 82
124 113
136 96
137 169
118 139
95 77
87 96
119 146
114 109
107 ’15
150 232
6t 91
97 103
122 141
111 128
lOO 86
136 119
203 225
121 125
193 39.7
109 111
142 228
152 214
166 243
164 "256
317 498
185 295
63 58
153 390
171 180
186 299
1960
113
159
99
99
106
9O
82
175
92
77
.93
102
95
81
318
130
92
88
95
103
]08
313
]50
68
91
326
108
93
120
148
117"
~38
105
118
95
122
151
166
139
67
127
89
128
105
116
377
180
113
86
79
76
102
496
9.2
t50
96
152
83
86
70
152
112
51
70
111
103
69
256
81
97
138
116
88
71
228
~29
405
94
233
202
226
260
419
336
50
355
172
328
To:a1 m~nufacmring 124 176 278 293 122 142 132
0
0
O.
0-
0
[lL..
Source: Vadotts Issues of Irish Statistical Bulletin (:SO Dublin
* Committee on Industrial OIgantsation reported on these lndmtrfes
#.
................................................................... . ........... ................
.# ......................
,¯ ° ¯
Table i.-¢t; Average annual percentage ch~ulges In valuc of production ~nd employment, 1953-1960,
1960-1966, 1966-1973, 1973-1970
Maunnfactntlng Industry " ’ ", Volnmc of product/on Employment
1953-60 1960- 66 1966-73     1973-76 1953-60     1960-66     1966-73     1973"76
1 2 3 ¯ 4 5 6 ’7 8
Bacon 1. 0 g. 6
Slaughtering 8.4 7.3
Crcamcrles 1.1 8. 6
Cmanlng "1.8 6. 7
Grain 1. 5" 2.1
Flour. biscuits "2. 6 6. G
*Sugar. chocolate etc. O. 0 3.9.
Margarine "0.8 4.5
Mlsccllaneo~ food, fish 5, 7 8. 3
Dlst.illing "3. 8 ’ 6. 7
Malting ~. 0 O. 1
Brewing 1,5 0,7
¯ Aerated watch ~.4 7.2
Tobacco -9., 5 "O. 4
*Woollen, worsted 4.7 3, 5
¯ Linen. cotton 11. 9 3,2
,Jute, canvas 9. 9 2, 8
¯ llo$Iery 4.8 8.4
"13oot. shoe 2.1 4.6
¯ Men’s, boys’ clothing "2. 8 2. 1
¯ Sldrm|aklng 3.4 5, 3
*Women’s gift’s clothing 3; 6 7,~.
¯ Miscellaneous clotlflng 8.0 2. 3
Made-up tcxtilcs 8.0 . 6. 9
Wood. cork -3. 0 9. 6
¯ Fuml turn 2, 2 5, 0
"Paper, paper products 8, 8 2. 6
* Printing. publishing 8.4 3, 9
Fellmongery O. 1 4. g
eLcather, leather subs 8.3 5.4
¯ Fcttillsers l~. 9 7. 8
Oil. palnu etc. 2, 5 5.5
*Chemicals 8. G 18. 5
Soap etc. 1.6 3.6
¯ Gl&~, pottery 5, 5 7, 0
Clay products, cement 4.5 11.8
Metah 7. 9 10. 2
Machinery, ex, electrical ILi 5.4
®E1ect~Ical inacl~nery 12. 8 17.9
Ship. boat building 5.7 3.7
Railroad equipment -6.2 "5.7
¯ Road vehicles 8.0 2. 1
otlu~t vehicles -3.0 9. 3
MI~c. manufacture 12.4 10. 9
1.6’ "5.0
8.8 4.5
8.6 7.6
7.2 -4.1
3.4 -1.4
6,8 T6,7
1, 6 "5. 5
2. 0 "i. 6
9.9 15.3
8.3 8.4
8.0 15.3
4.8 -2.3
11. 6 8, 9
4.0 ~.4
7.0 0.6
1.5 -7.3
14.8 5.5
15,1 L7
"L3 "8.9
3.9 . -3.4
1.9 -7.8
5.5 L1
1.8 "11.9
9.7 "3.2
4.9 L3
5.7 0.6
10. 2 "3. 2
3,8 "0.8
L7 4.4
I. 5 -23. 5
9.3
-4.2
7. i -2.3
15. i 17. 0
3,5 "11,5
8.3 I.?
i0. 4 "L 7
8.9 "2.0
7.1 -I, 2
5.8 7.7
5.0 8.5
-3.5 "2.9
4.5 "4.8
3.0 "5.8
9.7 6.7
3.8
6,9
"0.’I
"0. I
0.8
-1.5
"2.8
8.3
"I. 2
"3.7
"LO
O. 3
"0,7
-3.0
2.4
6.0
3.8
-1.3
"I. 8
-0.7
0.4
I. 1 "
1.8
6.0
’ "6.1
"I. 3
3.4
1. I
-I, 0
2.6
5. 7
2.2
4.7
O. 7
2.4
0.7
2,9
6.1
7.5
¯ 4.8
, -5.6
3,5
"L6
3. 6
2.5 -0.4
5.5 "5.9
’;4.8 4.5
5.8 " 0.7"
"1.3 "0.3
0. 4 "0, 8
2.0 "0,7
-I0. 6 3.5
19.8 8.9
~.6 -IL3 ¯
-2, 7 -7. 7
1.0 -1. l
].5 4.9
0.0 0.2
0. 8 -1.3
-l. 6 -4.9
0.8 3.0
4.2 2.4
1. i -2.9
-1,5 1.4
2.4 3.0
0,9 "0.0
-0. 9 -5. 1
0,0 6.4
8.9 1,7
1.1 0.9
-0.5 ~. l
0.5 1.7
-1,2 -~ 9
2.1 -1.9
5.4 I,$
0.5 0.5
~.7 7.8
6.6 0.3
3. 1 %0
0.3 8.0
5.3 5.6
1,4 6.6
11.4 5.4
4.9 t~9
-1,0 -L2
3.2 3.1
11,5 0.7
0.3 7.1
-3.0
4.9
0.4
-3.0
-4.6
"4, 8
-3.4
0.0
-17.4
3.6
"1.3
!.0
0.4
-8.7
-10.0
-1.4
-7.0
-12.8
-30. 0
"8.7
"L9
-2.7
3,3
-3.8
-2.0
-0,7
-2..5
0.8
"15.2
O.d
:l.1
7.4
-5.4
0.7
-1.9
-2.3
3.0
-2.9
4.4
-4.8
-6.(;
-L5
3.1
Total m~nu facturc 3, I 6. 0 6. 8 1. 8 O. 7 2. 5 2.2 -~, 4
Ii l
IJ
U
hflc ~ou[ce: Table l,’X,
Not.~e
Annual average rates are geometrical
i.o
@
T~b] 1,4: Annual P.veragc pcrcenta~c ch~n~cs 19G0-1973 for C10 Industries add CIO aaalvsfs of ros ct
........ . - .. _;us o~ Dros~.cm
Indnstfles survcyed
by CI0
o"
I .
¯ .    +
a
$
Volume of
productlon Etnploymcnt
Sugar. Chocolate ~ 3 0.6
Woollen and worsted "0.S
~2~r*r_.~q ,~nd cott~
:    Hosiery 11. 9 ¯ 8;’2
Root. sho~ 1.4 "I. 0
¯ . .+,
Men’s. boys’ clothing 3, I 0.1
Shhtmaklng ~. 5 P,. 7
Wotn~’l. ~dr ls ’
clothing
MlsccB. clothing
Pura|tu[e etc.
-3.1
5.4
¯    LO
Pa.pcr. paper products    6. 6
~tnt~g, pt~bllshfng ~. 9
leather, leather good~ ~. 3 "
t
Fettllhets g 6
0,9
1.1
0.1
8.8
e
Chem/cah            16. 6           6. 9
6"lash pouev/ % ’/ Ik 2 ¯
IHcctr[cal rn,,chtnery 11. 2 8,1
e
Itotd Vehlcle! ~.’6 ~1. $
CIO Analysis of Prospects
Production
Small expansion if vigorous
expc~l marketing policy
pursued.
Net real Increase of about
25% b)’ 1970 on home nlarket.
Greater Increase 1 f exports
|reprove.
If Industry to meet International
competition "fundamental and
extensive" actloffmust be taken.
Home market expected to
dec~case~
Profitable sales In Europe could
be developed. Good market
ptospecu.
The Industry not alive "to the
possibility of radical technical
development."
Output could possibly increase
by 20 per cent but adaptatlc~a
essential
.° ¯
Even with ratlonalisatloa
substantial losses" will occur on
home market whh advent of free
trade but if exports doubled
could maintahr present produc-
tlot~
The Industry could c×pect a
modest growth In productlcxa
l’novtded exports developed.
Markets abroad must be devel-
oped to compensate for anttcl"
pared losses on the home market.
Progress possible If adaptatlo~l .
measures taken.
With ratlonaHsa.tion and
Improved production, disul-
bution, marketing, could
have considerable growth.
Ptogrcss could be difficult
~rlth compet!tlon from abroad,
Suuctutal changes necessary.
If adaptation measures taken
the Industry could Improve.
The Irish Industry not compe"
tltlvc with EEC counules at
present. Efficiency measures
taken to Improve situation.
Employmellt
Disemployment unlikely,
Total employment static due to
labotLr productivity increases.
Possibility of maintaining emplo)~
by Intensive tralnlug and Increased
labour productivity If output c~ Ix:
hnprovcd.
If accotmt taken of a possible grc,~d
of the industry, increased employ-
meat Is likely.
Whhout hnproveruents dlsemploym~
"might go as high as 2. 000% ~qit.=
Improvements employment could bt
reduced by 1.000.
If the Industry "failed to Imp:ore its
present rate of exports, namely ~,
cent of Its total output" about 1.~¢’
workers could be tedundaut. If imF
ment took place employment wc~!d
tnalntalned at present rate-.
Employment ctxJld be maintained
If exports substantially Increased.
Will probably maintain a :ubstaath~
proportion of    " present employ:;~
’lf dm Common External Tariff
applied to F~.t Eastcru imports.
without other testrictious, the lo~s el
employment may be at least 40 ~t
cent of the 19G1 figure,
Pos~blliry of maintaining prc,..eu.t
levels of employment.
Expansion unlikely over total !ndu~u~
Heavy unemployment In early sta~e~
of free trade..
}lope to maintain employment tt
existing leveL
Could be some sedundancy.
Not much change expected In
employment.
I
Future of the Industry uncertain, ltope that tedund:u.cy can be avold-
] Conld Improve with consfdcrable
¯ "1 adaptation and se-organisation,
’ ¯. +
] If competitiveness Improved. Redund,,~cles expected initially.
reasonable prospects for rite
Industry.
By 1070 production may have
Increased by GO pet cent over
p~sent level=-
Motor assembly Industry
expected to cease under flee
trade.
Improvement If production Increased
conttdctably.         .,
b’y 19"/0 employment may have
Increased by 20 per cent over piece.z]
leveh.
Considerable redundancy.
Various lsmes of Irish Statistical Bulletin, CSO DubHa,
Itcpo¢’ts of ClO Survey=. (19t;,~).
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The CIO method applied a.t intervals of years would apr[ori
appear to have considerable usefu!ness in rational industrial plam~ing. Obviously
It enables industry to air its problems and difficulties, bringing these to public
and government attention. But as an aid to forecasting, e.g. for capital
investment? :Businessmen are pahffully aware of the element of uncertainty.
Capital plans are notoriously affected by even small adverse winds of economic
change. It is therefore important to decide whether the first CIO app,:each
has been generally ~aseful. Clearly this has been the case as regards industries’
own citation of difficulties. :But how about assessment of the future ?
Complacency on our part is not to be implied from the statement
of "success" at the outset of this section. Achievement in fut~are must be on
a great]y increased scale, as we shall’show. ,Success so far will be interpreted
as showing rather of what we are capable than of what we have as yet- achieved.,
1:2 The Statistics of N[,.’~ttfacturin~!ndustry in Ireland 19.53--1976
Tables 1.2 mid 1.3 are fundamental as showing the recent
trend in volume out:put and employment in Irish manufaek~rlng inck~str[es. The
reasons for selecting the years 1953, 1960, 1966, 1973 and’1976 ar.~e fair!y.
evident: the period 1953-1960 is that just preceding the economic upsurge which
began about 1960; 1960-1973 is the period of rapid grox~¢h preceding the
depressJ.on, January 1973 also being the month Ireland entered EEC; and 1966
divides the period 1953-1976 into two roughly equal periods of years and marks
the signing of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement.
-14 -
We coiffine ,mmlyses to simple comment. From Table 1.2
we note that since 1953 output nearly trebled \virile employment increased
by only one-third. ;the enormous variability in the 1976 indexes (1953 as
t
100) for output will be noted, in fact from 32 for Railroad equipment to
over 2,000 for Chemicals.
1953-1976 are (in order)-
and least -
hldustries which have increased most in output
Index Index
Chemicals 2112 Miscell. food 705
Electrical roach. 1159 Jute, canvas etc. 695
Miscell. Industries 984 Ferti]lisers 638
Creameries 785 Hosiery 633
i,
Railroad equipment 32 Men’s, boy’s clothing Ii0
Leath(~r etc. 66 Sugar, chocolate etc. II0
NIiseell. eothing 105 Tobacco .116
Boot, shoes i05 Soap ef, c. 122
The "miscellaneous" headings in the earlier lietst probably include much of the
/
newly-created and more esoteric industries. One i~otices the contrast between
Hosiery with an index over 600 and the three clothing items which, in the 23
years, have barely held their own. The substantia/increases J.n output of
.%
Distilling ~d Malting were accompanied by disastrous fall in employment.
._.._______----- ....
Those comments on individual lndustires are not exhaustive: in this regard the
tables must speak for themselves, though some of the figures for particular
Industries are cited in Part 1.3.
Commenting on this point Kierm~ A. Kmmedy stated in a footnote to an Article vith
Tony Foley entitled Industrial Development. (Irish Economic Policy: A Review
of Major Issues 1978):-
In the case of distilling, however, there is some doubt as to whether
the loss of employment, and the rise in labour productivity, has been anything like
as great as the CIP figures indicate. Inquiries from the mai~l.dacturers suggest
that, while the number of workers located in the distilleries has been greatly
reduced, there has been, however, a large growth in numbers of "headquarters"
staff, dealing with such matters as marketing, fimmce, research, blending and
distribution. Irish Distillers Lhnited claim, in fact, that they now employ nearly
as m~’my as in the industry in 1953, and that all employment is directly or indirectly
related to distilling. Due to considerations of co~ffidentiality, it has not been
possible to ascertain from the CSO precisely how the CIP figure is derived.
But It is possible that in distilling a siFnH’icant number o[ service-type
workers are excluded, which In the gene.rality of Industries would (~)roporly)
be included in the manufacturing sector
- 15 -
Table 1.3 is perhaps the more informative as in it the time element
has been eliminated, i.e. in using mlnual average rates of change in output and
employment. As regards suffnnary output indexes, we note that the rates in
increase of production at 6-7 per cent in the’periods 1960-1966 m~d 1966-1973
are about double t]~e rate in 1953-1960 but had receded to less than 2 per cent in
the recession period 1973-1976. ¯ Regarding labour productivity (LP)rates as
given approximately by the difference between outpu~ told employment rates, in
l/le.four periods these rates were, In succession, 2.4, 3.5, 4.6 and 4.2. Tlle
fall in 1973-1976 compared with 1966-1973 is obviousiy due to the recession for,
.¯    ¯ ,       ° ~                °                                                                   ---h
as Kennedy (1969) has shown, LP increases with increasing output and vice versa
Prior to the recession there can be no doubt about tlle reality of the hlcrease in
the LP rate, associated with increased capital per {yorker within each industry,
as we show later, and possibly sl/ft in the composition of industry towards capital--
intensive processes. Improved industrial efficiency signalised by hmreash~g LP
is good for business at home and abroad but it is inhnical to employment at ].east
in the short-run, our major problem, unless accompanied by quantum output
increase at a greater rate than hitherto. This "conflict of interest" b’etween LP
%
and employment will appear in many forms throughout this st~idy.
There are 44 manufacturing industries listed in Table 1.3 so Umt 176
(--44 x 4) comparisons can be made between rates of increase in production ~md
employment. In 34. cases (or one-fifth of the 176) the a,~mal rate of increase in
employment exceeds that of production.
t
w     "IWe proceed with some econometrics applied to raLle I.S, the variables
numbered 1-8 as slmwn at the column heads, the variables being X with these
subscripts. First is the relationship between the rates of change ill employment
and production volume in the four time periods. (Note that we !~egard production
as indvar, i.e. as the cause of employment. ) ,
Gro~x~ch of Labour Productivity in Irish M~mufaeturing 1953-1907, Kieran A, ’Kemledy.
Journal of The Statistical And Social h~fitt_!XAi_Soc_~oLi~.a/!d. 196 8-69.
It could be argued that increased LP increases employment ral:her than l~.educes it, ,.
Insofar as if LP in industries did not Ira;tease in Irehmd then, in 1,he presence of
foreign competition, these jobs would bc simply wiped out. On a l’;]obal basi,; the
the argmnent re l he relatiorship between I,P and tu~pmDloymen{: is however ’:;trong’et’.¯¯
-16 -
.~,.,
Following are the regressions (t values in brackets):-
F ’
.1953-60: X5
64,6
1960-66: X6 21.5
¯ 1966 - 73: X7
10.0
1973 -- 76: X8 43.0
= -0.66 +0.54X1(1.7) (8.2)
= -1.05 + 0,62X_
(1.1) (4.7) z
= -1.12 + 0.43X_
(1,1) (3,2) ~
= -2,38 + 0.53X.
(3.3) (6.7) ¢
The c.c. s are:-
r 05) --. 78
r (2s)= .5s
r 07) = .44
r (48) =. 71
All relations are lflghly significant, r (37), the smallest, being near but below
the NHP =. 001 point. Note that the relationship is weaker in the two middle
periods of g~’eat industriitl progress than in the other two periods.
i
The most remarkable result is the persistance not only
!
of the form of the relationship, but the values of the coefficients and intercepts
in th’e very different economic conditions of the four periods. While the values
of the intercepts are not statistically significant in the two mlddIe periods their
¯ practical identity makes them so. The normal average rekttlonship thus emerges:
In mamtfacturlng industry in Irel,’md percentage increase In employment is haft
,
that in volume of production minus one. Of course there are many exceptions
to the rule, as Table 1.3 clearly shows, but enough truth }n it to make it a
criterion ia pl.’uming.
.- Applying the formulae, using the actual total percentage
increases in volume of production shown at foot of Table ]. ~ we find:
Actual and estimated annual average percentage increase in emolovment
Actual Estimated
% %
1953 -60 0,7 1,0
1960 - 66 2,5 2,7
1966 - 73 2,2 1,8
1973 - 76 -2.4 -1.4
At the same time this result emmet be used too literally. There can be little
doubt about the re~ity of the coafficient, of approrAmatety one-half. The intercept
Is ~mother matter: only the. latest is signffie.’mtly different from zero. At least
It seems reasonable to argue that the intercept is negative .-rod the persistanee of
the value -I during tl~e period 1960-1973 of industrial upsurge is our reason for
our tenL:ttive adopl.lon of It.
We do not know ff the value of about -2.4 for the period 1973-1976 is or Is
Ixot a feature o[ the 1-ecessi0a, or whether the rcgxdar increase (in absolute value)
Is an indication of trend: in 1976-1980,. say, will the Intercept be still greater
(in absolute value)? Such a trend wouhl, cetori___~s p:tribus, be against the n’ttiou’s
Interest as inimical to increased employment.
Our use, hereafter, of the formula will be interpreted in this spirit.
- 17 -                                     o
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Although the actxm!s are weighted averages and the regression -- esthnated
unweighted, the correspondence for the first three periods is quite good. As
regards tlte last, it would appear thai in a period of recession there has been
a tendency to shed more workpeople than might have been expected. :But the
evidence is slender. It could also have been due to structural eh~mge in
aebaality. Note, however, that the 1973-76 h~tereept is statistically highly
sigglfiem~t.                              .,
We also used Table 1.3 to examine whether during the
period shade 1953 there was a persistent tendency towards large or small
percentage increases in volume of proctuetion of industry, The relevant c.e, s
are as follows:
r ¢2) =. 40
r (2a) =. 52
.. r ¢a4) =. 48
For 42 d.f. all are significant at NI:IP = . 0l. An industry with a high (low)
percentage increase in output in one period is Likely to be f011owed by a high
(low) increase in the next: the maintenance of the relation in the recession will
be observed. Of course, as Table 1.3 itself shoves, there can be exceptions to
the rule. But these simple results justify the approach in the next section,
namely that systematic study of the trends of world foreign trade h~ the recent
past is likely to indicate the kind of commodities which wiI1 be in. demand in
future and which accordingly we should set about producing in quantity.
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2. ¯ Foreign Trade as an Aspect of Economic Adaptation
In relation, to GDP Ireland has on~ of the largest foreig’n trades in
tile world. Economic expansion depends on further la~’ge increases in exports told
It will be a long time, if ever, before thehnported materials reMfircd therefor.
home market is big, wealthy and efficient enough’for a rapid absorption of. our
!
Increased potential production, though the e~ansion of hnport susbstitution is /
ta valid policy in view of our labour s~12~l.us problem. . .
l
Oar approach here is strictly statistical based on Irish Externml
Trade Statistics and the UN Yearbook of Ia~ternational Trade Statistics, There are
two m,’dn approaches (i) direction of trade and (11) selection of commodities to trade
In, The device of international comparison is used, mainly with our IEEC partners,
some o.f whom are twice as prosperous as we are; we ilffer, if not in strict ¯logic tha
what we do, if differing from What they do, may be a cause of our lowly status and, /
/
to Improve, we should imitate them.                                                [
¯ We are so accustomed to Ireland’s geographically lop-sided foreign
trade that we tend to take it for granted. We cannot do so in any consideration of
national buying and selling efficiency to which the present paper is devoted.
Countries
In 1976 the visible import excess amounted to £478m (a doublin~ of
the £223 m of 1970, the period 1970-1976 spraining our entry-on 1 Jmmary 1973-
Into EEC). ]By main areas the 1976 figures are given ill Table 2. I.
~able 2.1 Trade of Ireland 1976 ~£mill[on)_
Area Tetal Imp or t S Imp err
exports balanee
¯ UK 906.5 1,153.3 246.8
Rest of EEC 502.2 469.1 -33 ~ 1.
Rest of World 448.7 713.3 264.6
Total 1,857.4 2,335.7 478.4
Source: External Trade December 1976 - Provisional Figures, CSO Ja.nuary 1977.
?
Though with a fall In relation to real value as re.ensured by import unit value which
nearly trebled (achmlly increased by 181 per cent) between 1970 and 1976.
¯ -19
Tile large visible import balance is a seribus economic
°y .............................. .
¯ problem and is getting worse: the 1976 figure is near double that of 3.975
¯ (£258 million), itself very large. The magnitude of the UK balance in 1976
is exceptional. This was partly due to imppr~ers sensibly
shifting purchases from other countries to UK under the impact of devaluation.
Obviously a large part of our problem of imbalance relates to our trade with non-
EEC countries.
The total imbalance of visibles is the reason for our chronic overall
import balance of trade,
sub stantially pc sitive.
since the export balance on current invisibles is ahvays
Table 2.2 Visible Trade of I~EC countries 1974: .~(~_billlol~n21!ort-.export ratios.
EEC Country Exports hnports Ratio
E M M,/E
Ireland 2.6 3.8 i. 452
UK 38.6 54. 1 i. 401
France 45. I 52.2 " i. 156
/3elgium-Lux. 28.3 29.7 i. 051
Netherlands 32.8 32.6 0.996
Germany, FR 90.6 70.2 0.775
Italy 30.3 40.9 1.353
Denmark 7.7 9.9 i. 279
Total EEC 276.0 293.4 i. 063
Source: UN Yearbook of Itaternational Trade Statistics 19__!_~74 Volume 1.
Ireland has the highest import/export ratio, followed closely
by UK (Table 2.2) Ireland is far and away the poorest country- in E:EC, with
o
Italy and UK next in order. We hesitate to infer a causal relation between
poverty and imbalance of trade; nor can it be dismissed. The three countries
mentioned stiffer from high unemployment and underproduction, Ireland
relatively worst in these regards, hnbalance of trade and poverty have a
common CaUSe, underproduction at home, and over-consumpt[ol} of hnports.
o.
//
i
Table2. ,3_ Visible trade of Ireland i21 1976 specifying" countries other than
t
EEC \vith total trade exceeding £10 million
£ million
Country Exports hnports hnport
excess
Australia
Au stria
Brazii
Cmmda
Finlm~d
I{ong Kong
Iran
Japan
Knwait
Nigeria
Norway
¯Polm~d
Portugal
Saudi Arabia
South Africa
Spain
¯Sweden
Switzerland
U.S.A.
U.S.S.R.
Other (except EEC)
r
17.8
6.1
0.8
21.0
5.0
2,0
9.5
23.6
2.4
17.0
10.1
5.8
6.9
4.4
5.5
12.7
21.9
11.6
129.0
1.8
133.8
3.5
6.6
9.5
29.7
21.7
8.4
38.7
51.5
19.5.
3.0
11.6
15.4
7.0
22,3
8.5
16.1
41.8
17.6
199.2
21.1
160.6
-14.2
0.4
8.6
8.7
16.6
6.4
29/1
28.0
17.1
-14.1
1.5
9.6
0. i
1’7.9
3.0
3.4
19.9
6.1
70.2
19.3
26.8
Total (except EEC) 448, 7 713.3 ¯ 26,i. 6
Source: s~qme as for Table 2. I.
¯ , °.
lqo~e
Countries are those explicitly mentioned in reference. There
may be others with trade exceeding £i0 million amongst "Other Countries" in
the refercne e.
Amongst the twenty countries specified in Table 2.3 we have an
export excess only with two. Since "Other’! has an import balance of only
£27 million (in a total of £265 million), clearly the solution to the problem of
improving the’non.-EEC balmme (if the word "improving" is.not begging a
question) i.s to be found amongst the countries specified.
We pause to remark that our attitude about this geographical imbalance
of Irish foreign trade is not chauvin~sticnorindeed, in any sense ofthe
word, political. It is quite po.ssible that, having regard to comparative
advantage m~d to buying in the cheapest, and selling in the dearest, markets,
.a considerable lack of balance could ensue, not inconsistent with an optimal
tradh~g situation. This may be.especially true of a small eom~try, We do
no~ think it is true of Ireland. Having regard to all the circumstances, tlie ¯
national economic strategy should be directed towards a substantial reduction
In the Import excess of each of these twenty countries for the very simple
reason that the chronic import excess in our overall current baL~tnoe of
payments (visible and invisible) is a constraint on economic development
and the best way to cope in principle is t6 increase exports to all countries.
Even at a a~tcrifice in price, within reason, should nor purchases be shlfted
from high deficit countries towards lower or no deficit cotmtries on the
pril~ciple thai: we ~hould p~-omote the interests of our customers?* No
country more than ireland should be in a stronger position, for claiming
most favoured nation treatment for its exports.
_.
’ a
¯ Amongst the-@wenty, three OPEC countries account for £6 .: million
(a substantial reduction on. the £83½ million of 1975) of the total non-EEC
Import bal~mce of £265 million, or 24 per cent. What efforts are Irish
exporters making to gain a foothold in these countries, now with vast resources
and wlth Ireland’s advantage of deva]uation? As we shall see, a good start
has been made. Even so, it is clear that a substantial reduction in the import
balance can be effected by energy conservation.
#
moan asking the t:u,q)ayer to subsidtse high-cost foreign l~l’odt|ccrs and therefm’e should
.he applied with discre{ion. If the pottcy is of doubtful vali.dity and di[ticuJ~ of i, mpt,.nncn-
* This raises the question of how such a policy could be implemented. It could finally
tatlon, It Is a good argmment for forcing defi.clency counl:ri0~ to 10try our exports,
Table2.4 Percen~e dtstributlon of foreign trade of Ireland other EEC countries, and certain other countr!es 1974
¯ 1 2I 3 i 4 EEC I Rest of5 6 7 8    9 I0 I! .OtherCountries (!-8)       V¢orldI
1. I~]md
2. United Kingdom
3. France
4. Belgium - Luxemboarg
"5. Netherlands
6. Germany, F-~
7¯ Italy
8. Denmark
9. usa
I0. Japan
11. Canada
EXPORTS
56.4    3.2     3.3    4.1    5.9    1.6    0.3    I0.0    0.8 I.~ 13.8 74.8 25.2
5.0 - 5.5
,-
4.9 5.9 6¯0 3.1 2.6 10.6 1.9 2.9 51.6 33.0 67.0
0¯4 6.6
- 11.5 5.4 17.5 11.8 0.7 5.0 1.0 0.9 39.2 53.9 46.1
0.3 5.4 20,1
- 17.2 21.5 4.5 l¯l 5.6 0.5 0.8 23.0 70.1 29.9
0.4 7.9 I0.i 14.5 - 32.6 6.0 1.6 3¯5 0.6 0.4 22.4 73.1 26.9
0.3 4.8 11.9 7.6 10.2 - 8.1 2.0 7.5 1.4 0.8 45.4 44.9 55.1
0.2 5.2 12.6 3.4 4.5 18.5 - 0.7 7¯6 i.I 1.0 45.2 45.1 54.9
0.4 17.1 3.4 1.6 3.1 12.7 4.3 - 5.8 1.0 1.2 46.7 45.3 54.7 ¯
0.2 4.6 3.0 2.3 4.0 5.1 2.8 0.4 - 10.8 20,2 46.6 22.4 77.6
0.0 2.8 1¯3 0.9 1.9 2.7 0.8 0.4 23.3 - 2.9 63.0 10.8 89.2
0. i 5.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1¯7 1.4 0.i 66.5 6.9 - -     14.1 i2.5 87.5
I~[PORTS
I. Ireland 46.6 5.4     2.2    3.4 7.7 6.5 1.5     22.4 68.3 31.7
2. United Kingdom
3. France
4. Belgium - Luxembourg
5. Netherlands
6. Germany, FE
7. Italy
8. Denmark
9. USA
I0. Japan
11. Canada
Total value of imports from
rest of world ($ billion)
- 2.1 0.9 1.3
3.5 ’- 5¯7 2.8 6.9 8.1 3.1 2.5 9.5 2.4 4.1
0.2 4.3 - 10.3 5.7 19.5 7.6 0.5 7.8 1.8 1.0 1
0.2 5.7 17.4 - 16.3 22.4 3.8 0.5 6.5 0.9 1.2
0.2 5.2 8.1 14.1 - 28.1 3.5 0.8 9.0 "1.3 0.7
0.2 3.3 11.8 8.9" 14.2 - /8.4 1.4 7.8 2.0 I.I
0.i 3.0 13.2 3.3 4.3 17¯8 - 0.8 7.7 I.I 1¯4
0.I 9.8 4.0 3.8 6.3 19.5 2.8 - 6.4 0.4 2.8
0.2 4.0 2¯3 1.7 1.4 6.4 2.6 0.5 - 12.4 22.1
0,0 1.4 1.0 0.4 0.4 2.3 0.7 0.2 20.4 - 4,3
0.I 3.6 1.2 0.5 0.5 2.4 1,0 0.3 67.4 4.5 -
51.4 32.6 67.4
41.3 49.1 50.9
21.3 70.1 29.9
29.0 60.0 40.0
40.9 48.2 51.8
47.3 42.5 57.5
46.1 44.3 ~ 55.7
46.5 19.i 80.9
68.9 7.4 93.G
18.5 9.6 90.4
\.
3.8 54.1 52.2 29.7 32.6 70.2 40.9 9.9     107.1 62.1 32.3     350.5 293.4 552.0
Basic Sources: Ireland: TSi; other countries: UNYITS, Vol. I, 1974.
Note: The Y in the regression (formula (I) in the text) are the 56 percentages in rows 2-8 and columns 1-8 and last colurmn of the exports
section of the table;
°.
¯
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Governnlent can scarcely be blamed for failure to promote
exporK~ Export policy is tripartisan. In fact, a considerable measure of
success has attended this policy, as we shall see. Exports are encouraged
by ~ remission, a substantial contribution by IDA, particularly
for foreign companies export-orlented, Coras Trachtala is a state organisation
designed to assist exporters in every conceivable way and the Irish diplomatic
service should find a large part of its justification in promoting ex~ports. The
question must be posed blm]tly: are Irisl\~industrialists active enough in promoting
sales in foreign markets ? Are they producing enough of the right goods ?
I
EEC norms ?
Wha~ should Ireland’s geographical tradh~g parietal be lille, on
To begin the search for an answer, see Table 2.. 4, in which
percentage distributions of foreign trade are shown for Ireland.
¯ °
other EEC com~trie’s, and three other important countries (1974:).
.t
(Table 2.4)
Of the eleven, the only country resembling Ireland in its concentration
of foreign trade on a single country is Canada, two-thirds of the trade of which
d.
is with the U°~k, natural enough when one considers the size of the US market
and the length of the land boundary between the two countries. None of the other
countries show anythfllg like Ireland’s one-half of both exports and imports to and
from the UI(. (It may be remarked that of Denmark’s 55 per cent o£ exports to non-
EEC, 25 per cent is to Scandinavia; with imports the percentages are 56 and 22. )
¯ . ,0
¯
:. °.
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i~ereenkagewise Ireland’s foreign trade has changed between
¯ 1970 and 1975-1976 as follows:-
E~j2orts Pert entag.e Shares ~_~l~orts
1970. 1975 1976 1970 1975 1976
m.--,----
United I~ingdom 65.8 54.2 48.4 53.5 48.7 49.4
Rest of EEC 11.7 25.2 27.4 17.8 20.4 20.1
Rest of world 22.4 20.6 24.2 28.7 30.9 30.5
Contrary to what had been anticipated, Ireland has done more "flooding" of
EEC (ex UK) markets than vice versa, exports increasing from 12 per cent
to 27 per cent of. the total in the six years mainly by tr/msfer from UK.
Comparatively, the geographical pattern of imporLs has changed little.
¯
.                     ¯
To answer our question of some paragraphs ago, what Irelm~d’s
geographical trading pattern should be like, we have set up a regression as follows:-
Y = percentage in 1974 exports towards other EEC countries and
2.~\Rest of the world for all EEC except Ireland; (See Note to Table’ ~..
’ X1 = total imports in 1974 in $ billion;
X2 =dummy: contiguous - 1, other EEC 0, I~est of world 1.
5[~e data for Y and X1 are given in Table 2.4.With Luxembourg and Belgium
as a nni£, the number of sets of observations is 56 (=ri). The hypothesis
involved in the regression is obvious: percentage exports towards any
Country should depend on total’imports into that country and should be the
larger eeteris paribus the gre’ater the contiguity, i.e.. the "shorter the distance".
The reg~:ession is :- .
_     X2 R2.(i) Y = 1.1047 4- 0. 1011 X1 8.6406 + e =. 85
Using this formula (omitting ei for IreIand expected percentages compare with actv.al
/
as shown In "fable 2, 5.
Table 2.5 Irela~ld’s perce~~or~s t~o other EEC countries and ]test of
w_or].d_z expected. (as calculated and adjus(:ed) and achlal., 1973
Country
Calculated
Actual
Original Adj us ted
1 2 3 4
United Kingdom
France
Belgium- Luxembourg
Nethel:imlds
Germany, FR
Italy
Denmark
¯ 15.2 16.3 56.4
6.4 6.9 3.2
4.1 4.5 3.3
4.4 4.8 4.1
8.2 8.8 5.¯9
5.2 5.6 1.6
1.0 i.i 0.3
Total EEC (ex UK)
Rest of world
29.3 31.7 18.4
48.3 52.0 25.2
Total 92.8 I00.0 I00.0
.Notes: Col. 2: by substitution of Irish values for X1 and X2 in formula (I).
Col.2 and adjusted to add to 100.
actual (derived from UNYITS).
!
Tlmt the calculated (fable 2.5) percentages add to as close to
100 as 92.8 is satisfactory, so that the fomnal proportionate adjustment to
total 100 does not make much change in the originals. Contrasting Cols.
3 and 4, the great change-over would be from UK to ]:test of world. Each
of the other EEC countries would take a_u increased percentage,
gate increasing from 21 to .32.
i
the aggre-
(Table 2.6)
I
Table..~..6 in which certain important zones are disth~guished,
sho~vs a marked improvement in cql[alisation in the visible trading situation
of Ireiand in the last two years, as indicated by the ratio R: if there was a
slight recession in the All Countries ratio for 1976, for the hvo years 1975-
1976 the figure was 0. 825 sig~fificantlyhigher than the figures for 1970 and
.!
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Table 2.6 Total cx_Dorts, imports and ratio, Ireland 1970 and 1974--1976
E = Tolal cxpor{:s; hf = hnpol~t:s; R_-- E/M. (Values in ~m[.
Area
United Kingdom:
Other EEC:
USA- Canada:
E
M
R
E
M
R
E
M
R
.Japan: E
’ M
. :
]~
4 OPEC*: E
R
1970
283.9
349.6
0.81
50.6
:115, 9
0.44
49.6:
56.2
0.88
zi.O.
1971     1975 ] 1976
634.2 781.3 906.4
758.2 828.2 1,153.3
0.84 0.94 0.79
206.5 363.1 502.2
352.6 347.0 469.1
0.59 1.05 1.07
119.1 104.6 149.9
129.9 14:0.1 228.9
0.92 0.75 0.65
9.5 9.1 23.6
¯ 21.7 29.9 51.5
0.44 0.30 0.46
3.7 8.8 23.2
86.1 92.5 86.3
0. Q4 0.I0 0.27
151.0 174.5 252.0
278.3 261.9 346.6
O. 54 O. 67 O. 73
6.4
0.63
0.7
20.5¯
0. O3
Other countries:
All countries:
E
Ni
R
E
M
R
42.4
105;1
¯ 0.40
431,2
6 53..7:
0.66
I, 124.0 i, 441.4 I, 857.4
I, 626.8 I, 699.6 2, 335.7
0.69 0.85 ,0,80
Basic Source: Trade Statistics of Ireland.
*Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia.
1974. In 1975 and 1976 trade was favourable with Othdr EEC, the ratio
having more than doubled since 1970, Themarked fall in 1976 in the most
important ratio of all, that for UK, leaves the joint 1975-1976 situation slightly
better than the figures for 19"70 and 1974. For USA-Canada the near-equality.
of 1970 has receded to two-thirds hi 1976.
declined in 1975 recovered in 1976.
The Japanese ratio, having
¯ Perhaps the most intriguing showing is that for OPEC where the ratio
increased ninefold in six years, though the import excess amounted to £63
million in 1976, Compared with £20 million in 1970.
¯ i
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¯The rapid increase in the ratio for Other countries from 0.40
to 0.73 in the six years holds the promise of near equality (R = 1) in a
further short term of years¯ What is really encouraging about the showing
of Table 2.6 is the magi]itude of export aclfievement even in the years of deZ
pression 1974-1976 and malting due allowance for inflation° However, the
nation catmot continue to cope with the 1976 import excess of. nearly £500 milJTon.
Are we not: livfl~g beyond the standard to which our skills, flldustry
stud nktural resources entitle us?
What this analysis so far has shown is that goods acceptable
as exports are produced and marketing skill to sell them is already available
in large quantity: all that is needed is hnprovement.
Emphasis so far has been almost exclusively on exports, to
improve our economic situation. Import substitution is not less b~portant,
especially under the wide-rm]gfng condition of free trade witl]in EEC. It
!
goes without saying that reduction of imports (below what these wotdd other-
wise be) will also increase the export-import ratio.
..:
Actual and’ Expected Exports
The question arises: from the purely geographical point of
view (i.e. disregarding commodity distribution), have Ireland’s exports
been as large as they should have been in recent years? To answer, we
o
consider the two separate years 1970 and 1974. In 1970 there were 16 countries
to which Ireland exported more than £i million. Exports to these comatries’
amounted respectively to £391 million and £1,021 million, ratio 2.61. The
£/$ exchange rate in 1974 (1970 as 1) was 0.9798, so that in $ terms the
ratio was 2.56. But if Irish exports 1o thes4 16 countries was exactly
proportional to their $ total import ratios, the ratio ("expected") would
¯ ¯
have been 2.50, so that actual/expected was 1. 024.
e
Reversing the
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calc[flation, i.e. with 1.974 as base (i.e. using tile 26 countries wi.~h exports
from I~eland,exceeding £2 million) a.ctual/expected is I., 00. \Ve conclude
that beIaveen 19’10 and 1974: Irish expor~s closely kept pace with imports of
the cotmLries to which we exported.
Comm edifies
Characteristic of primitive economies is a large ex~ort
of one or two unprocessed commodities to pay for most other non-food
.requirements, as imports; this means a vast disparity commodity-wise
In the patternsof exports and i~nports. At tile other extreme, that of an
advanced economy, a certain similarity in patterns of exports m~d imports
Is to be expeotecl, thotigh with some commodity groups favoured in accordance
with the principle of comparative advantage. Lowering or abolition or"
tariffs (m particular within EEC) should accentuate such sh-ni.larity, ~{dvaneed
economies make nearly everything except certain primary products, for some
of which indeed they are finding mmmfactured substitutes. USA might seem
an exception to the foregoing generaHsation in view of its large export of
grain: exports of "cereals. and preparations"- 04. in SITC - were valued
q
In 1973 at $8½ billion, or 12 per cent of total exports; it must always be
recalled that the foreign trade of USA, though the largest in absolute world
magnitude is but a small fraction in relation to its GDP, in marked contrast
to most other adx,aneed eeonom.ies.
....-
\
At the beghming of a search for commodities of which Ireland
might produce more (~or export or for import substitution) we theref6re
assign a role to tile current value ratio of. imports to exports. I-las diversity.
g
(1. e. in the ratio" as between different groups of commodities~ changed
appree!abIy in recent years ? In Table 2.7 we compare the ratios in 1970.
i
* The US foreign trade performance is exceptional in many ways. For example,
according to the Central Bank calculations in their second quorter 1977 Bulletin
the United States had by tar the slowest rate of increase in unit
wage costs (adjusted for exchange race variations) o~" all developed countries
over the period 1970-1977. If unit wage costs were that criLicaia feature
of competitiveness, the present huge U.S. trade deficit would be uncxplah]abte
in theory.
Table 2.7 Ratio of values of imports to exports, h’eland 1970, 1975 and 1976
for one-du~,it aiYd certain two-di~f[~Sl’l’C con~modity groups
SITC commodity group
00 - Live animals
01 - Meat and preparations
O’O’O02 - Dairy products e~,~,
R0- 12est of group 0
’ 0-Food and live animals
1 - Beverages, tobacco
2- Raw materials, ex. fuel
3 - Mineral fuels etc.
.4-Animal, reg. oils, fats
5- Chemicals
65 - Textile yarns, fabrics etc.
66-69 Metals, non-metals and manufacturers
126 - Rest of group 6
6 - Manufactured goods
71 - Machinery (non-elect.)
72- Elect. roach., goods etc.
73- Transport equipment
7 - Mach. and trans, equipment
8 - Mmmfactures, n.e.s.
9 - Parcel post and special transactions
Ratio
1970 1975 1976
0.362 0.114
O. 005 O. 017
O. 011 O. 045
1.652 1.313
0.413 0.297
0.671 1.131
1. 205 1. 052
5. 118 12. 764
1.776 1.527
3. 194 1. 773
I. 765 I. 225
3. 327 2.17 9
2.328 1.605
2.391 1.651
5.600 2.530
2.603 2.203
10. 048 3. 582
5.574 2.600
1.156 1.123
1. 468 0. 741
0,163
0.024
o. 644
1.195
0.343
0. 961
1,407
25.366
1.558
1.536
1.136
2.326
1. 657
1.655
2. 148
1.776
4.227
2,340
1.184
0.776
Total trade 1. 516 ¯ 1. 179 .. 1. 258
]Basic source: TSI
¯
. Notes
Exports are total, i.e., they include re-exports. R before a single digit means "rest
of group". Group 7 contah~s only the two-digit heads cited.
S
.°
I
¯ J . ¯
,o.
¯°
°...
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1975 and 1976 at tim. one-degit SITC level generally but with a few impqrL~nt
..
two-digit ratios as well.
I
(Table 2.7)
F~
F
F:
[:
At the high level of aggregation represented in Tab].e 2o 7 it
Is not to be inferred that the group content of imports and e~q~orts is the
same,- as regards the detailed commodity descriptions, Thus group G5,
consisting of textile yarn and fabrics may have differ#nt proportions of
yarn and fabrics in imports and exports. Clearly, the greater the refinement
in commodity detail the greater the disparity h~ the ratio.
Table 2.:7 scarcely needs any statistical finesse to make
the point that there has occurred a large reduction in import-cAvort disparity
since 1970. Of course group 3 - mineral fuels ete - is an obvious exception
and we notice that group 1 - beverages, tobacco -in 1970 with a marked
cxloort advanLnge has now moved to near equality. The large reductions in
the ratios for groups 5, 66-69, 71 and 73 (all with a high degree of manufacture)
will be noted.
"" Heads 00 - live animals - and 01 -- meat and meat prcparations~-
may be considered from a different ~’mgle. In 1970 the ratio in value of exports
of 01 to 00 was 1.32, in 1976 the ratio was 2.23, a trend greatly to be welcomed.
r i We shall suggest later that there is further scope for development in. the meat
trade 6vhlle maintaining the very valuable live cattle trade), thus creating
employment, the country’s direst need.
It may well be that this tendency towards import-export
ratlo balance in advanced economies depends on the size of the country; so,
In Table 2.8, comparis6n is confined to the four smaller countries of EEC,
(wlth Bclgium-Luxembourg as one trading trait) at the SITC unlt-digit level
Table 2.8 Imt___)ort-ex~ort ratios for t%eI[ium-Luxembourg’, Denmark, Ireland,. Netherlands
at SITC sin~le-d___~i~!tcon_~modi_,~X leycl,~ 1973; ratios for total t_x’.adc~] 970-197:~
FI
SITC commodity group
, 
0 Food and live animals
1 Beverages and tobacco
2 Crude mats. excl. fueis
3 Mineral fuels etc.
4 Animal, reg. oils, rats
5 Chemicals
6 Basic manufactures
7 Machines, transport equipment
8 Misc. manufactures
Total (fi~el.. SITC 9) 1973
~Belg.--
Lux, ~ ......
1.228
2. 098
2.577
2. 974
1.717
Denmark    Ireland
0.336
i. 395
1.318
6.217
O. 422
Netherlands
0.337 0.608
1. 070 1. 069
1.531 1.310
11.818 1.008
1. 908 1. 018
2.102 0.561
1.728 1.151
3.590 1.259
I. 192 I. 500
0,718 1.838
0,586 3.016
1. 241 1. 355
1. 001 1,033
0. 979 1. 297 11311    0.970
" 1972 0,972 1. 166
I, 1971 1. 038 1. 272.
" 1970 0. 979 1.335
1. 305 0. 994
1. 403 1. 071
¯ 1.515 . .1.138
t
p
(.J
i
i.:l
L, ."
(’~ ..,.j
7
 ,iLJ
Basic Source: UN Yearbook of h~ternational Trade Statistics 1974, Volume I
Notes
At column heads (S) is special trade (i.e., excluding ~e-exports), (G~ is general trade ,
Ratios for SITC commodity group 9 (nGoods not classified by kind") are omitted as lacking
significance. Ratios for group 3 may not be comparable - see text.
¯ °
°..
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of commodity aggregatiol}. The nearer the ratio to unity the lower the disparity.
’" (Table 2.8)
We are not adopting a mercantilist attitude ("to e~l~ort
is good, to import bad") in regard to Table 2.8 or anywhere’ else in this
chapter oll foreigu trade. We simply wish to show that countries twice
as prosperous as Ireland. (on a dollar GNP per head basis) have a more
bat~-meed trade than we have. It is to be expected that the advanced
E
¯ economy is big in every activity, industrial, trading (including foreign
entrepAot trade, i. e. re-exports)and other services. To repeat, we use
this ratio¯ approach to indieate the lines in which we might be engaged
to. a greater extent than we are, by comparison with more advanced
economies than ours.
In regard to Ireland’s))ersisting problem of the aggrag~’¢te
[
import balance of trade, i.e. the increase in foreign indebtedness,
we note from Table 2.8 that in all four ..
yeaA’s slio%~al the total (visible trade) Irish ratio is greatest of the four,
though sometimes (a~Id significantly) approached by that for Denmark.
!
Clearly a valid ~im of Irish economic po]icy would be to bring the ratio
nearer to unit)., as in the case of Belgium - Luxembourg and Netherlands. )There :
’are certain similarities in the ratio systems of Denmark and Ireland: the group
P
0 figures are identical, the group 3’s are far larger than for the other two countries
’.                                                      . ,
t , ’.
and, as alreacty remarked, the total ratios are not very different.
As to diversity we have made thefollowh~g unweighted calculations
from the group ratios of Table 2.8 (omitting group 3 - for reason see later):-
Belg.- Nether-
Lux.    Denmark Irelmld lands
Mean 1.40 1.34 1.68 1.06
Standard dev. 0.69 0.85 0.95 0.33
¯
The exact opposite is nearer the truth.
to obtain the imports we need.
Exporting is the sacrifice we make’
"l’hc mean irish excess of imports and lhe disparit), behveen groups (indicoled by lhe
standard devlation) are largest in the case o£ Ireland; had we included group 3 ralios in
the calculations the contrasts (between Ireland and lhe others) would have been much 9realer,
Petroleum
: The outstandh~g ratio for Ireland in Tabl e 2.8 is that of 12 for
’ t
group 3, of which the principal constituent is, of course, petroleum. The
’magl~itude~ of the rati’o depends on the treatment of this product i~. Irish for.eig~
trade statistics which, as we have noted, are compiled on the p/_q!~eral
p r.h~eiple, i.e., exports include re-exports. We understand that, however,
the trade in crude petroleum if[rough Whiddy Island is treated in a special way.
Imstead of formally including the values for both imports and exports of
¯ petroleum gl~oss, only a single net fig~tre is included in exports for value
j i
added "(cost of loading, unloading, wareh.ousing, depreciation,, etc.)at Whiddy.
Very reasonably the view is taken that formal gross treatment would impart
avast distortion not only to the single item but even to total trade. But this
i
treatment may render comparability (of absolute figures for value of imports,
exports or their ratio for petroleum or any item includh~g petroleum)with
9thor cotmtries invalid. Despite these statistical difficulties there seems to
be prhna faeie a ease for the large development of petroleum product industries
.............. in .Ireland, sa that the figures, .such as they are, must be looked at a little "
further.
. . ’ .......................................
. ¯    ,
It seems obvious that the probiem of increasing the processing
of petroleum in Ireland should be examined as a matter of urgency. Availability
of crude in unlimited supply at Whiddy must be an advantage. We are aware
that petroleum industries arc highly capital-intensive and, as such., are not
to be faizoured in view of our chronic condition of surplus labour supply. We
suggest that this is a case in which purely economic considerations must prevail
over the social in view of the magmitude of the sums involved. Clearly the ar~ment Par
a petrolum industry woutd be strengthened by the discovery of n.a~ive supplies.
Motor Vehicles
We call attention also to the Table 2.8 group 7 raiiiof0r Ireland
of 3.59, some three times as large as for the other countries, even Denmark.
Its Irtsh Adaptation Committee’s forecast for the Irish motor assembly i ndtis’try
was gloomy to the poti~t of suggesting that it lnight have no future at all. ¯ ,
t
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ttappily this prospect has been negatived to some extent, h’[odern, motox: works
everb~vhere are all assemblies on a vast scale: -we read of some having as
many as a hth~dred sub-contracts. So we suggest a policy of encouragement
with a view to a marked increase in the motor vehicle industry, or some
specialised sections thereof: if we emmet be a major world manufacturer (of
motor vdfieles or anythh~g else), why should we not be sub-contractors for
bits and pieces ? Later we shall find evidence of the astonishfilgly large part
the motor h~dustry plays in world trade. To thrive we must have some dlare in
heavy industry.
Individual Commodity Ex])orts
We pause to remark that in this paper we have no pretension to
0
examining Ireland’s foreigm trade even as regards statistics, but only to seek
some guidelines as to our "future foreign.trade policy. In this section we consider
possible expansion of exports. This we do simply by comparing the current
value or h-ish commodity exports (using the SITC at different
levels) with world and EEC imports similarly classified.. We seek policy only,
not detail, and raise questions rather than try to provide answers. Even the
most deta’iled (i. e. the five-digit) SITC will not be precise enough
for an interested possible exporter who must do market.surveys to discover
precise varieties demanded and countries of import.
DO we try to expand in commodities in which exports are.. ahTeady
large (i. e, almost certainly in accordance with the principle of comparative
q
advantage), or do we develop in export lines at present small but for which
world demand is large or increasing ? Policy must favour the
former, as the less risky. With the former there may be natural advantageh (our
matctfless grasslands for livestock and livestock products and recentdiscovery
}ii1
.of minerals existing tmused capital structure and expert labouy:’ (so that any
" increase in exports may be marginal production at low cost), and marketing
expertise, But change is ¯of the essence of eeonomte development~ policy must
¯ , q ,
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have regard to ch.anges in demand even foz/ our traditional products and to
changes in methods of production and marke.ting. Ireland is perhaps
for~.unate in its speeialisatior} in agricultural products in which demand has
altered less than in other producl.s; but great change has occurred in production
methods with which we must keep abreast even to hold our markets, Irehfnd is
less forttmate in the prospect of increased exports of its traditi.onal, products in
that the income elasticity of demand for these products Ks generally less than
tinily, in marked contrast to other and to new products. Sopo[iey and plmming
must take account of al_! products in current and probable future wo{’ld demand.
Is1 this eomaection, it is encouraging to think that we now exporI: commodities we
hardly Imew existed (or did not exist at all) even at .the beginnin.g of the industrial
upsurge (ca. 1960). Most of these new exports may be due to foreigaa firms
towards whom we have no chauvinistic objection but whom we shall like even
!
better when they use more Irish materials instead of imports, retain more of
their Irish profits for devel0pment in Ireland and train more Irish .cit[zel~.s
In production and marketing. "’
Besides agric[~itural products,texiiies and (Lo a certain extent)
.-
clothing are traditional Irish exports. In our efforts to join our EEC partners
as an advanced economy should we not reconsider our policy in regard to these ?
All countries have an interest in t.he economic development of the so-called

"developing eom~tries’" (but developing too slowly, except in OPEC), not merely
on humanitarian grounds butbecause,¯ better-off, they wili be more lucrative
markets for our produce, Now, developing countries (as Ireland did) probably
start with light, or merely assembly industries, low in capital and high in manpower,
unskilled or semiskilled, textiles in particular. Should policy not consider a
gradual drift away from such products e.xcept by the most efficient firms, e,g., in
woollen textiles produced entirely from Irish wool, or by specialist brands. While
%
wages will certainly rise considerably in developing countries (and it is to our
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.advantage in the long run that they should), for some time to come they can
undercut us in price in these typical "beginners’ products", Do we let them
and leave for other fields ?
In i973, regarded as a boom year in Ireland, world imports
amolmted {o $588.4 billion* and Irish exports to $2,131 million or O. 36 pc{-
cent of the world total. For the market economies, with which we shall be
exclusively concerned, imports were $526.3 billion, of which Irish exports were
$ 2, 09~. million or 0.40 per cent. EEC imports (including those of Ireland) were
$214.6 billion , of which Irish exports were $1,620 million or 0,75 per cent. Irish
exports to U.I~. amounted to $1,166 million or 3.00 per cent of U.K. imports.
These Irish exporl: percentages will be borne in mind in assessing commodity
balances. Ireland is a small country which, by past standards, has recently
done well with its exports. Still, these mh~ute percentages show that there is
-.
)
t
vast scope for further improvement.
p
E.___~,.2ports Of .~’ood and Live Animals "
-
In Table 2.9 we show Irish exports as a percentage of total imports
into (i) all market economies, (H) EEC (iii) U.K. for certain SITC three-digit
commodities in group¯ O-Food and Hve animals, which, as deriving from
agriculture: would appear to afford the greatest potential, for export expansion.
Experts regard Ireland as capable of considerably increasing its
qumltum output of agriculture and elsewhere ¯ we arg~m that a large increase in
agricultural output will be necessary to stem the flow of wonkersfrom agriculture, which
flow exacerbates the problem of the non-agricultural unemployment. Without
such increase in agricultural output, anything like full employment will be
* Except as otherwise indicated, all basic figures quoted are derived from UNYITS 1974
** An__AAA1jalysis Of Recent: Policies For Beef And MHk. Robert O’Connor, Journal
Of The Statistical And Social Inquiry Society of Ireland 1969-70.
¯ 1R, C. Geary. and M. Dempsey. "Relief of Unemployment in Ireland" ESRI
Broadsheet Series No. 14, 1977.
, ,°             .
¯ i
Table 2..9:Irish exports and (i) world market ¯economy, (li) EEC and (ill) U.K. Imports of certain commodities in SITC group O with percentages for Ireland, 1973
001
SITC No. and Commodity
" Live animals
011" Meat, fresh, chilled, frozen
012-Meat, dry, salted, smoked
018 " Meal tL’med nes or prepared .
022- Milk, cream
028 - Butter
024- Cheese, curd
025 " Eggs
031" Fish, fresh, simply prepared
032- Fish, etc. tip_ned, prepared
041 - Wheat, tmmilled
0.<3- Barley, unmilled
045 - Cereals nes unmilled
048 - Cereal etc. preparations
051 - Fruit, fresh, nuts fresh dry
082 -
053 "
054-
055 "
05! -
Dried fruit
Fruit preserved, prepared,
Veg. etc. fresh, simply prepared
Veg, etc. premrved, txepared
Sugar, honey
062 - Sugar preps., non-chocolate
073 - Chocolate and products
081 Animal feedLng stuff ¯
091- MargarLne, shortening
099 - Food preparations nes
x i971~ + 1972
Basic Source: UNYITS 1974, Volume II
NOTES
Imports ($ mi!Hon)
8,008 1,874 197
8,014 4,701 940
596 509 465
1,515 700 849
969 x 626 88
891 631
1,342 916
442 271
8,978 I, 007
I, 086 477
+
2,758 I, 503
96.5 .532
883 231
I, 051 409
4,782 2,684
429 234
1,671 1,017
3,223 1,933
1,287 .784
4,200 944
386
152
26
143
181
414
29
21
38
5OO
103
319
333
127
416
308 139 12
469 29! 46
4,581 2,920 378
223 127 74
733 276 ’ 46
irish exports per cent
imports of -
V/orld
I imkt. ec.
EEC
6.9 10.6
3.5 4.4
5,0 5.2
1.2 2.2
x
2.7 4.5
8.7 6.7
3.2 4.7
0.0
0.6
0. I
0.6
0.0
1.1
nq
LO"
L8
nq
0.0
°..
0.2
0.4
0.4
0. I
1.6 2,,6
6.9 ’ 10.3
0.6 0.8
0. I
1.8¯ 2.4
nq
nq
nq"
nq
nq
nq
,, r orderWorld e, po_t
ireland
I Denmark
1i
5
¯
1
2
8
ITK
8L 2 3
10.4 9
5. 7 .2
4.4 13
47. 0 7
12. 1 " 8
27. 5 8
. ]2r
nr
nr"
llr
1% 7 15
n/
18. I 12
nr
Dr
nr
Ilr
1% 3 13
65. 3 5
5. 7 , 22
14. ! 12
5
4
8
4
9-
12
7
17
I0
nr
nr
nr
nr
7
15
8
9
8
nq: not ~aoted in basle so~ce amongst some 60 market economy countries
.~: not ranked, L e., not Ln first 22 in value of exports in 1973 amongst m~ket economy ccmnmies
Several items in the SITC group O are omined because there seems to be no prospect of Ireland’s ever achieving an expe~ (or e’,’en re-exp~t) =ado in ~hern.
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Impossible of achievement without emigration on a large scale. These general
reiuarks are a background for what follows. "’
’90 repeat, our approach in this section is £o identify the commodity
groups in which we might increase our exports by having regard to the magnitude
’                    (
of imports of the world, EEC told UIf groups, in relation to Irehmd’s recent exports.
hi Table 2.9 ou{~ basic source will be seen to be the UNYITS. While we could¯ have
obtained actual entries for positions marked "iq" and "nr" in the table from TSI,
actuall~ the symbols are bettor suited to our purpose: it is  ough to k,~ow that
the aetna! values so marked were small in i973.
That our great traditional eAqoort, of live animals (001) constituted
in 1973 only 7 per cent of world imports will come as a surprise, as will the fact
that the two countries with larger exports are Frm~ce told Germany FR, two of
the most adwmced economies: other leaders in this exq)ort are like a roster of
the wealthiest economies since, following IreL~md we find USA, Netherlands,
13elghun
, 
U.K. a/]d Cmlada. ]hi fact, Ireland has a].ways rather deprecated its
great e)q~ort of live cattle as wasteful of home employment: the view take/1 was
that the animals should be converted into beef before export.
At the same time, on the world pattern, the increase in meat
exports (011) should be vastly greater thm~ the export of live cattle. We note
’that the market economy world import was, in 1973, a magnificant one of $8 billion
~md, with increasing world prosperity, is certain to increase in real terms~ We
notice that in world imports the ratio of meat imports (011 + 012 + 013) tO live
One of us recalled that at a trade conference he heard a UK official rather-over-
frm~kly remark "The only thing we wm~t from Ireland is its store cattle". Long
may it remain so, m~d the world to thinl~ likewise’ We must foster th.[s export
which probably leads for Irclm~d as that in which we have the greaLcst comparative
(i. e., natural) advantage. Th.ough the profit per acre is lower than for other
agricultural products at present, this may not be the case with improvement of
grasslm~d to carry more cattle.
.animal imports (001) was 3.4.
o
1.6. It is suggcstcd,, thercfore,
t
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The eorrespondi6g ratio for Irish exports was
that policy should be directed towards a gn’eat
expansion of meat exloorts, ,while at least maintaining live eal;tle exports.
¯ Comparisons with Demnark are traditional in Ireland, of world
rankings compared to Ireland’s. We show up yery well in dairy products (022,
023, 024). Demnark appears in the rankfi~g, however, oftener and usually
higher than we do.
. .
¯ . Sadly we recall the eminent Irish statesmm~’s asservation that
"we shal! .dro~l the British in eggs" ha looking at tl~e entries for item 025. Its
world market is now small and UK’s import negligi.ble; still, it is hard to
understand the difference between Denmark’s export in 1973 of $11 million m~d
Ireland’s $0] 2 million.
Ireland’s showing in the two fish headings 031 and 032 is
unimpressi:ve, considering that length of eoastlhle is one of the few eharaeteristies
in which we loom large in EEC. One of t/s has recently written to the press
asking whether a policy of using Ireland’s magnificent geographical position as
an entrep~t for seafish caught by trawlers of all nations in the North Atlantic
(for re-export raw or export prepared), would not be vastly preferable, from
the employment viewpoint, to the favoured policy of trawler expansion which
(ineluding also concomitant fishery protection) is so undesirably capital-intensive.
Geary would like to add that it now appears that the North Atlantic is over-fished
and that a prior policy, eonsistent with any longer-term policy for Irish sea
fishing, would be conservation, with. the aid of the navies of ail our EEC partners.
Exports by Denmark (also with a long coastline but not nearly as long as Ireland’s)
under the two heads (which, by the way, include inland as well as seafish) was
$264 million, exactly ten times Ireland’s.
We intervene to repeat that, in regard to fish or anything else
mentioned, we do not advocate particular policies but we present, in a reasonably
~ystematie way, based only on foreign tk’ade statistics, aspects wMch may be
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helpful in the determination of~prudent policies, in particular to ensure
thatnone will be overlooked, even if somewl{at outrc~ as a possibility to start
with° To repeat, we must be on the qu! rive for change in a rapidly changing
we.rld, as regards products, me.thetis of production and direction of trade.
EEC and UK
As regards the fruit and vegetal01e heads 051 to 055, while world,
"imports are very large, that Irish and ]Danish are unimpressive
is probably a matter of climate. Still, it is hard to understand why Ireland has
,
0fily 0, 4 per cent of the $3 billion market for fresh vegetables etc. (SITC 054).
Our impressive ranking of 5th hl worl’d exports of SITC 073 "
(w!dle world imports are small) is satisfactory and prompts the reflection that
F
F
I°
F-
production by Irish subsidiaries of foreign c0nderns (producers of cllocolato have
been a long time"in Ireland -.ipsis hiloernis ... ?) need not l~e a constraint on lrishexpo~
Here and elsewhere in this chapter we have selected the years
1970 and 1973 for comparison oftrend in the latest period of more or less normal’
¯ development of f~ol-ei~l, trade, i. e:, precedh~g the moire recent years of depression.
During" this period have Ireland’s SITC group 0 exl~orts increased as much as
WME generally? The answer is No: on the latter ("expected") basis Ireland’s
exports in 1973 would have been $923 million; actual export $859’million. The
shortfall of $64 million has more than accounted for the fall in expoxCs of items
001, 011 and 012, i.e., live m~imals and meat, in turn mainly due to a cyclical
Eii
i ].
decline in the supply of Irish cattle, a phenomenon with a long history and still
not understood. On the other hand, exports of dairy products (022, 023, 024) have
done much better than expected (actual $182 million, expected $123 million.)°
Creameries will probably be aware that the world market for 022 (milk and cream)
.
and 024 (cheese and curd) are each. now much larger fllan for 023 (butter) and have
grovel more in WME between 1970 and 1973.
A non-Irlsh colleague comments: "This finding is fully compatible with the very
low standard of vegetables both in h-ish shops and in h’ish restaurants; "l’he
consumers of vegetables on the home market are apparently not that discriminating,
but it would be far more difficult to foist these goocls onto foreign markets.
**Using formula .< IF. x WMT,~/WMT0’; :< over 25 items with Irish exports
specified, but omitt~tOg some i)roducts w]-th no h:l’~h export potc, ntia[, !E = h’lsh
oxports, WM = market world imports.
,:%.
°
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We conclude this commentary.based on Table 2.9 with the
remark that wecould have said much more’as regards even the statistical
aspects,(production, prices; etc. of the, products indicated) but this would
Iead us too far afield. In general, the showingof Table 2.9 is satisfactory from
the Irish point of view: in several products our world export ranMng is high.
’Clearly we must foster those exports in which our exporters must have acquired
great, skills in production and marketing Imowledge, and large capital investment.
a small country with high rankings in some productsWe must not be censorious;
must.be low in others.
group 0,
If we were asked about an optimal export policy based on SITC
having regard to sfze of world market,, but without regard to dozens
of other aspects. (including profitability, skilled manpower, ere. ) our order wouid
be (1.) 011, meat, (2) 022-024, dairy products,(3) 081, animal feed, amongst
highly developed products,
marketing than production),
{4) 031-032, fish, (but with more emphasis on
(5) 054 - vegetables amongst the less developed products.
.°
E Exports other than Animals and Food
In our continuing search for commodities which might be capable
of export development (expansion of old, or discovery of new lines) we adopt
even a simpler approaehthaninTable2.9: using only the invaluable UNYITS 1974 Vol. I~
we investigate, at SITC three-digit or over level (where these are given), (I)
magnitude of world market economy imports in 1973 and (ii) growth in three
years i970-1973. Commodities or groups large in both (i) and (ii) qualifyfor    "
consideration, exeept, of course, those obviously with no Irish export potential,
For completeness we include group 0 products, already dealt with in this apprqaeh.
Motor Vehicles
Overwhelmingly the largest import item at the three digit SITC
level is 732 - Road motor vehicles with world market economy (WlVIE) imports
of ~8 billion in 1973, a reminder of the dominant role of this industry in the
advanced economies, both as a symptom (or effect) and a eause of general
,,
t
economic weal or woe. This import was 7.2 per cent of \V~IE imports in 19’73 and its
value increase in 1970-1973 was 87 per’cent, somewhat la~’ger than the tctaI WIVIE import
increase of 79 per cent.
f
As already stated, the CIO Survey team report for the Irish motor
assembly industry in 1968 foresaw no useful role for this industry in the future economy
of the country:- "IIere the survey teaiu concluded that the entire industry i~otor vehicle
assmnbly would go out of production in free ", trade conditions° The industry, which is
¯ largely under the control of foreign firms, only came into existence because of the impositio~
of a vlrkml prohibition on the hnport of completed vehicles. The disappearance of this
restricticn wotdd remove all reason for sepa2ate assembly over hei]e and the parent
¯ compm~ies are therefore likely to cease production in Ireland entirely or to use the
Irish firms merely as distributive outlets." Despite such a gloomy prognosis the
industry continues to exist. The question arises: cml a small mcdern
economy function without a substa/itial motor vehicle industry ? We seek ei.%ligl?tenment,
as before, by comparison in Table 2.10 with the foreign trade experience of our EEC
partner s.
Table 2.10: FoY.e.l.g~.trade of EEC countries hi SITC commodity
~2 7__°02 - road motor vehi.eles. Values in S bill.ion
EEC cotmtry hnports Exports Ratio Export Nature
.. 1973 1973 E/M increase of trade
IV[ E 1970-73
%
Gdrmm~y FR 2.44 9. Ii 3.7 94 S
Belgium - Lux. 2.39 2.22 0.9 107 S
France i. 90 3.78 .2.0 I00 S
Netherla/ids i. 34: 0.4-1 0.3 125 S
Italy i. 26 I. 96 1.-6 67 S
UK 1.60 2.70 1.7 35 G
Demnark 0.54: 0.42 0.8 88
Ireland 0.18 0.01 0.1 328 G
IY][ a[n source: UNYITS 1.974 Volume Ii.
Notes
In final column S is special, G is general, trade, i.e., exports respectively exclude
or Include re-exports. SITC group 732 includes pm’ts of road motor vehicles.
While it is true that there was great percentage increase in Irish exnports between
1970 and 1973, even in 1973 these amounted only to $9.6 million and (see Notes to
Table 2.10 ) this sum included re-exports. Of course, it emmet be "inferred that,
. because Ireland ts by far the poorest and has the lowest exports of motor vehi.eles2
*.Committee on Industrial org’anisation. A Synthesis of Ile ~ort.~l I)~Ve.2 Team,%-om
22 Ii~dustric,q, Stationery Office.: DubIil{19¢;5,
i i ..- ......... : ....
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there is a casual relationship belaveen the phenomena; notice the comparatively
low export fig~u’e (including re-exporLs) for the very prosperous Netherlands,
which,, hm.v~),er, in 3.973 was some lorry times that for Ireland (including re-export~
i
. ’%
.
, . .,.,
While, as indicated in the last’ paragraph., the present analysis
does not prove that there is a necessary relationship between prosperity and    ,~-]
/
/
a thriving motor industry, it lends support to sueh a theory which is commonly ,’
I
aceq~ted abroad. We ore glad to note thai the IDA give this ospec.t      :    tt- ....
particular altlent[on. " " "I .Exp°rls°f SITC 732 fl~ 197b amounted to
£8.1 million (= $16.4 million), still small (allowing for inflation). In
1.976 exports of SITC 73 - transport equipment. - inc’reased to £37 million,
compared with £26 million in 1975 but the much larger imports increased
even more with the result that the import-exTort ratio increased to 4.2
from 3.6.
¯ °
As a general remark (applyh~g to the motor vehicle industry in
~/
particular) it is evident that industrial prosperity depends on a country
having heavy indust~-y, yet obviously a small country cannot have such an
industry in. tote. It must be content with having parts of such industry, To
repeat, the modern motor vehicle industry has hundreds of sub-contracts; we
could aspire to some of them, for speeialised export. We realise the danger
of speeialisation, as so vuh~erable to vastchanges hi demand. In the future
of industrialisation attention must be directed to product flexibility to avoid
unemployment due to change in demand~ not only when crisis oeeurs but as a
continuing strategy. Workpeople must be trained for change, and machines
and tools must be capable of adaptation to makh~different products; English
experience in the past of unemployment and poverty in whole towns with       _.
specialised industries is an example of what to avoid.
!
But why, instead of always following the band, should not Irish
genius lead into the fld, ure? Has the road motor vehicle industry about
reached its limit ? Is there any{:hin’g rex;olutionary in the wings (or on the
Table 2. !I; Particulars for !-di~R SITC commodity KKoups, WNIE imports and Danish and Irish ex,-ports. 1973
S~C commodity group
0-t Live animals, food, beverages,
tobacco
2 Raw materials, except food
3 ~iin. fuels, lubricants, related mats.
4 Animal, reg. oils, fats
5 Chemicals
6-8 ~,Ianufacturers ex machinery,transpo~
7 Machiner?] trans, equipment
W~E
Ex~orts ($ m-~illion) Ex-ports ~ V£~IE Ratioimports
($ billion) Denmark Ireland Denmark ireland Dan./It.
E;<ports
increase
19’70-73
2 3 4 5 6 7 - 8
2.18
3.23
8.21
5.93
2.58
2,30
7.87
%
85
75
129
67
68
76
82
68.52 2008.4 921.6 2.93 1.35
47.80 397.i 123.0 0.83 0.26
59.01 132.! 16.1 0.22 0.03
3.52 48.0 8.1. 1.36 0.23
36.29 371.3 ¯ 143.9 1.02 , 0.40
144.05 1326.5 576.8
-    0.92 0.40 "
143.91 1652.4 210.0 1.15 0.15
Total SITC 0-8 503. I0 5935.9 1999.5 I. 18 0.40 2.97 84
Basic source: UNYITS 1974, Volume I, Special Tables B and D, and Country Tables
I
i
Notes
Exports of Ireland and Denmark are general, i.e., they include re-expo~s.
Col. !: Grouping is that of UNYITS Group 9 - Goods not classed by kind are excluded because not comparable between Denmark and Ireland,
sLnce Ireland included ,1a~_:_ of exports from Shannon under this head.. See text.
Col.5:Col.3 per cent col.2
Col.6:Coi.4 percent coi,2
Col. 7: Quotient col. 3 co!. 4
Col.8: Percentage increase of co~._ 2 on correspondLng figures for 1970. Unit value and duantum.            ~maexes" to base 1970 as i00, classified
by commodity groups ,are:-
0-I 2-4 3 5 6-8 7 Total*
Unit value i49 145 166 127 135 141 142
Quantum 124 124 136 148 128 131 129
* Tmc-uding SiTC group 9
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wing’ ) comparable with the Model T or even the vW? Are tile people to toler~,te
any lo,lger the cost of making and upkeeping the modern major road? Wily should
Ireland not lead in the production of the cheap, popular, straight take-off, nuclear-
powered aeroplane which obviously will follow the road vehicle ? Unless, of course,
patents are already in the cold storage of a great motor manufacturer, .fearful of
his present investment being rendered obsolete. Ireland missed the bus (at last
a metaphor that is apt’) twice before: once when Ford set Up in Detroit instead
of Cork and once when Dunlop went to Coventry’ because in the 1900s the denizens
of Merrion Square thought they would have to endure the smell of burning rubber.
Some will ar’gue that such misses were not disasters, to which the answer will
be "Ireland must have more industry for the employr~ent it gives andmodern
Industry Is not the ugly thing so much of it was once".
..
Table 2¯ 11 (using the single-digit SITC as adapted
.---
b
by UNYITS) introduces an approach to our search for non-food commodities
(though groups 0-1 are included for completeness) which might have an improved
e~x-port potential for Ireland. The notion of the absolute magnitude of a world market
Is less sig,~fieant perhaps than the percentage increase showing the commodities
In Increasing or decreasing demand ....
As alread~, indicated, Denmark has been traditionally held up to
Ireland as an example to follow.in agriculture. "Here we use it to a similar
end in non-foods. In 1973 Denmark’s GDP was 4.2 times, GNP a head 2¯5
times, total exports 2.8 times that of Ireland. The point in using it here is that
Industrially Denmark is far more advanced than we are while its economy and
slze are more similar to ours than is the case with any other EEC country.
[L}
[]
Pj
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It ,nay have trodden ,-m industrihl path that we might follow, While "" "’::’..
exports in SITC Group O-Food andlive mlhnals (the characteristic
agricultural group) hi 1973 were 41 per. cent of all Irish exports, the percentage
/
for Denmark was only 32. We leave the tabIe to speak for itself.
A Search for Commodities of Which Ireland:Might Produce More
We have in mind both exports and import substitutes with
"the underlying assumption that commodity production will have its impact of
foreign trade, increasing exports and decreasing competitive imports:
Our approach is based almost entir’ely on the contents of
Volume II of UNYITS 1974:’1f simple,Our search is systematic. Our source
shows SITC (i)’3 digit and (ii) 4 "and 5 digit commodity groups, classified by
(usually) 60 leading market economy countries with largest values of imports
and exports for the commodity group. We omitted all single digit zero com-
modity groups (i.e. food and live animals), already dealt with.
The general idea is to compare statistics for Irish exports
and imports, by commodity groups with the experience in 1973 of (i) the world
market economy and (ii) our exemplar, Denmark. Our hope is that by our
tests certain commodity groups will stancl out. We should not go so far as
¯
to recommend that production in these grou’ps should be increased but. only
that they should be subjects for feasibility studies. Both Irish and Danish
foreign trade statistics are compiled on the "general" principle, i.e. exports
"include re-exports which means that exotic commodities, not economically
produceable at home, can appear as exports. The eouh~ry should not reject
the purely selling Ale for goods, involving warehousing but not manufacture,
but recognising that employment per £million sales will usually be much
lower thau in the ea’se of mamffacture, so that purely selling turnover must
be large to be of real worth. We have, for instance, alrea~ly suggested
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Ireland’s being the entrepo~t for fish caught in the North Atlantic.
Export.s
The UNYITS 4 and 5-digit commodity group table comprises
parLiculars for 168 commodities, excluding SITC group 0 - food and live
antm~ls. We eliminated 14 as hav’ing little apparent Irish potential - e.g.
the first eliminated was 11212 - wine of fresh grapes. The UNY1TS par-
"ttculars included value (in thousand US $) for the years 1970 to 1973 (or
’1974) of imports and exports for each oftl{ese commodity groups (described
as’ "selected"). Data were usually given for 60 leadifig .~ountries, with
aggregate trade for the whole developed market economy and subtotals for
EEC, EFTA etc. Clearly the UNYITS intention Was to select the most
lmportant commodities in internati0na I trade, fairly specffica 11y described.
Imports of the 154 "commodity groups accounted for little less than haft
Imports of the world developed market economy..
.. Punch cards were prepared for the 154 commodity ~-oups
". showing’the, following.-
".’
O SITC number;
°
O Value (in $ million) of exports from Ireland in 1973;:
o
Percentage increase in world market economy imports 197()-1973;
~, Ratio Danish)ZIrish exports 1973; Value (in $ billion)world
developed market economy imports in 1973.
In e.xtracting the data for the uNYYrs table a statistical anomaly therein
became apparent. While exports for Denmark (ff in a few’cases small)
were always given, they were entirely missing in no fewer than 38 cases
¯ (out of 154) for Ireland, while the quite minute values ~}.ere often given .
for other countries, amongst the identified 60, Reference to TSI 1973
and CSO revealed that in 36 of the 38 missing cases Ireland had exports
In 1973, for a few commodities small’ it is true, but generally far larger
than values for countries with data displayed. Would UNYITS and CSO
ii
T~)le 2.12: Data for 154 SITC ,i and 5 digit commo~~ c]assificd
accordh~g to (a) total DSIE iml)orts in 1973, (I.)) percentage
iljcrcase in DME imports 1970-1973, (c) ratio of Danish to
]:rish exports 1973, showin,,;" for each class, ntlmber of eom-
modil.y groups, value of ]3hie imports, value of Irish expor.ts
~97_._~3.
1’ 2 3 4 5 6
¯
.lqo. DhIE ira- "Irish ex-
Classification ports 1973 ports 1973 Percentage Percent,
($ billion) ($.miHion) col. 3 col. 4
(a) Total DME imports in
,.
1973 in $ billion ... .. "
0.4 or less 23 8.0 37.0 3.9 6.1
0.5 and 0.6 30 16.3 80.2 8.0 13.3
0.7 - 0.9 31 24:1 108.6 11.8 17.9
I. 0"- 1.4 26 .30.5 48.0 14.9 7.9
i. 5 - 1.9 * 20 34.0 133.9 16.6 22.1
2.0 or over 24 91.5 197.7 44.8 32.7
(b):Percentage increase
DME imports 1970-
¯ 1973 -
Lessthan50 26 .26.2 64.6 12.8 10.7
¯ 50-74 48 44.3 137.7’ 21.7 22.7
75-99 36 66.0 148.3 32.3 24.5
100-124 "18 28.9 126.4 14.1 20.9
125 or over 26 39.0 128.4 19.1. 21:2~,
rj
(e) Ratio Dm~ish to
Irish exports 1973 ..
0. 0 ’- 0.9 38 48.6 286.1 23.8 4:7.3
1.0 - 1.9 17 16.0 120.4 7.8 19.9
2.0 - 2.9 17 17.0 70.8 "8.3 11.7
3.0 - 5.9 24 32.8 "76.9 ¯ 16.1 12.7
6.0 - 9.9 12 29.9 26.4 14,6 4.4
10.0 or over 46 60.1 24.8 "29.4 4.1
Total 154 204.4 605.4 100. - 100. -
|
Basi~ sources: UNYITS 1974 Volume If, TSI, CSO.
Notes
In classifications (a) and (c) the principle of classification influences
the percentages, thus in column 5 for (a) and in column 6 for (c).
Norm s: (b) percentage rise in world exports to market economics (excluding
SITCnos 0and1)= 83.7.
(o) Ratio Danish, to Irish exports (excluding SITC nos. 0 and 9) = 3.54.
please note ? Countries asking (as we hope many ia serious imbalance
in trade with Ireland will be forced to ask) "What can we buy from Ireland?"
could be misled by the table as it stands.
Attention is directed to Tables 2.12 and 2.13. The underlying idea
is that commodities that loom large in world trade and/or are rapidly
¯ increasing in value and/or have large exports from Denmark are Worthy
¯ of consideration for expansion of Irish production for export.’. Table 2.12
"shows that the pre-depression export situation in the ~cpublic was a healthy
one, at least in aggregate. As to (a) of the table, we were well represented
amongst the larger world import commodity groups with more than 50% in
the $1.5 billion or over class. As to. the (b) distribution, we were ahead of
the general average amongst commodity groups that advanced 100% or over.
Section (c) of Table 12 shows that in the case of nearly half (actually 47%)
Irish special exports exceeded Danish in value. In many commodity groups,
ho~vever, Danish exports vastly exceeded Irish expbrts in value.
It is in Table2.13 that we try tobecome more spee£fic, in our r~_E~_.a
-
facie case-making. All the commodity groups shown qualify for considera-
tion. Of course, even at the 5-digit level these descriptions (if given
¯ in full, which they are not here) are not detailed enough for a prospective
exporter: they mere!y indicate the "commodity area": .........
Column 4 indicates how variegated the ex-port pattern is’, the ratio
ranging frorn 0.0 to 23.3. Double the l:atio norm of 2.7 (see Notes) are
group numbers 7352, 7293, 65164, 84111, 84112. Groups below the
norm are, however, very nurnerous. Column 2 of section (a) of Table ~..13
’gives some indication of the commodity areas we should head for, with
.j
motor vehicles and petroleum products high on Lhe world list but low in ’/,
Irish exports, as we might expect, from earlier analysis. Some of       ,/’
V
Ta.b!e 2.13: Leadin.~ojl-mnodity g~’ou]2~aceording to classifications (a K_O2_)_m!dc(9.L_
of Table ]2__sj~n~ 1973 value of DME imp, orts~ h’is_h Cx-port value
,         aud per thousand DME imports,
S1TC commodity group DME Irish 3 as
imports exports¯ per $1000
1973 1973 of 2
$ billion $ million
1 2 3 4
~a) Largest DME imports 1973
l
7321:
7328:
6672:
2432:
3323:
5812:
7353:
68212:
3324:
7293:
84144:
7143:
3214:
Pass. motor vehicles ex. buses
Motor vehicle parts n. e. s.
Dimnonds non-ind, unset
Lmnber shaped conifer
Distillate fuels
Polymerining products etc
Ships and boats non-war
Coffee refined
Residual fuel oils
Transisters, vab:es etc
Outerwear knit non-elastic¯
Statistical machines
Coal ex. briquettes
18.0
9.8
4.8
14.4
4.0
3.7
3.4
, 3.3
:3.3
3.1
3.1
3.0
¯ 3.0
2.2
0.8
0.0
O. 0
0.7
 i.4
24.8
1.9
6.4
17.2
i2.0
14.4
0.8
0.1
0. i
O.O
0.0
0.2
3.1
7.3
0.6
1.9
5.5
3.9
4.8
0.3
(l)).Largest percentage increase DME imports 1970-73.
$.
5151:
65352:
3323:
65164:
2433:
7143:
6861:
3321:
28311:
72492:
65210:
71142:
7241:
6672:
84111:
64122:
¯ 63121:
84112:
68121:
2423:
Radio-active elements etc.
Synthetic discontinuous fibres
Distillate fuels
Yarn, thread of synt. fibre, disc. non-retail
Lumber shaped non-conifer
Statistical machines
Zinc, alloys unwrought
Motor spirit, gasoline
Copper ores, ex. matte
Microphones loud spkrs, ampfrs
Grey woven cotton fabric
Aircraft engines, jet, gas turbine
Television receivers
Diamonds non-ind, unset
Men’s outerwear not Imit
Coated printing paper
Plywood veneers inlaid
Women’s outerwear non-knit
Printing paper not newsp, uncoated
Saw, veneer logs, non-conifer
0.3
1.2
4.0¯
0.6
1.2
3.0
0.7
2: 0"
1.6
0.6
0.9
1.6
1.8
4.8
1.9.
0.5
1.4
2.0
0.8
2.5
0.0
3.4
0.7
14.0
0.2
14.4
0.2
0.2
4.9
0.2
10.6
2.6
3.8
0.0
12.3
0.6
0.2
23.3
0,6
0.1
0.0
2.8
¯0.2
23.3
0.2
4.8
0.3
0.1
3.1
0.3
1.2
1.6
2.1
0.0
6.5
1.2
0.1
11.6
0.8
0.0
$
$
¯ ° °
Table 2. lji_~eontill~ued) " .::’
(c) Largest Danish to Irish export ratios 1973
68422:
6747:
3322:
3321:
72492:
6672:
72501:
71919:
6871:
67411:
1433:
2432:
3323:
6534:
Aluminimum plates sheet, strip 0.6
Tinned plates, sheets 0.5
White spirit kerosene 0.7
Motor spirit, gasolene 2.0
Microphones, loud speakers aml~lfrs 0.6
Diamonds non-ind unset 4.8
Domestic elect, refrigerators .0.5
IIeating cockling, equip, n.e.s. 0.8
Tin, alloys unwrought 0.7
Heavy plates, sheets 1.2
Lumber shaped, non- conifer " ¯ 1.2
Lumber shaped, conifer 4.4
Distillate fuels 4.0
Jute fabrics, woven 0.3
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.2
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.0
0.3
0.2
0.0
0.7
0.0
¯ ll. C.
TM
i]
Basic sources: as in Table 12.
- Notes
All three sets in descending order of classifier
(a) Commodity groups spec’ified with DiME imports in 1973 exceeding $ 3 billion
(b)
(e)
Commodity gz’oups specified with DNIE percentage inore.ase imports 197 0-1973 exeeedin[:
130.
Commodity groups specified with Danish to Irish export ratio 1973 exceeding 50.
Verbal descriptions are abbreviated. See full S1TC.
Co!umn4.norm: Irish exports per $1000 DME imports (excluding S1TC nos.
0 and 1) 1973 = $2.72
,°
.o
¯ °
¯Table2.14:l~,~rticulars of Irish and World hiE 3-digit SITC eonlmodity group imports 1973.
Irish % increase in imports
1970-1973SITC commodity group hnports
1973
’ ($ milliofl) V/ME Ireland
(a) Largest imports into Ireland 1973
732:
719:
332:
581:
653:
651:
541:
718:
641:
561:
712:
331:
735:
541:
243:
724:
729:
674:
714:
722:
861:
673:
121:
(b)
I~oad motor vehicles
¯ Machines 11. e.s. non-electric
Petroleum products
Plastic materials etc.
Woven textiles non-cotton "
Textile yarn and thread ..
Clothing not of fur
Machines for special industries
Paper and paperboard
Fertilis crs ma nufa ctured
A griculturat machinery
Crude petroleum etc.
I-
Ships and boats
l~{edicinal etc. products
Wood shaped
Telecommunica tion equipment
Electrical machinery n. e. s.
Iron steel universal~ plates, sheets
Office ma chines
Electrical, power machinery
Instruments, a pparatus
Iron, steel shapes
Tobacco, unma nufa ctured
Smallest Danish to Irish import ratios 1973
175.4 87
’156.5 75
109.0 95
77.7 101
68.6 75
66.6 87
62.3 108
56.8 .56
56.7 62
56:6 78
-55.2 90
54.9 126
46.8 102
45.7 67
44.1 115
42.4 ¯ 103
89.3 92
37. O ’ 68
36.0 65
=32.5 77
3’1.4 82
30.1 61
30.1 51
86
99
120
98
106
96
124 "
31
74
192
.71
4
409
65
81
142
10,~
135
84
41
"51
¯ 88
227
261: Pulp, waste paper
264: Jute. "
282: Iron, steel scrap¯
262: Wool, animal hair,
521: Coal, petroleum chemicals
532: Dyes: n.e.s, tanning products
24,{: Cork raw and waste
263: Cotton
¯ 421: Fixed vegetable oils, soft
612: Leather etc. manufactures
267: Waste of textile fabrics
271: Fertilisers, crude
265: V, egetable fibre, exLcotton, jute
411: Animal oils, fats
422: Fixed vegetable oil, non-soft
274: Sulphur etc.
697: Base metal household equipment
677: Iron, steel wire ex-wire rods
896: Works of art etc.
21i: Hides, skins, undressed
283: Non-ferrous base metal ore, cone.
551: Essential oil, perfume’etc.
561: Fertilisers manufactured
266: Synthctic, regenerated fibre
541: Mcdicihnl etc. products
897: Gold, silverware, jewcllery
¯ ’. °
¯ 0.2 167
1.8 0
2.2 37
29.6 113
3.7 31:
0.6 41
0.4 61
5.1 65
5.1 74
4.1 105
I. 0 76
8.4 " 45
4.6 52
3.7 44
5.6 75
2.3 0
11.2 80
9.6 58
4.2 176
7.6 115
0.6 " 44
" 3.4 77
5G.6 78
12.9 107
a5.7 67
4,6 89
-9
109
615
28-
76
51
81
49
33
’97
119
126
--40
85
"279
69
¯ 188
53
100
192
98
65
97
Table 2.14 (continued)
SITC commodity group
Irish im ports
1973 ($ million)
% increase in imports
1970-1973
WME Ireta nd
(c) Largest percentage inc#ease        imports 1970-1973
515:
890:
261:
842:
731:
733:
680:
631:
667:
632:
821:
331:
831:
611:
243:
211:
262:
657:
726:
341:
1]adlo-active etc. material
Works of art etc.
Silk
Fur etc. clothes, products
Ila ihvay vehicles
Road vehicles, non-motor
Zinc
Vencers, plywood etc.
Pearl, precious, semi-precious stone
Wood manufactured n. e. s.
Furniture
¯ Crude petroleum etc.
Travel goods, handbags
Lea ther
Wood sha peel
Itides skins undressed °
Wool and animal hair
Floor covering, tapestry etc.
Electro-medical, x-ray equipment
Gas, natural and manufactured
.... 0.1
4.2
¯ ’ "0.2
..0.7
2.4
9.0
2.8
¯ 16.2
0.3
6.2
12.6
54.9
’ 3.2
’12.2
44.1
7.6
29.6
14.9
"- 2.2
3.0
178
176
167
164
161
146
136
136
135
135
¯ 129
126
120
118
115
115
¯ 113
111
110
"110
8O
69
79
92
94
130
87
10
110
¯171
4
72
92
81
¯ 188
109
200
57
121
(d) Largest percentage increase Irish imports 1970-1973
El
[]
B.
261:
212:
282:
244:
284:
241:
242:
521:
221:
735:
111:
553:
677:
121:
851:
657:
561:
554:
211:
821:
Silk
Fur skins, undressed
Iron, steel scrap
Cork raw and waste "
Non-ferrous meta 1 scrap ¯
Fuel wood, charcoal"
Wood rough
Coal, petroleum etc. chemicals
Oil seeds, nuts, kernals
Ships and boa ts
Non-alcoholic beverages n. e. s.
Perfumes, cosmetics etc.
Iron, steel wire ex. wire rods
Tobacoo, unmanufactured "
Footwear ..
Floor coverings, tapestry etc.
Fertilisers, manufactured
Soaps, cleaning preparations etc.
Hides, skins, undressed
Furniture
0.2 167
0.1 74
¯      2.2 37
:. 0.4 61
0.8 29
0.1 46
¯ 12.1 103
8.7 31
’16.0 94
46.8 102
o. 5. "105"
" 6.7 96
¯ .9.6 ¯ 58
30.1 51
¯ 17.9 85.
14.9 111
56.6 78
7.2 72
7.6 .115
12.6 129
1w¢~
~:>~ "
. 782
708
615
556
409
396
282
279
227
216
200
192
192
188
171
E
Basic
(a)
source: UNYITS 1974 Volume II. Notes
All four sets in order of magnitude, (a), (c), (d) dccending, (b) ascending
(a) Irish imports 1973 exceeding $30 million
(b) Danish to Irish import 1973 ratio 1.5 or less
(c) Percentage increases 1970-1973 WME imports 110 or more
(d) Percentage increases 1970-1973 Irish imports 150 oz- more ; oo
in last column means "very large", i.e. 1970 figure very small
Norms last two columns
Increase in imports 1970-1973:-
WME imports (ex-SITC group 0 and 1) 83.7%
Irish imports (ex-S1TC groups 0 and 9) 81.1%
verbal descriptions are abbreviatcd. See full SITC.
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the groups listed may appear to have no export possibilities. For instance,
the only item appeariug on all three lists is 6672: non-industrial unset
diamonds’ This may seem bizarre until we recall that Irish exports (like
Denmark’s) include re-exports. In fact, in 1973 Denmark’s exports of this
commodity were valued at’only $27, 000; however, Ireland’s are vestigial.
,o
In each of the three classfficaLions in Table 2.13 the cut-off points
are quite arbitrary and the descr!ptions provided are much abridged¯
Truth to say, we are concerned mainly to indicate a systematic approach
to tl{c identification of possible export lines. These remarks also apply
to Table 2.14 dealing with imports, hi stich searches UNYITS will be ih-
valuable. To repeat, Irish economic policy must be directed towards ]
Increasing exports and diminishing imports.
.
o ¯
Imports                                " ¯         "
For Table 2.14 UNYITS 3-digit classification was used¯ Particulars
are given for 142 commodity groups. ¯ We eliminated only three as having no
possibility of production. Indeed the same might be said of many that remained-
see, for exa mple, 263-cotton on Table 2.14, retained because it might be possible
to substitute other fibres for it.
E
¯o
!
With regzrd to imports, distinction between producer goods (including
Capital) and consumer good imports is traditional, the former being worthy
as helping employment, the latter being much less so. There was a point
in the distinction st the beginning of industrialisation but latterly there is
little difference between them as to which kind of goods we should make
more of. ~So in this section we make no reference to "use" classification.
All the groups listed in Table 2.14arecandidates for our importing
less, and making more st home. The thllfidng behind the four principles
I
of selection’ in Table 2.14 are fairly evident:-
ot
t[]
[]
[].
[]
¯ (a)
(b)
(c)
largest in, ports
....-
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the low ratio means that Irish imports are large compared to Danish
the point here, as regards imports, is less evident; it is flint we should
be making goods for which there is increasing world demand - see (b) of
o.
¯ Table2,1.3 with similar scope but using the S1TC 4- and 5- digit classi-
fication.
o’ :"
{d) we should consider producing more of goods’in rapidly increasing Irish
demand.
(e) the scope for employment creation.
To repeat points made earlier: the 3-digit classification is too generalised
for practical use, it indicates only areas Of possible interest; the approach
may be regarded as an exercise of methodology for search of import sub-
stitutes¯ ¯ ..
¯As always,motor vehicles and petroleum products force themselves
to our notice. We shall allow Table 2.14 to.speak for itself. Clearly there
are other enormous imports in commodities we already produce and export
in large quantities, e.g. textiles, clothing, fertilisers, chemicals,¯ machinery
r-"
We give merely’ indications: by extending the analj, ses on these lines we
might discover other and more practical import substitution zones.
We pause to remark that this examination of both export and import
substitution possibilities savours of mercantilism which every right-thinking
economist condemns as being theoretically suboptimal, i.e. as regards /’~,b .
material prosperity. We argue, in reply, that Ireland is a special ease in :
i
.Its appalling and apparently insoluble (by methods used up to now) unem-
ployment and underempioyment situation.. SO we must contemplate an
optimum possibly in conflict with the economic one, namely one that will
ensure maximum employment. Government policy is well attuned to the
," °
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need for promoting exports by any rind every means; clearly these
efforts, must i~e intensified. But the argument for reducing imports is
equally compelling. Why should not the inducements to inerbase exports
be offered also to foreign manufacturers to produce import substitutes
In Ireland, to the extent that our owe industrialists cannot fill the bill ?
7
¯ " It mlght be difficult to devlse a system whereby tax relief would
 ,
be appl|ed to import substltutbn wlthout maior repercussTons on the taxation
t
of industry generallyl although means could probably be found of relating
tax relief to employment creatlon’in industry wMch could effectlvely
c|rcumvent objectlons advanced by the EEC to export profits tax rel|ef.
, i
As the Ir|sh market is on a small scale, effective import substltut|on would
tend to requTre access for the products concerned to export markets in order
¯ 0 ,
to attaln economies of scale.
¯
¯
.o
Table 2.15: Percentage dlstributlon of h’ish forelgn trade between UK, rest oP
EEC and dtllercounlrlesl import balance as percentage oP imports1
excl}ange rate, quarter_!y and annua! 1975 and 1976
r’
Quarter and Exports , , .!mports, ..... Import Exchange
year
Rest Other Rest Other excess rciteUK UK
EEC per cent ~/£imports
I
I. 1975. 55.1 23.1 21,7 47.4 21.7 30.9 26.0 2.39
II 56.1 25.5 18.3 47,8 21.1 31.0 21,8 2.32
!11 " 56.0 25.8 18.1 48,0 20.1 31.9 5.6 2.13
IV " 50.5 25.9 23.6 51.3 18.9 29.8 .7.9 2.04
Year 1975 54.2 " 25.2 20.6 48.7 20.4 30.9 15.2 2.22
I. 1976 49.3 27.0 23,7 50.1 20, 1 29.8 33.9 2,00
!! " 47.5 27.0 25.5 49.4 21.6 29.0 20,6 1.81
I
Iil -" 49.3 25.7 24.9 47.6 19.4 33.0 15.5 1.77
IV " 49.1 28.2 22.7 50.2 19.4 30.4 14.0 1.~x
Year 1976 48.8 27.0 24.2 49.4 20.1 30.5 20.5 1.80
0
x ~Dctober- November
Baslc sources:" TSI, International J:inanclal Statistics, January 1977~. rh series
¯Note
1"here are sterllng area countries in the two areas other than UI~ but correctlon by
including such countrles wlth UK in the table would have made little change in the
percentages.                                                  .
i 0 ,
i
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Effect of Devalu,ntion oa the Irish Geographical Trading Pattern
°
Table2¯ 15 starts with the first quarter of 1975 because the then
¯ ,doilar exchange rate had’cimnged little for several years before¯
...... (Table 2.15)
¯ A considerable change has taken place in the pattern of exports: exports to
UK fell from 55 to 49 per cent between I 1975 to IV 1976, percentages to the
othhr two zones increasing correspondingly. There is little evidence of any
.systematic change in trend in the case of imports: compare the percentage
for the years 1975 and 1976. Regressing the quarterly UK percentages on"
linear time we find the following F values, with (1, 6) d.f. : -
¯
Significance
Exports F = 15¯ 74 Significant at ¯ 01 prob.
Imports F = 1.36 Insignificant
In current value terms there is, therefore a downward trend
in the i~ercentage borne by exports to UK and hence a significant trend upwards
in the percentage for exports to non-UK.
In the case of imports.
Such trends are entirely missing
Exactly¯ the opposite is the case with quantum trade: In what
follows we abstract inflation other than that .due to devaluation, allowing for
the rate of exchange, in fact assuming that this non-de~;aluation
. Inflation was much the same in the three zones in the eight quarter period.
..,R
From the viewpoint of exporters and importers devaluation is
a rise in prices in countries other than UK, the "price index" being the
reciprocal of the exchange rate in the last col.umn of Table 15, with base
,
I 1975 as unity. As an example of this quantum approach consider the export
figures for II 1975:-
,
A devaluation/revaluation is, however, a change in currency values only. Due
to the impact of currency ch,-mges on profit margins there may be a consequent
realignment of markets.                                .          ¯
Actual Exchange
value (£m) price index
Deflated %
¯ Actual
To UK 183.9 1 183.9 56.8
elsewhere           143.8      1.0302         139.643.____22
323.5        100- .
"A similar procedure was adopted for imports.
for UK were:-
The full series of percentages
t
,i
I "
I 1975
"H "
IH "
IV " It ..
I’ 1976
~[ It,
III "
IV 11
Exports Imports
55.1 47.4
56.8 48.6
58.9 50.9
54.5 55.2
53.7 54.6
54.4 56.3
56.8 55.1
: 58.4 59.5
Regressing these percentages on linear thue F values with (1,
Exports F = O. 11
Imports F = 46.73
6) d.f. are:-
Significance
Ins ignfficant
Very s Ignificant
Any important shift away from UK for exports and
toward UK for imports should be brought to light by the foregoing procedure,
admittedly approximative. There is no such indication in the case of exports:
we went on just as before. There was a considerable drift towards UK with
imports. Importers seem to have been more percipient in adapting themselves
to this devaluation situation. Part of the reason may have been that exporters
were under far longer term contract than were importers many of whom, in
this small country, experience little delay in fulfilment’of orders.
o,o
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Conclu sion
f
In this chapter we address ourselves to a purely economic
aspect of our problem of adaptation. We start with recognition that tile visible
Import balance in recent years (nearly £500 million in 1976) is too large.
We ai’e living    beyond our means. We must tackle the problem of increasin.g
e~orts told decreasing imports, I.e. increase production of goods on a far more
hltensive scale than hitherto adopted, even since the economic upsurge that started
In 1960. "
We have not dealt with social aspects at all, the most
serious of which is unemployment and underemployment: possibly the 1975
Labour Force Survey will reveal m~ unemploymemt figure (including school-
leavers and others not in receipt of State payment) of 15 per cent of the labour
force. So clearly the manpower is available to produce more. The country
appears still to be credit-worthy as regards home and external loans for tangible
capital development.
There Is not the faintest possibility of increased production
for export and Import substitution on the scale required without industrial efficiency,
in which the main elements axe price and salesmanship.
We have made considerable use of the ratio of the value
of Imports to exports to discover the countries and commodity groups of
Interest for expansion @ositive as regards exports, negative for imports).
We also make use of international comparison, usually with our EEC partners
and other countries at an advanced stage of economic development. We
e%,
find that the ratios for commodity groups, and in to[o for such countries
are far better, balanced than for Ireland. As such a pheuomcnon can be
¯ $
logically justtHed we suggesg that it be adopted as a guide-line for Irish
foreign trade policy. .. ~.. . ..
,Pe
.     We have no intention of adopting the usual censorious
"m ¯
attitude towards Ireland’s actions and attitudes in our recommendations.
.::.; ".
Especially since c_aa. 1960 (and even later, since 1970) we have found many
.. excellent features, especially in exports, for instance in the improvement
of the ratio during the last few years.
w
’ " ’L";"
:.--:--:- ..-.:.-.    ¯ ... -.iJ.
..--g..
Foreign trade must be brought into better balance with
i.e. a nearer to equality in vahm of exports.and. our trading partners,
Imports. Improvement in thisdirection has ce.rtainly happened since 1970,
i.e. ,q lowering in the ratio of imports to exports with some countries. In
. Q                              ¯ ,
, ,
Q.
There should be great expansion in the meat trade as
This need not mean a shift f~,c,m livecompared ’with live a ninml exports’.
¶" ’ ~" dq, :    -. .    ~°;
exemplified in Tables 2.13 and 2.14. , :
only to have made a prima facie case. It is for experts to make a choice.
Our methodolo~, for discovering lines we should be "in" has been merely
As regards commodity lines for expansion,
,:.:. :.( :
.o
" s_alesmanshTp. .: ..
..
¯ , °
¯% -..
.
. f- .
we claim
0
.-duty of ¯Irish dlplomats.abroad, eklng-out.the efforts of.competent and asslduous
countries for Irish goods, Promotion of Irish exports should be..the prlnclpai
our purc.hases (imports) of given commodities from poor to good customer
the text it has been suggested that the device should be used of shifting of
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to dead exports: on the contrary there might be expmlslon in the live trade
as well. The point is that in a great increase in the output of live m~imals
by agriculture a higher proportion of animals should be slaughtered at home.
r
L .]
[!.
[i
7[l
iT
Attention might be directed towards increasing exports
In already well developed food lines like dairy products (but towards cheese
and away from butter and milk), and animal feed. Amongst the less developed
pr°ducts there are sea fish (but with stress on the entrep~t trade on a world
or at least European scale) and vegetables, fresh and processed.
.The country must have a larger share in motor vehicles,
machinery and other heavy industry. This will not mem~ such industries in
their entirety, but rather pieces thereof. Could we not make a stronger "set"
on great industrial com~tries outside EEC towards our being their Fifth
(’industrial) Column inside EEC ? Our principal asset therefor Is a comparatively
¯ large available supply of trainable labour. ,.
There are two aspects to the gigantic petroleunl problem,
conservation and home processing, both of which must be developed to the full.
Having regard to the magnih~de of imports, we consider that the savings to be
effected by conservation alone would have an appreciable effect on the import bal}mee.
o
As to processing, comparison with our EEC partners alone
has shown how essential it is to develop refining and petrochemical industries.
We have mentioned only a few of the possibilities of expansion
E:]
 ill
for export and import replacement, though possibly the largest. There are
literally hundreds of commodity lines and thousm~ds of varieties
,
T¯he scant removal of the Government subsidy on cheese will not help.
$$
We are glad to note that our ESRI colleague, ’E.~W. Henry, Is actively cugaged
with other bodies, Irish .-rod International, in studying the problem of conservation
of ~lergy.
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which could be brough!: to light by the methods we have adopted here, which
involve a search for products in larg~ and increasing world demand, and In
f
large production by dev.eloped economies.
Increase in exports and in import substitution involve
increased home production. Diminution of imports of certain lines may
¯ result in reduced" home consumption (as we hope, in the case of conservation
of energy) but in the large majority of cases will mean shift from import to
home pr’oduetion. " ’ :
*"
., . . ¯
’ : Great attention has been devoted to increasing exports in
this c’ountry, as in all others. The result has been that Irish exports have
had a creditable record, though we here suggest consideration of attention
to new lines. At least.equal, attention, official and private, should now be
o° ¯
directed toward’s imports, with a view to diminution.
¯°,4*
¯ - :--: .~- :
.,,~.~
.?
..-o
¯°
.Q
..¯
° .
,Q
, ,
°
¯    i
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3. !nvestmen__t Pq]icx
]Between 1960 (which may be regarded as the year when the economic
upsurge In Ireland began) and 1973 ([. e. before the economic recession of
the last few years), GDFCF in real terms increased by 222 per cent while /?
GDP increased by only 74 per cent. More relevant is the fact that the
GDFCF constituent, machinery oilier than agricultura.1, increased by 321
per cent while volume of industrial output increased by 122 per cent. The
Increase in GDFCF has been vastly greater than increase in output. Has
¯ physical investment at great cost been overdone, as distinct from recourse to
other means of increasing output and labour productivity ? These means
Include structural ehm~ge away from capital-intensi’ve and towards labour-
Intensive industries, mbre suitable raw materials, more efficient replacement
machi.’nery, better mmmgem6nt, more competent workpeople etc.
°. ~ -° ,~° . . .
The flgmres quoted merely raise the question but do not s~lpply the
answer. In fact, any year’s GDFCF includes replacement of existing stock
(t.hrough scrapping of old machinery or obsole~ence) and net increase in
stock. The single figure of GDFCF tells nothing about the magnitude of
the two cons~ituefits though it is an essential element in their estimation.
It Is even conceivable that all of GDFCF is replacement, i.e. Involving a
larger-scale scrapping of old physical capital (buildings, machinery, vetficles
eta). This may even have been the case with some older concerns remaining
In business. It cannot, however, have happened in the case of the many
new firms home and foreign, mostly established here with IDA assistance.
It Is essential to note, at the start of the discussion, that replacements if
new (though some may be second hand imports) must be assumed to include
all the latest improvements, wlfich moans that replacement alone must be
conducive to Increased output certerls paribus (improved quality In a given
a
0,
~°
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article is equivalent to increased output, statistically "the same" in quantity).
..
t
Estimates of GDFCF at constant prices are usually made by dividing
¯(i. e deflating) the current value estimate by a price (or unit cost) index. Now
the latter must assume unchanged quality which, strictly speaking, is unreal:
ff part of the capital is a typewriter which has to be replaced, the new machine
may be the same price as the old but must embody improvements which
experience has shown to be desirable but which do not justify a change in price:
improvements may not be costly or competition may not allow a price increase.
, t
A price index would show no change, though the new machine would be a better
one; if quality were to be assumed unchanged there should have been a fall
In price. In price index methodology and in consequence volume estimating
it is tel-ely possible to correct for quality changes, especially when these
are small. They can, however, be very numerous, so that, in agg~-egate,
the effect may be appreciable: In practice, (i. e. with no correction for
¯ quality improvement), therefore, the price indexes for capital goods are
too high so that constant price (volume) estimates are too low. Ignoring
(or after correction for) inflation, a manufacturer who, by repairs and
maIntenance and replacements as required, over a period of years regards
his situation as that of keeping his plant at the same quantum level throughout,
may In reality have improved it and this improvement should be reflected in
Increased output, his staff and overheads remaining unchanged, though
vai~iabl5 costs (other than staff) will have increased.
While, as already indicated, the GDFCF constituent, machinery
other than ag~ricultural at construct prices quadrupled between 1960 and 1973,
employment in industry Increased by only a quarter. This violent contrast
raises ~ even more fundamentalquestion than that cited above (ft. not
Implicit In it 7): is Ireland with surplus labour power being forced towards
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a policy of eapital-hltensive industry, in competition with, or in imitation of,
advanced market economies, in which (m~til the recent recession) manpower
was the scarce resource ?
The rise in factor (i. e. labour and capital combined)
productivity not accolmted for by rises in quantities of factors is much. discussed
in the literature, for which see S. IIollander (1965)* Following is a quotation
from that work:-
|’The recognition of the phenomenon of highly productive
though relatively modest replacement expenditures lends support to the view
expressed by some maeroeeonomists concerned with economic growth that
considerable attention should be devoted to the rate at which the existing stock
of capital is altered to introduce technical change, rather than simply to the
variables which determine the rate of expansion of the capital stock.
"Thb ¯ recogniti’on of the efficacy of "replacement investment
¯Incorporating technical change is important both in accounting for certain
anomalous features of past experience and for throwing light on current policy
Issues relating to economic growth".
Contribution of Factors to Output at the Macro Level
[
[
[
r*
[
The factors are labour and physical capital and (except where
otherwise indicated throughout this chapter) output is in volume, i.e. constant
price, terms. Considerable attention has been devoted in USA to the problem
of acccuntkng for the fact long.since noted that factors, presumed unchanged
Inefficiency, appear to account for only a small proportion In the continuing
Increase in volume output over long terms of years. Some of the best lmown
names in US national accounting (including Denison, Goldsmith, Kendrick,
Kuznets, Solow) have been associated with research in trying to find an
explanation of this phenomenon, I.e. to apportion credits for the
*: S. ]lollm~der "The So~lcccs of [ncl’eazed Efficiency. A Study of Du Pont Rayon Plants"
........ . ........
%T,l~:.,.,:~(,l,~,t,~,ll.~ II’,~’iilllle o1" T,,~’!~t~,’log’:.V. L1SA 1.9(i5.
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possible causes of this improved factor productivity. Apart from separating
out (i) change due to factors of presumed unchanged in quality and (ii) all the
rest, ~e are not satisfied that’a full causality has yet emerged: .([i) remains
what h~. Abramovitz called it, a "mysterious phenomenon’,.
¯ . To discuss the problem in its Irish aspect we require annual
statistics of aggregate capital stock at constant prices. These are not available,
so w.e sball have to make our own estimates. Before doing so, however, we
shall exhibit the phenomenon in its UK aspect, at the macro level.
Like the Irish constant price series, the UK series are
.e_m~ressed in 1970 prices. The year 1970 is therefore convenient for the
settingup of our constant price series. In that year GDP was apportioned as follows ’.-
Remuneration of employees m~d self-employed
Other GDP (at factor cost)
Total GDP (at factor cost)
~m
34,199
/’ 9,381
¯ 43,580
(3)
(4)
We also note, for 1970, the following.-
Labour force at work (000)
Average capital stock+ (£ milllon)
We then find, as quotients:-
24,.735
176,300
(5) Remuneration per worker £1,382
(6) Other GDP per £ capital stock £0. 05321
Note that all the labour force at work have been deemed equivalent to "employees"
and that (2) profit cte has been assigned to capital, an assigmnent near enough for
t
our present purpose. It should also be noted that heads (1) and (2) do no_~t represent
+
This differs slightly from the official fi~tre of £43,489 million by what is described
as a !’residual erred’of £91 mitlion,
Average of end of year cst:hnates for ’1969 and 1970.
IIere and hereabouts we have not rounded olT fii,~’ures used. As In national accounting
generally, there is not suggcsLion that precision to the last digit is to be inferred.
the "shares’~ due t’6 labour and capital. \Ve do not believe it possible to
make such segregation: labour is helpless without tangible capital, mid
vlee versa. The two resources are inextricable.
¯ We are concerned only to estimate for a number of years
what quanilm] output would be at the rates obtaining in 1970, given quantities
oflabour and capital "in those years. Thus in 1966 (3) and (4) above were
respectively 25,357 and £149,800 million, so ¯that estimated GDP at
constant (1970) prices at factor cost, assuming 1970 rates for factors is:-
£(25, 357 x 1,382 + 149,800 x 0.05321) milHon = £.43,014 million
Estimated and actual factor cost GDP at 1970 prices are then:-
Year
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
GDP (£ million) UK
Constant.
. [factor output
43,014
42,857
42,988
43,391
43,580
43,490
43,896
45. 078
45,629
Actual
39,370
40,416
41,902
42; 600
4~, 489
44,488
45,243
47,891
48. 089
Obvio.u sly the c on stant fact or output serie s i s almo st static, wMle the
actual series has unbroken growth.
Y = ae,
Fitting exponentials to both, i.e.
bt
we find b = O. 0073 for the former and O. 0253 for the latter: h~ the UK in
the years 1966-1974, factors with unchanged factor output rates accotmted
for only 29 per cent (i. e. O. 73 per cent of actual 2.53 per cent rate of increase),
the remaining 71 per cent being due to all other causes, including better ’
i
replacemeat capital, greater efficiency in l’abour and management, better
materials etc.
In the foregoing very simple approach we are concerned only to
show the great discrepancy between the two series and to point the moral
therefrom, without reference to figures. So, we do not considcr it necessary
’ to refine our calculations (in particular by attempting to correct gross
capital esthnates by subtraction of capital not in use,. ahnost impossible
anyway)( a remark that applies throughout this chapter.
¯Fii
El
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For Ireland, as relevant data at the macro level, we have
e
only GDP, GDFCF and depreciation. We need capital stock at the end
¯ .
of one year (say 1970), and to estimate consecutive end year to end year
changes therein from GDFCF, the other constituent in the latter being
F]
replacement capital. We seek guidance from the UK figures.
For UK in 1970 the capital-output ratio was very close to 4;
fact average capital stock was £176.3 billion and GD1~ at facto1- cost
£43,489 million. As Irish capital stock includes that of agriculture we
tlfil~k this ratio too low and try 5 instead, which, since factor cost GNP
in
[]
was £i,400 million gives an estimate of capital stock £7,000 million,
e
deemed to apply to the end of the year 1970.
" ’ As to the estimation of addition to capital stock included in
GDFCF, it remarkably happens that in UK in the eight years 1966-1973,
addition to capital was equivalent to either 73 or 74 per cent of GDFCF,
..
remarkable because of the constancy of this percentage. This would mean
tlmt replacement was only a quarter of GDFCF. We consider the latter too
low a fraction for Ireland. In fact in 1970 depreciation (£133.0 million)
.~v.3
E]
was 37 per cent of GDFCF (£361.1 million).
as actual replacement capital.
So we decided to accept depreciation
$
Note that these values are aggregate m~d not incremental capital/output
ratios. The ICORs would be much less.
..    °~
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During the period 1960-1973 the Irish labour force at work was
practically constant a[ 1.1 million; h~ 1970 it was estimated as 1,055,000.
In the Irish NIE the distinction" is made (see NIE 1974 Tables (A and B) 2’)
between (i) remm~era.tion of employees and (ii) other. This is purely a fomnal
distinction: (i) relates to those with a contract of service. For production
o.
ftmction purposes (Cobb-Douglas et al ) labour (and by hnplication its remuneration)
should extend to the whole labour force at work. So should labour income.
We cmmot give effect to this fully for Ireland. We do not need to do so. Wlmt
we have done is to define labour income as the whole income of AFF together
with remm~eration of employees in non-AFF. In fact in 1970 the Irish versions
i
shnilarly numbci-ed as those given about for UK are:-
(I) " Labour income (£ million) : i, 025.1
(2) Other GDP (at factor cost) (£m) "874.6
(3) Labour force at work (000) i, 055
(5) Remuneration per worker (£) 972
(6) Other GDP per £ capital stock (£) 0.,0544
Depreciation (~o be used as capital replacement) is given in NIE only
at current prices; we have converted these figures to 1970 prices by deflating by
the GDFCF implicit price deflator.
We now have all we require to estimate Irish factor cost GDP at
1970 prices assuming unchanged factor output. In 1970 depreciation was £133.0
million, GDFCF £361.1 million, hence addition to stock during 1970 was
£228.1 million. Therefore capital stock end 1969 was £6,770.4 (= 6,998.5 - 228.1)
million and average stock in 1970 was £6,884.5 milliou. All average capital stock
estimates at 1970 prices for the years 1960--1973 were derived in a similar
way..Using (5) m~d (6) above, as in the UK case, as constant multipliers,
estimates of GDP, assuming constant (1970) rates of factor output, were
derived. Such e~imates and corresponding actual estimates are as follows:-
°.
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GDP (£ mUlion) Ireland
Year , ’ 0o11 sta nt
t
factor output
1960 1,316.1 .’
1961 i, 319.0
1962 1,330.5
1963 ’ i, 344.0
1964 i, 352.5
1965 1,356.3
1966. I, 368.9
1967 i, 371.6
1968 I, 384.0
1969 I, 398.3
1970 1,400. I ..
1971 i, 416.1
1972 i, 420.1
1973 i, 439.3
Actual
972.5
I, 012.5
i, 04.9.4
I, 083.0
i, 138.9
i, 152.7
1,169.7
I, 229.2
L311.5
1,366.7
1;399.7
1,479.0
i, 54.9.1
1,647.8
Ezponential rates of growth in three periods (i. e. 100 b in y = aebt)
are:- .C
Period Constant
factor output
1960-1966 0. 676
1966-1973 0.704-
1960-1973 0. 670
A
Actual
3.194
4.692
3.903
Cas%
of A
21
15
17
It does seem that for the comparable period the rate of growth for Ireland
unexplain, ed by labour and capital input (85 per cent, 1966-1973) was even
greater than that for UK (71 per cent, 1966-1974).
As already remarked, we are not concerned to defend the foregoing
estimates of Irish capital stock or the figuring depending on these. We use
It to make some non-statistical ~oints which we conceive to be of fundamental
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importance for Irehmd, to be discussed later. We mention one point only here, applying
,-flso to UK: the social implications of a nealiy constant labour force at work mid the
regtdar increase in capital stock at constant prices "(2.8 per cent a year in the period
e" ’
1960-1973, on our estimates). This tendency, however (as some thbfl~) economically
inevitable, is detrimental to the social ideal of full employment." And, as we sh~l see,
it has the economic disadvantage that physical capital increase has a large import
content, therefore tending to increase foreign indebtedness.
Our "macro m~alysis suggests (if it does not prove because of the
dubiety of our figures) that there are many elements conducive to growth in real
GDP other thai net increase "in capital stock. This is highly encouraging as a guide
to action: every effort should be made to increase output with existing capital stock
,’rod without recourse to new capital.’ Or otherwise, capital stock should be increased
olfly after the fullest investigation of increasing output with existing capital. When
examb~ng the capital output ratio over the last decade, attention should be paid to
the effect of dm abolition of tariff barriers and the relative movements of average
t
hourly labour" costs between Ireland and the UK. It seems thata considerable amount of
capital has had to be expanded in order to maintain output levels as high tariffs are
abolished. We leave such investigation to others,
|
Individual Industries
We are in a somewhat stronger positionintrying to apply the
essentially macro ideas in the foregoing section to individual industrial groups° This
is because there are available estimates of capital for such groups, at constant (1958)
prices, for each year 1953 to 1968 inclusive. These estimates were made using the-
perpetual inventory metl~od. We use them here in less detail thin1 the authors, as we
,
wish to associate them with the Input-Output industrial grouping of the CSO 1964 92 -
0
Sector table, which is somewhat different. Our classification is merely illustrative and
not exhmi sti ve.
See source Table 3. I. Since our ealculatious were made these esthnates have been
revised by R.N. Vaughan. W(; are of the.opinion that these revisions would not
alter the qualitative conclusi.ons of this chapter.
Table 3.1: Derlvaffon of percentage surplus for Tndus~icl ar~upst 1953-60 and I960-q968.
t
1964 Output inc. % per year %surplus
Industrial group
Work- Cap-
~orce ital 1953 - 60 1960- 68 1953 1960
Actual CRE Actual! CRE -60 -68
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
o0g
I. Stone, eta. ~m3.1 6.3 6.3 2.9 15.1 8.4 55 46
2. Slaughter inc. bacon " 6.7 7.9 3.5 3.5 6.2 5.4 I 13
3. Creameries 5.0 13.5 1.6 5.7 5.1 11.2 a a
4. Animal feed 2.4 4.9 3.7 3.4 7.1 2.4 9 66
5. Bread 9.5 15.4
-2.2 -0.3 1.8 1.0 a 42
6. Sugar, confectionery 5.2 7.9 -5.4 -1.3 5.6 2,.1 a 62
7. Drink 7.9 27.8 1.1 1.8 2.9 3.3 a a
8. \:;o:Ilen; worsted 6.9 8.8 5.2 2.9 5.0 2.3 45 54
9. Hos;ery 6.7 7.9 4.5 -0.4 11.3 6.1 108 46
O. Shoes, leather goods 7.0 3.6 2.2 -1.0 13.9 1.6 146 89
1. Other clothing 16.4 5.1 1.5 0.9 5.5 2.2 4O 6O
2. Printing 9.6 10.8 4.5. 1.4 5.3 2.3 69 56
3. FertiI*isers 1.6 6.6 13.8 9.2 7.4 13.8 34 a
4. Chemicals, drugs 2.9 5.5 5.9 4.9 16.! 6.8 18 58
5. GI~s, etco 2.9 3.0 5.6 3.3 7.9 5.5 4O 3O
6. Cement, etc. 4.3 12.7" 4.6 3.1 12.7 10.1 33 2O
7. A’~.tal products 10.7 14.5 8.0 3.1 9.5 7.0 61 26
8. Machinery not elect. 2.7 3.8 11.2 5.1 4.3 3.4 54 21
9. Elect. machinery 7.2 6.1 13.2 8.6 15.8 10.9 35 31
O. Vehlcles ’ 6.3 6.7 8.0 3.4. 3.9 4.1 57 a
1. Construction 44.4 27.8 -2.3 -4.0 8.8 4.6 b 48
2. EIectriclty Supply 9.3 152.7 8.3 3.0 10.1 4.7 64 53
1
I
1
1
1
1
~c~;ic sources:
Col. I:
Col. 2:
Col..3-
Cols 4,6:
Cols 5,7:
Col 8:
Col. ?:
.... "t" .... ° -
(I) Estimated Levels of CaPital Stock in Irish Industry 1953 - 1968 by E.W. Henry and S. Scott~ ESRI Memorandum Series, 1971.
(2) Input-Output Tables for 1964. Compiled by CSQ. Prl. 985, 1970.
a: CRE exceeds actual, b: CRE less than actual, both negative.
Notes
GrouI~ ~e illustrative arid not comprehensive.
Numbers ore overageS.
Capital is valued at constant (1958) prices. Figures sh .b~vn are simple
averages of end of year values given by Henry and Scott.
Figures are based on gross output; see rex,%
Based on CRE outputs. CRE outputs are those which would be expected,
given particular years average workForce and physical capital, at the rates
of pay per worker and profit per £ capital in 1964.
Percentage surplus = I00 (col. 4 - col. 5) col.4 for 1953-I960. Here and
elsewhere calculations were made using more digits than shown inthe table.
o means that CRE exceeds actual percentage, b means that actual exceed
CRE percentage but both were negatlve.
As in col.8 but applying to years i960-1968.
°.
¯
"- i
¯ i
i
i
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]h~ Table 3.1 the main object is to compare the ammal average
rate of change of actual volume output of each industrial group with what the
rate of ehm~ge would have been had the units of the factors (i. e. wages per unit
labour mid profit per £1 capital) been unchmlged (in fact at their 1964 levels).
For our purpose we term these CRE (~or constant rate expected) outputs.
Actual output should be net, in fact added value but statistics of net output
,o
at coi~stant prices for individual industries are not available, so we have used
gross output indexes for rates of change instead. At the level of precision
and the degree of aggregation at wl~eh we ’are working we think" that estimates
of rates of change based on gross output are a sufficient approximation for
tlle net output rates. For methodology see Notes to Table 3. i,
(Table 3. I)
We define surplus as the excess of actual rate over CRE rate
,o
and surplus as percentage of actual rate is shown for two periods of years in
eols. 8 and 9 of the table. It is at once clear that the surplus phenomenon
Is very pronotmced in Irish industry: amongst the 22 groups in 1960-1968 there
are only four exceptions to the rule of positive surplus. The four are interesting:
F
[]
rl
creameries, drink, fertilisers and vehicles. These are the industries in
which physical output did not match physical factor input hi a period of general
growth and the factor element. Was mainly capital¯ The surplus percentages
varied’greatly: in 1960-1968 the lfighest was for group 10, shoes mid leather
groups with 89, also largest, with 146, in 1953-1960. There is only a slight
°, .
tendency for the surplus phenomenon to affect industries in much the same
degree: In the two time periods: r =. 48 for the pairs in eols¯ 8 and 9 (omitting
the 7 cases of non-growth in either), with null hypothesis’ significance lying
between. 05 mid .’10 probabilities¯ Also the percentage surpluses will be
seen to be generally lower in the later period than in the earlier period of lower
economic growth: simple average percentages for the 15 growth industry
Table 3.2 : .~_pltal stock (£000 at 1958 prices)per unit labour at work [or industrlal g~
195.._3 . 19_.._6__0 19 _R.  68.
i i
L1
’
Industrlal
~group
1. Stone etc.
2. Slaughter inc. bacon
3. Creameries
4. Animal feed
5. Bread    ,
6. Sugar, confect|onery
7. Drink
8. Woollen, worsted
9. Hos.iery
10. Shoes, leather goods
11. Other clothing
12. Prlntlng
13. Fertilisers
14. Chemicals, drugs
15. Glasst etc.
1’6. Cemenll .etc.
17. Metal products
18. Machinery not elect.
19. Elect. machinery
20. Vehicles
21. Construction
22. Electricity supply
Capilal stock per Percentage
unit labour (£000) Increase
1953 1960 1968 1953-60 1960-68
I .72
0.80
I .42
0.97
0.91
0,93
I .81
0.90
0.57
0.36
0.21
0.87
I .06
I .34
0.79
I. 62
0.79
I .30
0,71
I .07
0,26
I .80
2.44
0.88
2.88
1.25
1.33
1 55
2 80
1.02
0.99
0.~I
0.26
0.96
2.18
1’.63
0.95
2.68
0.88
1.08
0.89
1.06
0.54
17.26
2.65 42
1.46 10
3.67 61
2.85 29
I. 98 46
2.i7 67
4.26 55
1.43 13
1.36 74
0.68 14
0.41 24
1.39 10
7.75 106
2.13 22
1.64 ’ 20
4.06 65
1.75 11
1.95 -17
1.00 25
1.37 -1
0.78 108
18.01 46
9
66
61
128
42
40
52
4O
37
66
58
45
256
31
73
51
99
81
12
29
44
4
Basic source: (!) of Table 3.1.
s
Q
°.
.l
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cases were respectively 52 and 45. Positive percentage surpluses were much
more uniform in 1960-1968 thau in 1953-1960, standard dcviations being
respectively 37 and 21.
. ¯ The lack of obvious relationship between factor input and gross
output (i. e. between cols. 4 and 5 - or between cols. 6 and 7 - of Table 3.1)
is so evident that it is with something like relief that we discover tlmt there
is any relation at all. In fact r = . 58 (significant at null hypothesis probability
level. 01) for the 1960-68 period.
expected.
This value of r is far lower than might be
The most significant conclusion from tlhs part of our analysis is
t
that a L~.rge part (and possibly the greater part) of industrial output inthe
Irish upsurge period 196 0-68 cannot be accounted for by quantum growth in the
combination of labour and capital.
¯ o.
Oalbltal per Unit Labour
.,
While the statistical analysis in this chapter was designed to examine
only this problem of surplus it brought to light a far more serious aspect of
F
FJ
recent Irish industrial development which, indeed, requires more mmlysis
than we have been able to give it, namely the growth of capital compared to
that of manpower in industry, i.e. the factor shift from’manpower to machinery,
m~d Its implications.
.’ (Table 3.2)
k
Table 3.2 shows that far ,and away the most capital intensive
industry is electricity supply in 1968 followed, though at longremove by fertilisers,
[i
[]
drink, cement mid creameries. Percentage growth in the ratio in 1960-1968
was greatest in the case of fertiliscrs. There is l~ot a single exception to the
rule of growth in the ratio in 1960-68 and only two cases of decline (both small.)
J
In 1953-1960, Though 1953-1960 was a period’of slow industrial growLh iL is
5.
..-
7.
8.
9A.
10.
rt"12.
13.
r 14.
¯ -.15.
16.
r]17.
- 18.
19.
ri"23.24.
FI"26.2Z.
29.
30.
31"
32.
33.
35.
36.
[] 38.
39.
[1 .40.
¯
41.
42.
45.
4.6.
[]-47.49.
50.[]
E]
Table 3.3. Capital s:ock per unit labour (I),. earnln sg.~per worker (2),. ratio of numbers
of female to male workers(3), classified by~ industryt 1968.
Manufacturing
Industry
Bacon
Slaughtering
Creameries
Canning Vegs.
Flour
Other. Mi I ling
Bread
Sugar
Sugar Confec.
Fish
Margarine
Misc. food
Distilling
Malting
Brewing
Mineral waters
Tobacco
Wool & worsted
Linen & Cotton
Jute & Canvas
Hosiery
Boots
Mens Clothing
Shirt Making
Womens Clothing
Misc. clothing
Made Up Textiles
Wood
Furniture
Paper
Printing
Tanning¯
Leather Goods
Fertilisers
Oil Paints
Chemicals
Soap
Glass
Struct. Clay etc.
Metal
Machinery except to test
Elect. Machinery
Shlp & Boat B.
Land & Road
Other Vehicles
, ,"    .
Capital Earnings Fema le/Male
~er worker per ,;yorker/ rallo
1968 year 1968 1968
£000 £
."...:.’..
!
,t,
67O
718
718
538
723
762
723
897
642
536
661
536
736
834
1108
772
778
589 0
600 0
0.312
0.178
0.119
1.279
0.280
0.280
0.280
-0.q45
i .725
0.918
0. 936
0.918
0 *
0 *
0 *
0 *
i.422
.799
.416
585
533
556
465
364
416
4O8
442 4.
647" 0.
0.503
1.792
1.002
3.248
" 8.313
5.383
3~871
363
O8O
650
699
863
764
496
1084
827
562
749
746
830
772
749
658
915
986
1053
0.080
’0.614
0.324
0 *"
1.381
0 *
0.     *
1.073
1..115
0.275
0     *
0.125
0 *
0.921
0 *
0 *
0 *
1.69
1.47
3.95
1.83
3.97
2.99
1.94
3.50
2.23
1.94 .
2.44
3.12
3.87
3.36
5.08
2.24
2.65
I .50
2.11
1.93
1.46
0.65
0.45
0.36
0.43
0.38
1.25
1.62
0.70
2.30
1.46
2.05"
1.01
8.01
2.53
2.19
2.30
1.68
4.17
1.81
2.08
1.05
2.43
¯1.4.0
1.43
Basic sources: (1) of Table 3.1 and individual industry reports from CIP 1968 in
": No £emale workers in these industries or less lJmn. 005 ratio.
¯ INotu .
ISB (for last column]
Figures for caphal stocl{ per unit labour above differ front similarly desclqbed figures for 1968 in
Table 3.2 because of (i) grouping and (ii) figures in Table 3.2 are based on averages of capital
figures at beginning and end of year and in Table3.3 capilal figures are for flu; end of 1968.
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evldent that capital intenslty was well on its way. With growth durlng 1960-1968
there was a conslderable increase in capital intensity: the simple average of the
percentage increases (including negatives) was 38 in 1953-1960 (7 year changes)
compared wlth 60 in 1960-1968 (8 year changes).
What is utterly unexpected is tile entire absence of relatlonship
between the increase in the ratlo and the actual rate of growth in gross output amongst
the 22 industrlal groul~s. For1953-1960r r = -.21; for 1960-19681. r = -.27. Both
negative s]gns are perverse; anyway neither value is signlficant even at the . 1 NHP Ievel.
Earnlngs and Capital
As a general rule men were better paid than women in 1968 and
capital-lntenslve industrles are also male-lntenslve. Table’:S.3 was prepared as a basls
for measurement of these phenomena. As already indlcated~ the rather remote reference
year 1968 is the latest’for whlch we have the Henry-Scbtt capital statlstics.
:
" Eable 3.3~. "
."
The very conslderable range of values for each variable will be noted.
The correlation coefficients are as follows:-
.. .r.12 = .6317
r13 =--.4616
" .’
r23          -- .6831
Subscripts indicate variables involved~ as shown at head of Table S.3.
"- 6~ -
For 42 d.f. th~ .001 NlflP critical point is .4589 so that all three coefficients
may be regarded as highly significant.
The really significant correlation is what happens when the
/
¯ female-male ratio is constant, in fact ri2.3. The value is .4883. For
4.1 d.f. the .01 NHP critical point is .3890 so that the positive relationship between
Fl
[]
[]
[i]
[]-
[]
[]
° ,J
[}.
capital intensity and average earnings sex-corrected is emphatic.
Tl~e OLSregression is -
-- -1.04 + .0047x_ - .048x^,
xlc (1.06) (3.75) 2 (0.35)L 
t-values in brackets. F = 14.0, significant at NHP of" .001.
R2= ".,4007.    Incluslon of X3 (= female/male ratio)¯ does not improve the regression;
in fact omitting it gives a simple regression with R2 2= r12 = .3990 nearly equal to the
value for the two indvar version. On reordering the residuals ac.cording to the
magnitude of indvar X2, tau is found to be 26 (out of 44 sign changes) giving no indication
of residual auto-regresslon. At the same time, the earnings "explain" only two-flfths
i
of the variance of capital per worker. It is of interest also that the intercept in the two
indvar regression is not significantly different from zero.
°.
Causatlon.ls perhaps more plausible from regression¯ of X2
i.e. of earnings per worker on capital per worker.
x.=X.-.X..
I    I    I
on X
]’
The regression isx 2 = 79"3x1’ with
R2 = .4007, as before.    An increase of £1,000 in capltaJ (at 1958 prices)
per worker would increase earnings per worker by £79 at 1968 rates.
What is happening to an appreciable extent is as follows. Tangible
capltal is replacing labour at an increasing rate, i.e. constantly fewer workers are
required for a given quantum output. More workers are made re’dundant than would
otherwise be the case. The real earnings of those at work are greater than they would
have been wtthoul; increase J.ll eapil;a].. Another interpretation would be that, when
real wages increase a lot, firms feel they .have no choice but to have recourse to new
%
investment embodying the latest technology to increase production.
/
,/
1
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Policy Implications
The foregoing statistical analysis has shown clearly:-
(1); At the macro level ia UK and Ireland some three-quarters
of recent growth is unexplained by quantum input of labour
and capital; there is a large proportion of industrial ~,n-owth
In Irelm~d not accounted for by factor (capital in partJ.cular)
greyish.
Capital intensity (in relation to labour) is increasing" and
lndu strywise i s unrelated to growth.
F
Both findings are relevmlt tb a consideration of the role
of physical capital in future economic and, perhaps more important, social
development in Ireland. The implications of the second showing are of fundmnental
significance, as we hope to show, Both points support our main thesis, which is
that, as a matter of national policy, net additions to fixed capital stock be reduced
to a mlnlmum* i.e. that such increase be resorted to only ~ter the most intensive
examination of the potential of existing stock, if necessary with replacements,
Increased output being achieved by improved mmmgement and labour, increased
shift worldng, improved materials,skilled max.keting, chmlge of produ.cts in
.,,
accordance with demand,.in fact every device exceptnet increase in capital.
!
Objections to increasing capital are mainly the increasing, current cost of depreciation /
(tending to increase the competitive cost of the article) and the large impoi:t content
of capital goods used i,1 Ireland - direct and indirect possibly 70 per cent - inimical
$$
¯ to our serious balance of payments problem.
I ’
We remind the reader once more that all the comment in
this chapter relates to const~-mt price series of variables. Price i~fflation is not
A colleague comments: "I suspect that Government policy should be devised in such
a way as to influence the composition of capital- that is, halt the recent trend towards
labour-saving capital m~d seek to increase capital comptementary to labour at all
skill levels". Of course we agree. ,
Would the energy Industries please note, and authority for the vast building Industry
rccognisc that many more buildings call be reconstl~mted thau now-built within a
given sum awfilablt; for capital invcstme,~t?
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a direct element here though it does, of course, affect output, foreign trade etc.
?
in their physical aspect. Inflation is m~ arch-agent for the misdirection of economic
activity away from social optimality.
As to point (1) above, the sdrplus phenomenon is, of course, a
good and it is satisfactory to note that Irelm~d is we]if to the fore in its exploitation.
All that seems to be required is that the fact enter tlm consciousness of pla:mers,
public mid private. The slogan might be " more output is possible from your
,
existing capital stock" (apart, of course, from present depression levels). In this
respect individual firms would do well to try to imitate their best exemplars,
always bearing in mind the Linehan 1962 showing, that in a given i’ndusti7 in a given
.2:$$
year net output per person engaged cm~ vary in the ratio 4:1 .
.... ¯ - o ......... ¯    ¯ . ,
As to (2), increasing capital intensity is a world problem for
_~
which we do not presume to know the answer. The marked tendenoy towards ’.
substitution of machines for labour is specially grave for Ireland with its endemically
/
.high rate of unemployment which (including unregistered’) at present may amount to
one-seventh of the work force. The tendency is, of course, good for exporters of
i
[:I
[J
[:1"
capital goods, typically the economically adv,’mced countries. We had this aspect
In mind when, in the previous section, we recommended that Ireland should seek a
larger share in heavy, industry, if only in its ¯small 15arts.
............ m.
We are emphatically of the opiidon, that almost exclusive acceptance
of the profit motive in tl~e private zone will not ~olve the Irlsh unemployment         ~.
o°
problem, or lead to even a sizable reduction in the pr.esent level during the
next few years. Government must intervene. To rep’eat, a point ¯made " .
’
¯ g¯°~._ . ’
In previous papers*~* ’in future planning emphasis should be on volume of employmen
rather than on income. Faced with a choice, we would prefer a situation of a. lower
rate of increase of real income per head (including unemployed ~md unemployment
pay) and a low rate of unemployment, thml the contrary. The personal preferences
of the writers do not matter. We merely pose the problem which must be faced,
1
¯
i
~
$
This observation is based on limited investigation, for instance undcrutilised.
eap.ital capacity may be related to profitable use of the capita[ stock.
’,~ ¯                                                ,                           ..
The Structure of Irish Industry T.P. Linehan, Journal Of The StatisHcal And Social
~(_’.i__c_h[ of Irel:md 1961-62: comment by I~. C. Geary
$$$
lt,C, Geary m~d J, G, Hughes: C~.rtatn Aspects of Non-Agricultural
Jj~emplovmunt in h’el.’md ESI]I P:q~or No 52, l)ul.)lin 1970,
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4. Three Studies on Irish !!!~
ThisphPor on Irish industrial adaptation led us rather far
b.
afield. Following are three mutually indepeJ~dcnt aspects which we thilfi< worthy
of retention. The first, basecl o11 financial accounts of Irish public compmfics,
rech’esses to a eert,’~/n extent the balance of official statistics which make no
disth~ction between native and overseas enterprises, the latter so important
In recent years, dealt with by D. i~eAleese. ..
The second is a contribution to the very vexed question.of the
extent to wliich industry ,’rod other autonomous economic activity c{’eates service-
r
type and other induced employment. Like of~hcr writers we refrain from
suggesting a multiplier.
The near-constancy over the years of the percentage employment in
ma.nufact~lre to total non-agricultural employment is notable:-
1951 1961 1966 1971 , 1976
. ¯ (e std. )
25 27 27 27 27
The provincial ratios are almost equally remarkable for their constancy: 28
per cent in Leinster, Munster and the three Ulster eoun[ies in 1971, if only
17 per cent in Colmacht. It is quite likely that the Connacht ratio had increased
since 1971, due to the promotional activities of IDA and SFADCO.
We arc concerned with national as distinct from lecal induction
with which Baker, Black and Jefferson deal - see later. Will the multiplier of
nearly 4 persist innon-agriculture, i.e. that 27 extra jobs in manufacturing
lndusb:y will result in a total of 100 extra jobs, i.e. 73 extra jobs? We need
not mention induction 6vhich really begs a question)but simply the fact of the
constant ratio. A more prosperous agriculture will promote jobs In non-agriculture.
But will the fact of so much of the new industry being "forced" by IDA grmlts
m~d tm~ holiday militate against the nl~tntenance of the multiplier ?
*D. McAleese A Profile of C,r:lnt-’Aidedh~(lustrza. IDA, l)ublin, 1977.
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We do not attempt ,’mswers but we suggest that these important
aspects merit hivcstigation. Indecd we think that authorities, should give as much
attention to the p~’omotlon of service-type employment locally m~d nationally a~
they now give to the economic aspects of industry mid AFF. Even from the
narrower viewpointof induction, we hint at a multiplier of 2. We
are convinced it is much larger but we cannot even conjcctx/re how much.
The third paper uses data derived from E.W.
.o
IIenry’s I0 Table
’to display certain general relationships pertaining to Irish manufacturing industry
In 1974.
o
o
."
q
*We understand that the IDA’~glve attention Io the promotion of service industries
but our point is that in view of" the vast employment potential perhaps more
emphasis on this aspect may be desirable.
-i
- ~9 .-.
4.1 Irish Industrial Public Com~
f
.,
Our basic sore:ca here is the mmual summary of public companies
published by The Irish Times. The statements we.use are those for 1971, 1973
mid 1976, those for 1971 and 1976 prepared by Bill Murdock and that for 1973 by
,
Anthony Keogh. Notoriously, financial accounts of companies are not suitable
as statistical "docmuents and the c°mpilers have done wonders in endowing them
with statistical form. ThroLjgh no fault of the compilers,the inadequacies are
manifest. The twelve months to which the accotmts relate differ in considerable
degree, l~articulars are missing in a number of cases. I~otmding-off in the case
of our principal variable, number of employees, indicates imprecision. We do’
not think that there is nmeh point in giving exact descriptions of the variables we
use, beyond those given by the compilers. We did not expect to find many
significant relations in our analysis. If lack of relationship is due to statistical
inadequacy in the basic data we can at 1east argue that if we ’had exact data, at
best the relationslzips could not be very strong. One can at least assume that the
lack of relation is correct told in some cases tlzis is ilfformative.
- Before 1973, the return related to the "Top 50 Companies" and in
1973 it was expanded to include "all industrial companies with a Stock Exchange
quotation", and additions made to the amom~t of information provided. Most of the
heads of information are clear enough from their titles, except perhaps in a single
ease, capital employed, defined as follows:
it is the sum of issued capital, reserves, loans, bank overdr~t, minority
interests and future tax, less any goodwill.
We make two analyses - (i) 1971-1973 ,and (ii) 1973-1976, the idea
in (i) being a period of relative prosperity and (ii) a comparison of a good year with
a bad. In our OLS regression our depvar was percentage change in number of
employees, In (i) we included 34 companies, all those with tmchm~ged names,
though they may have changed in str~cim:o from take-overs etc. We also omitted
The 50 Largest Irish Inchlstrial Comp~mies 1971. Compiled by Bill Murdoch
Irish Times December 1971. The Irish Times - Irish hMustrial Companies 1973
Compiled by Anthony Keogh. IX.[Sfi__T_!~.nc_,.~.December 1973. The irish Times -
Irish COmDmlies 1976. Conmi[ed by Bill Murdoch Irish Timr:s: Dac~.mbc.r 1 970.
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a few companies which we did,1’t think qualified as "industrial".
I
1971-1973
In full, our variables for (i) are:-
.
2.
3.
4.’
5.
Number of employees, percentage change 1971-1973.
Profit, before interest and tax, percentage chm~ge 1971-1973.
Capital (as defined above), percentage change 1971-1973.
Number of employees 1971, as measuring size.
l~ercentage of exports 1973 -’
Percentage of equity held -
6.        by director and family interest.
7.        outside the State.
8. Equity market capital, percentage change 1971-1973.
Regression of variable 1 on the remaining seven was highly
significant: F = 3.89 almost exactly at the NItP of .005 for d.f = (7,26).
significance was entirely due to a single variable 3, change in capital, the
This
coefficient for which was 0.43 (t = 4.98), none of the other coefficients (flmluding
constant) being near NHP = .10 significance level. This memos that an increase
of i0 per cent in capital (as defined) resulted in an increase of about 5 per¯cent
in employment.
. °
Of the 28 correlation coefficients (r) only four proved significant
at NHP = . 10 level.
Variables
(1,3)
(2,8)
(3,5)
(6,7)
¯ °.
r NHP significance
¯ 700 ¯ 001
°’
¯ 475 ¯ O1
¯ 375 .05
-.533 ¯001
The last is obvious and requires no comment. The first has been
dealt with. One would perhaps expect the r (2,8) to be ever stronger. The
significant value of r (3, 5) shows that faster growing companies export a
higher proportion" of tl~eir output than do smaller companies°
I
/
/
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The non-significmlces are more interesting. They cml be
inferred from what has gone before. We mention three only. S~ze (wu-iable 4)
is unrelated to any of the other variables, including export propensity; neitl~er
is variable 6, percentage of equity held by tinnily and directors, except to the
obvious variable 7. That symbol of economic virtue, propensity to export,
had little, if rely, effect on employment. In fact r = . 22 (at least the sign is
) with NHP = . I0, r = . 29. Exporting firms were not sigqdficm~tly more
successful increasing profits in 1971-1973 than were other firms; in fact
r = . 15 between variables 2 and 5, far below NHP Significance of . I, but with a
positive sign.
1973 - 1976
" The Irish Times cover,~oe for these years was much more
¯ complete thml before 1973. Two extra variables were provided:-
9. Turnover, percentage chm~ge 1973-1976.
10. ]3orrowing as a percentage of shareholders f~mds 1976.
Our main interest being change between Ilm taro years we had to contend %%4th many
gaps, particularly in turnover in 1973. As will be seen, variable 9 was found to
be important in the study of relationslzip told filling the gaps was little better than
gnless-work. We were able to include 61 industrial firms, similarly named, in
our comparisons of 1973 and 1976, to repeat, between a good year and a bad year.
In Table 4.. 1 We provide simple analyses of the data before
consideration of statistical relationship, concentrating on classification by size
(number of employees in 1976). Total employment in these public compm]ies
fell by 9.7 per cent. Tiffs compares with a fall of 6.2 per cent for all transportable
goods (TG) hldustries. The TG experience is the better because it does not include
the Construction industry (with some firms ~’unongst the public companies) and
includes the added employment from firms comfl~g into existence between 1973
mid 1976.
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Table 4.1. Comparison in 3.9’/3 and 19’/0 between
,employment,_ val.___ue of ectt.ljty_ n)a._rke.t capital and
profit’ of Irish industrial public companies classified
,by size 0mmber of en~loyees, 1976)
Class:                   I II III IV            V All
Size: 5, 000 .~ 2 - 5, 000 1 " 2, 000 500 - 1000 Under 500 sizes
Number of companies: 3 4 16 13 25 61
Employment (000)
1973 16. 1
1976 17. 5
Percentage chmlge +10, 8
Equity marlat
.
capital (£ million)
at end of year
1973 74. 7
1976 91. 1
Percentage chm~ge +22. 0
I
Profit (£ million)
before interest & tax
1973 " 12. 9
1976 24. 5
Percentage change +89. 4
13. 2 25. 4 10. 6 "9. 1 74. 4
11. 7 . . 21. 4 9. 3 7. 4 67. 2
-11. 8 -15. 5 -12. 6
-18. 5 - 9. 7

36. 1 86. 9 45, 0 26. 0 268, 7
16. 3 " 60. 5 22. 9 13. 7 204. 5
¯ "54. 8 -30. 4
-49. 2 "47, 4 - 23. 9
5.9 17,5 8.7 3.5 4~5
6. 5 20. 3 10. 0 4. 1 65. 3
+9. 2 +16. 2 +14. 0 +17. 2 +3~,. 5
Basic source: The Irish Times annual reports on Irish Industrial Companies, 1973 and 1976.
tt
It is ob~dous that the three large class I firms had a far more favourable
experience generMly thml other public companies, in respect of all three factors. We
cannot argue that their success was due to their size. It ma:~ be nearer the truth that
their size is due to their success in the past. ""    .
In interpreting the equity and profit figures’ it is necessary to take inflation
into account, the most suitable measure of which is the CI°I which increased by 66.8 per
cent between 1973 and 1976. Accepting CI~I as a deflator, the re,~l equi.ty.and profit
situations cml be summarised as follows:-
Real percentage changes 1973-1976
Size class of company I II - V
Equity market capital
-26.9 -65.0
Profit +13.5 -31.3
All sizes
-54.4
-19.4-
These figures indicate a low state of confidence in the Irish capital market
in 1976. Even the excellcnt profit showing: of the three large class I companies evoked
only a poor" equity response.
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- Exports had to be treated separately since there wereso many
data gaps.
Tnble 4.2 Exports of Irish industrial public eompmfies 1973 and 1976
Size class
Number of ExporLs(£ million) Chm~ge
companies
1973 1976 per cent
.I
¯ I 3 16.7" 31.1 +86.6
H 4 11.6 57.2 +393.i
III 14 27.8 67.0 +140.8
IV 5 7.0 i5.6 +123.9
V 11 6.2 7.1 + 14:9
All sizes 37 69.2 178.1 +157.2
Basic source: Same as Table 4.1.
Total exl~orts from Ireland, except of live animals (hence "industrial"
in some sense) amomlted to £748.5 million mid £1749.6 million in 1973 and 1976
respectively, ml increase of 134 per cent, compared to 157 per cent for the 37
compmHes in Table 4.2. Obviously the export record of the 37 was comparatively
satisfactory except with the smallest grade V compm~ies. Exl~orts of the 37was
ahnost exactly one-tenth of tot~ exloorts (except livestock) in 1976.
The 37 companies were only those for wl~ch data was available for
both years 1973 and 1976. There was a great improvement in availability in 1976.
In fact, no fewer than 64 companies supplied particulars of exports (if often nil or
very small). They were distributed by magmitnde of exloorts as shoxml in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3. Irish public compm~Aes classified by size of expol~s in 1976
Size of exports No. of
(in £ million) firms
Total value of -
exports Turnover
Ex2~ort s as
percentage of
i~arnover
or over
1 - 5 16
0 - 1 21
No exports 18
£ million
139.6
40.7
7.7
0’
387.7
237.1
166.5
178.3
36.0
17.2
4.6
0
TotaI 64 188¯ 1 969.6 19.4 ’
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Expol~ distollion is evident: the nine comp.anies (out of 64) ~4th largest exports
accoualt for three-quarters of Irish public 9ompmw exports but for only two-fifths
of turnover. Encouragement told help to all these compm~ies to improve their
export performm~ce might substantially reduce the half-billion visible trade
balance.
as follows :-
OLS regression of variable i on the remaining nine variables was
-2~.9 + 0.1787 x3 + 0.078G x9 + (terms in other V mdvars)
(2.50) (2. ~4)     (2.74)
F=4.75        I~2 = .360, n = 61.
Only the two fl{dvars shown had coefficients significm]tly different from zero (near
NIIP = .01). The F-value indicates NHP = .001 significmfce. The seven omit±ed
values add nothing to the regression since I~2 = .421 for the regression of )~ on
on ~ and X9 alone. On the other hm]d inclusion of both variables is useful since
.
I~2= .322 for X1 onX3 aloneand~2 = .367 for X1 on X9 .
In words: percentage chsnge in number of employees 1973-1976
is positively related to a combination of percentage changes in capital and hlrnover.
. Of the 45 correlation coefficients (r) bet~veen the ten variables
11 proved significant at NHP = . 1, as follows:-
i
Variables ~ r NHP
(I, 2)
(1,8)
(1,9)
(2,3)
¯(2,8) .
(2,9)
(2,1o)
(3,9)
(4,,~)
(4.,7)
(G,7)
.416
¯ 577
.614
¯ 504
¯ 508
¯ 713
¯ 216
¯ 651
.232
¯ 228
¯ -. 330
significm]ce
.001
¯001
.001
.001
.001 .......
.001
¯ I0
.001
¯ 10
¯ i0
.01
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The system is a f,~irly highly intercorrelated one. The only
variable missing is 11o. 5, percentage oxq~orts 1976. There was no sig’nificmlt
relationslzip between tlis variable told chamges in employment, profit or rely
oflmr variable considered. That some of tlle relations are as they shoLLld be,
... is statistically reassuring.
Comparing with the 1971-1973 period variable no. 3 (percentage
change in capit,n/) appears as a significant indvar in both. Three of the four
¯1971-1973 correlation coefficients appear amongst the eleven for 1973-:’1976.
Altogether, the results for the two periods are consistent, generally stronger
in the later period.
¯ Of particular interest is the fact of a significant positive correlation
between changes in employment mid profits (variables 1 and 2). But we also
notice that as we might expect, each is highly positively correlated with chmlge
in t-~lmover. What happens ~4th change of t~arnover construct ? We find r12" 9
fmsig]dficantly different from zero. The relationship between chm~ges in
employment and profits is entirely due to the fact that each is related to hm~over.
Turnover turns out to be a strong variable in tl~e 1973-1976 system.
But, as noted earlier, the comp~’mies with missing figures for 1973 which had to
be guessed were tmcon~fortably numerous, so it was decided to rerun the
data omitting the 16 missing companies. Most of t.hese were small ........
The following results relate therefore to Irish public companies on averse larger
than the 61 already reported on for 1973-1976. The regression is
Xlc = -26.8 + 0.2196X3+0.0835 X9 +.(terms in other 7 fndvars)
(1.86) (2.46)
..
F= 3.68, }~2= .359, n =45.
The two indvars picked out as significant are the same as previously
and the coefficient values are not seriously different. The F value is lower but
still indicates equation signific~mco, but now at NIIP = . 005. P~y the 1~2 test the
seven indvars other thm~ X3 and X9 contribute nothing to the regression.
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As to the correlations,variable 11o. 5 (percentage exported) is
not si~]ificm2tly reiated to :my of tlle other’ nflm variables. Our m,Mn interest
is, however, variable no. 9, the reason for the re-cqmputering. Its si~ific,~nt
r - values now are
r (1,9) = .629
r (2,9) = . 731
r (3,9) = .716
2}hough all are slightly larger thin1 in the previous experiment, they are not
significm~tly so.
".
Of cburse there are mm~y other aspects of relationship between profits, turnover
e~orts etc. that could have been discussed but in the interest of brevity
cannot be developed in this paper,
¯
~ "
o
.° .Q’ ¯
4.2 Autonomous and Jlnduced Emplo._oyment
,o
Official policy to create employment in Ireland has always
concentrated on industry proper. I.t ks recognised that concomitantly employmeiit
In service-type economic activity should exl)mld, without much promotional
effort, h~ fact there never was rely prospect of attainment of full employment
(without large scale emigration), or mwwhere near it, through increased
employment hi industry alone, Policy concentration on industry (as distinct
from services) is natural: industry units are typically larger in employment
.than service units, and hence promotionally more rewarding per unit created.
:Policy decisions to establish industry, either in private or public sectors
were not he~,evcz; based primarils; on employment potential but on prospect
of profit in the Private sector, mid on social and economic need in the public
sector; rather, in chehe terms, "regard" was had" to employmeat.
¯ ¯ ~ ,
 .
/
I
!
/
¯ Vast sums have been spent officially on helping agriculture but
never in the expectation of increasing employment. Ever since the :PoPulation
$
Commission there has been tacit acceptance of the notioh tlmt income was
all that mattered and average incomes were to be increased by reduction of
manpower (the denominator) rather¯ than by substmltially increased aggregate income
(the numerator). We have expressed our strong disagreement with such toleration,
being of the opinion that unless the flow of m,-mpower from agriculture can be
statmched there can be no hope of reducing the chronically high level of mlemp}.oyment.
Tostart a statistical examination attention is directed to Table 4.4
Building m~d services (3) are now more than half total emplo#ment; despite the
Con]mission on Emigration
Office Dublin 1954,:Pr 2541.
and Other Population Problems 1948-54. Stationery
** R.C. Geary ai~d M. Dempsey (1977):"A Study of Schemes for the Relief of
Uneh]ployment in Ireland." FSIII Broadshect No. 1.4.
Table 4.4
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Numbers (000)at work in broad branches of economic activit~,,h’eland
¯ " 1951, .1961, 1971 and 1976
Economic activity 1951 1961 1971    1976
1. Agriculture, forestry, fiskhlg 498 380 273 243
2. Other production 195 198 238 228
3. Building, construction, services 524 475 544 564
4. Total at work 1,217 1,053 1,055 1,035
3 pel: unit of -
1 plus. 2 0.76 0.82 1.06 " 1.20
2 . 2.69 2.40 2.29 2.47
Basic sources: CP (1951, 1961, 1971); ER told O June 1977 (1976)
depression their number is estimated to have hmreased by 20,000 since 1971. Number
In agr’icult~are etc (1) has halved since 1951. Our main interest is, Imwever, in
the quasi-multipliers in the last two rows..The contrast will be noted: the
considerable ,’rod regular increase in tlie ratio of’building etc and service to
production employment in the twenty-five years mid the comparative constmmy of
the ratio of services etc to what is mainly employment in mmmfacturing. If we
o
wished to formulate a theory of causation for employment, with production
the cause m~d services etc. the effect’we would be incline~l to regard 2 above as
having a far stronger effect on the level of 3 than has i and 2 together’or, more
[1
I[:]"
, °
simply, that agriculture has a comparatively small effect on the demmld for
services. Admittedly this train of argument is weak but the conclusion agrees
,
with that of T.J. Baker (1966), the pioneering Irish researcher in this field, as
**
regards locally induced employment. W. Black and C.W. Jefferson (1974), on
the contrary, found that in Northern Ireland ’
"There is very little evidence that the inductive
power of agricultural employment is significantly
lower thml the inductive power of non-:agricultural
employment in Northern Ircl;md. There is no
evidence i:hat farmers spend a lower proportion of
hmomc on induced activi.ties than the rest of the
community."
i
* T.J. Baker:Regional. Employment I)atterns in the~ ]Republic of .Ireland, L,.,’,qRI Paper No.
32. 1966
** Willimn Black and Clif.ford W. Jcrr.erson:I~cgionaI Employment Patterns in Nc, rihern
h’eland, ESI~]: l)apcr .No. 73, 197,1.
The difrereace at tile thne may be partly due to average agricultural income
fll North’crn Irelandbeing k~rger thml in the Republic. What is rca]ly w,~ntcd
Is a multiplier to convert each unit of causitive employment created into
total employment. Neither Baker, nor Black-Jefferson ngr Baker and Ross provide sue
on
2~stimate, we consider wisely, as a result of own investigntion reported here.
The multiplier is here basically an income concept (though originally an employment
concept), as Black-Jefferson have emphasised mid from which, indeed, they have
evolved a useful definition: induced employment ina district is that of persons who~-
.2
hleomes arise in thedistrict, the autonomously employed are all othdrs at work,
1. e. those whose incomes come from outside the district.
Baker made a careful allocation of numbers in the categories
afltonomously induced locally, based on CP industrial statistics of persons
"’at work, his district units being the twenty-five cotmties, excluding Dublin.
I-Ils allocation would, in the mahl, agree with the Black-Jefferson income
source definition just cited. There could, of course, be differences of
opinion even within the allocation of individual industry numbers to either
category but breaking down such numbers would be arbitrary and the
statistical results would probably not be significantly dtfferdnt.. So, in our
Investigation, we have adopted for 1971 the Baker allocations of individual
Industries, as far as we could.**
Table 4.5 ~. Numbers (000) at. work in autonomous and induced employments,
Ireland1951~ 1961 and 1971
Category 1951 1961 1971
1. Agriculture, forestry, fishing, turf 502 384 278
2. Non-agricultural autonomous
3. Induced
¯ 315 324 392
400 345 385
4 Total at work 1,217 1,053 1,055
4 per unit 1 ptus 2 1.49 1.49 1.57
2 .plus 3 per unit 2 2.27 2.06 1.98
*Terence J. Baker and Miceal Ross: Employment Relationships h~ Irish Counties,
£SRI, Dublin 1975.
~:, :.
**There were sorne changes in indus.trlal’classlflcation at the 1971 CP compared
wTIh 1961. A6tonomous h~dustrles 183 and 228 (employing together merely 2,600
in 1961) had di.~.clppeared in 1971. lhelr irnpliclt erroneous inclusion in "induced"
in 1971 could make no di[t:ercnce to our results.
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It may come as a surprise Cl’able 4.. 5).that the non-agricultural autonomous
employed ,(2) h:we persistently increased despite the showing (in 1971-1976)
of Other production (2) in Table 4.4. The main reason is that head 2 in Table
4.5 large service-type branches are included, the principal, being 1Public
administration and de£cnce. (If, from one point of view postal services, in
particular, would be regarded as induced, by the ]31ack-a’efferson "outside
h~oome" standard they are clearly autonomous. ) ..
The last two rows of Table 4, 5 are multipliers of a sort, the
first in{plying that agricultural employment Ires inductive power equal to
th,’/t of non-agriculture, the last row hnplying that it has none. The figures
are given-"without prejudice". 1,1 what follows wc question the x-alidity of
{his type of multiplier approach.
We calculated the percel.ltage changesin number at work
bet~’,ee~l 1961 and 1971 for twenty-five cotmties (excluding Dublin) for the
following
1. Induced employment
Autonomous employment,’--
2. Non-agricultural
3. "Total (i.e. including agricultllre; fol.-estry, fishing, t~rf)
The following correlations (and their significance with 23dr) were found --
r {1, 2) =. 20, not significant at NHP =. 10
r {1, 3) =. 40, significant at NHP = . 05
Although number in agriculture ere fell in every county (and in a remarkably
,
m~iform way - o,1 Which we comment L~ter) inclusion of this economic activity
Ires a marked effect on relationship. Agriculture, with greatly increased
Income in 1971, now seems to have some effect in inducing local employment,
In agreement with.the .Blaek-Jcffersol)finding for Northern Ireland.
t.
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Disregarding the aul:onomous - induced aspect, we also obtained
the correlations for the main htdustrial grbup percentage changes in munbers
’1at’work 1961-197 , the twenty-five cotmties being again the units. The groups
are, -
Coeffic lent of
A ssociation*
i Agriculture, forestry, fislfing
2 Manufacture
3. Building, construction
4 Electricity> gas, water
5 Commerce, finance
6 Trmlsport, communication, storage
7 Public administration, defence
8 Professipns
9 Other’, or industry not stated
The column of coefficients will be dealt with later.
.21
.02
.25
¯ 14
.30
0¯2
$
-.10 "
.14
-.00
There are 36 correlation
coefficients, of wkich 9 (all positive) proved significm]t at IN IIP = . 10 by the
collvontional standard. In descending order of magifitudc the 9, with their
NHP significance were
Groups r
¯ . °.
1,5 .66
5, 8 .64
3., 5 .58
3,4 .55
I, 3 .41
8, 8 .38
¯ i, 8 ".. 38
4,5 .37
2,6 .36
NIIP conventional
significance
.001
¯ 001
. O1
.
.01
.05
.10
.10
.10
.10
The strong relationships between commerce (5) with agriculture (I) ,’tad
building (3) are of interest.
-t
The co-efficient of association for an industrial group is the shnple average
’of its 8 ccs. included whether conventionally sigldficant or not.
¯
’ ,                                                t 4
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Themost surprising showings are the low rating of h{amffaiture
(2) and the lfigh rating of Agricultnre (1). Even though the employment exl)erience
in agriculture 1961-1971 was uniformly decreasing co~.mty-wise, there was a
marked difference between comities which declined least and those that declined
most in agrieulh~re in the effect on local non-agricultltral employment power.
Note that agricultur6 occurs in three of the sig~.ficant ccs cited above, the
value of r(1,5) with commerce (5, with the highest association) being the largest
in the series. Mmmfacture has but one mention (r (2, 6) = . 36) of which tile
"significm~ce" is on]y NHP = .I0.
, It iS not une~l)ected that Public administration and’defence
¯ (7) and Other (9) are the only groups unmentioned amongst the significant co s
and their carrying negative signs amongst the coefficients of association is of
no importance.
We have been careful to emphasise the fact of association
rather than causation (implied by autonomous - induced theory), which is not
to imply that causation does not operate to some extent. We tlfink that, in the
m.aln, what is involved is the income multiplier, as Black-Jefferson have
suggested, the employment effects being nitional as well as local. It may be
that in the short run autonomous enterprise may induce employment o’utside the
enterprise but then expenditure of income takes over, with equal inductive effect
whatever the source of income. Wc were not very successful in our attempt
to "explain" the induced employment percentage increase oyer the period
¯ 1.961-1971, the depvar (no. 1) using OLS regression, our four lndvars being
I
--S3.-
Pcrccntagc change in employmcnt 19G1-71:-
2. Non-agricultu ral autonom ou s
3. AI?F and turf
4. . Pcrccni~ge in AFF in 1961
5. Average income 1965" "
f
’As before the units were the 25 counties . The F valu’e was Z. 38, significm~t
°
only at NHP = . 10 for (4, 20) d.f. The individual ccs.. are more intcrcst!ng.
O£ the ten, four are sign~ificant at NttP --"
Variables r
#
4,5 -.86
1,3 .51
3.4 -.45
3,5 -.43
¯ 05, as follows
NHP co1~ventional
slgniiicane e
.001
.01
.05
¯ 05
The highlighting of the agricultural variables 0los. 3 and 4) is very marked,
the high negative relationship between percentage numbers in
agriculture (4) and average county income (5) specially so. ’Poverty in agriculture
(pre-EEC, it will be noted) was obviously the main reason for exodus. 1V[ost
relevani: to the present inquiry is r (1,3): counties with least ~lecline in
numbers In agriculture were best inducing local employmcnll.
So our last word in this section must be on agriculture.
In the present analysis, nothing has struck us more forcibly than the mggormity
of decline in numbers at work 1961-1971 in AFF. The (weighted) average
¯ decIine was 27.9 for the whole Republic andthe range amongst the 26 counties
was only from 23.4 (I~ildare) to 35.1 (Leitrim). The main ilfference from
thls uniformity is the strength of the force of shedding of manpower in
agriculture, independent of geography, type of husbandry mad everything
else, during a period of unprecendented economic advance hl non-agriculture.
The first essential for the economic wcllb.eing of the nation
is that average farm income should be increased by a vast Increase in quantum
IVIic cal lloss: "Persona.1 hmomes by County 1965."
J
ESRI Paper No. 49,’ 1969.
/{:2--
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output, obtained by properly exploiting our main national asset, the land.
Thus present’numbers’will be retained on the land, enabling non-agriculture
to cope with the endemically high level of unemployment, draw in the slack of
underemployment on falm~s and, by increased agricultural exports, enabling’
the country to cope with another of our disasters, the import balance.
{
The analyses In the present chapter, in showing the positive
relation between change nmnber in agriculture and number in non-agriculture,
demonstrates that nothing would be more conducive to local employment in
non-agriculture than an improved manpower outlook in agriculture.
~. °:
4.3
I
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The Constituents of Irish Mmmfachu-ing Industry_
The basle data in this section are derived
,.
from a 1974 Input-Output table prepared by E¯W. Henry and
described by him as consisting of "rough estimates"; as such they suit our
hmncdiate purpose which is oag.y to display orders of magnitude..         ¯
.. . . 1-. q., ,: .’..’... ~o
¯ ¯
.
..
¯ _ .......
." ........
: ........ - .... :...: ¯ .......~__:~_.~__ .:.. ................
IrE sh m amffaeturing industry, 197.4 Percentage of
£
output
1. Gross output, including interindustry and VAT 2,234 116¯ 8
2¯ Interindustry transactions ..’ 321 16¯ 8
3. Output 1,913 100
4. " Materials and services from outside mfg¯ ind. 1,302 68¯ 1
5. Added value 611 31.9
6. Paid to government, incl. VAT, net of subsidy 104 5.4
7. Depreciation and saving 81 4¯ 2
8. Employee compensation, disposable 346 18.1 ¯
9. Net profit, disposable 80 4¯2
Notes
Relations: 3 =1-2; 5 =3 -4;.5=6 +7 +8+9¯
,, An Input-Outnut Apl)roach to Cost-Benefit Analysis of Energy Conservation Methods,"
E: W¯ Ilenry Economic and Social Review Vo¯ 9 No¯ l October 1977. We are also vc, ry
¯
.          .             .                    .                   ’
much indebted to Iienry for advice and supplementary estimates in connection with
what follows in this section.
"% i.
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The outstanding fealure of the foregoing table is what
,
seems to be the meagre reward to owners (of capital) at some 4 per cent of output.
the sum set aside for capital replacement and development, also seems far too low.
On this showfng, owners of m.anufacLuring enterprises must surely lack incentive
/
to develop and it is a cliche in business that to stagnate is to die. The livelihood
of the 9.20,000 persons at work in manufacturing industries in 197.4, as welr as
the prospects of employment of those seeking work in these industries (the LR
alone for these industries numbered 16,000 in 1974.) depends on the outlook of
/
1
Ite~
i
U
l
1,-
the comparatively few people who run these industries. If decision to expm]d or
not (i. e. employ more or fewer people) is now made largely by managers (who
are technically employees), owners are the source of funds. A small shift in
r
lhe percentage from employee compensation (8) and government (16) (which need
not mean any absolute reductions in a growing economy) could mrfl;e a great
difference Lo the percentages at items 7 and 9, and hence towards capacity and
(lisposition to expmld. Niost (if not all) increased net income of owners must
accrue from tax reduction which, of course, cromer be confined to owners
(though weighted in their favour)~ut, by increasing their net incomes, will act
as a fillip to workpeople and m,-magcments as well. The principle of differential
taxation is now firmly established but is still far from fullyserving the nation’ s ec onomi
ends. Why, for instrmce, should exports be so favoured’tm,:wise when suh’cessful
competition against imports serve exactly, the same economic ends?
L[
E
E
°
¯ IIenry’s input-output table also enables analyses of some of
the foregoing figures to be made,’ e.g., ....... .
¯ .° "3. OutEut ... .... . ........4. Materials . ....£m .... % .........
£m ¯ % .
3.1 Home sales 934 48.8 4.1 Home purchases 693 53.2
3.2 Exports f. o.b.. 97.99 51___. 2
. =. 4.2 ImPOrts c. i.f. 609
3 Output 1,913 100 4. Materials 1,302
"l
-
...... ’ ..................... As reg~.ds both sales and purchases of materials and
services, honie and fordgn are about equal. While Output had a substantial
46.8
i00
direct import, content (nearly one-third in fact) the export balance was quite    .
This is a m.atter of opinion with which indeed a colleagxm demurs, pointing out
that: "This p.rof[t/sal.es ratio is in fact in line with historical experience, being
.4-,4% in 1.950 and 4, 6% in 19(;7. Such a markup may imply a rate of re.turn on
sharehohlers funds of around 15% which is adequa.te reward, I wouhl not necessarily
agree with lhe aul.hors that a 4% marlmp is too low." We, let our statement stand
for ~’tll’lh¢,l" d[t,(:u:;:::|Oll,
Table 4. $ Input to manufacturing industries 1974 (excluding purchases from other manufacturing industries) classified by industrial group and t:v~pe of input
Manufacturing industrial group
i. Food, drink, tobacco
2. Textiles, clothing, shoe, leather
3. Wood, furni~re, paper, printing
4. Chemfcais, rubber, plastics
5. Petroleum re~ining
6. Clay, cement, pottery
7. Metes, machinery
J
8. ~’ehicles
Total, manufacturing industry.
!. Food, drink, tobacco
2. Textiles, clothing, shoes, leather
3. Wood, furniture, paper: printing
4. Chemicals, r~abber, plastics
5. Petroleum refining
o
6. Clay, cement, pottery
7. iA[etals, machinery
8. Vehicles
Total, manufacturing industry
, _, e~.t TotalPurchases Indirect ts~xes Depreciation Employee D- ~
Home     Imported less subsidies and saving comp. before before input =
..... tax tax output
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Actual value s (£ million)
511.2 112.1 -4.2.6 29.8 134.8
50.4 93.0 5.7 ii. 8 72.0
20.6 43.5 3.7 6.4 43.0
28.4 65.2 4.7 9.3 46.5
3.5 90.0 0.4 1.4 3.0
23.8 15.7’ 3.1 , 8.0 26.0
40.4 106.4 5.5 I0.6 63.0
15.5 82, 8 14.0 3.6 41.0
37.1 782.4
I0.7 , 243.6
5.1 ¯ 122.3
¯ ".
18.8 172.9
3.1 101.7
7.0 83.6
15.7 - 241.6
8.4 165.3
693.8    608.7
-5.5 80.9 429.3 105.9 1913.4
Percentages
65.3 14.3
20.7 38.2
16.8 35.6
16.4, 37.7
3.5 88.8
28.5 18.8
16.7 - 44.0
9.4 50.1
36.3 31.8
-5.4 3.8 i7.2
2.3 4.8. 29.6
3.0          5.2        35.2
i
2.7 , 5.4 26.9
0.4 "1.4 3.0
3.7 9.6 31.1
2.3 4.4 26.1
8.5 2.2 24.8
4.7 i00
4.4 i00
4.2 I00
-0.3 4.2 22.4
I0.9 I00
3.0 I00
8.4 I00
6.5 i00
5.1 !00
5.5 !00
Source: Eo\V, He~%rv’s ES~ Sem}ng,~ L~OUt-(~’t~ut table :L97],                                                                           ~vl
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¯ healthy for manufacturing industry, equalling £370 millioll.
. .
f
13ut, as will transp!re, it must be increased.substantially,
for it is oil mmmfactdring, almost equally perhaps with agriculture, that the
respoilsibility falls of reducing or el[mhmth~g the present intolerably high
level ef the import balance.
Details of payments to government are as follows:-
~3nl
o
6.1 Social insurm~ce contributions " 29.3
6.2 Corporate profits tax . 12.8
6.3 Income tax 67.4
6.4 Indirect: taxes 18.8
6.5 Less subsidies -59.0
6.6 V.A.T. etc. 34.7
6 :Paid to government 104.0
%
28.2
12.3
64.8
18.1
-56.7
33.4
I00
I¯tem 0.3 includes income tax paid by employees as well as shareholders or
owners. No account has becri taken of customs and excise revenue duties
(Drlnclpally on drink, tobacco a~d petroleum products) amounting to £180 million,
as It is considered unlikely that any reduction in these taxes to improve profits
Is likely or desirable.
¯ L. -,
..                   .:.:"
.... ~¯..o
°.
1
Notes
Cols. 1,7: inputs from manufacturing industries excluded
Col. 2: imports are e.i.f.
Col. 3: includes VAT, conjecturally estimated
¯ Table 4.0 shows that while i Food ere has the largest
Irish content (i. e. Imports are comparatively small) it is proportionately a
poor creator of labour and Indeed, of added value generally.
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Table 4.6 contains many policy direci:ives. That two-thirds
of direct input of Food etc (1) is home-produced (mainly from agriculture, of
course) is in ~.vide contrast to the other groups shown. ’Clearly the industrial
hffrastructure exists for the material absorbtion of a great qum]tum development
In agriculture, with emphasis on meat etc, as distinct from live cattle expok~ts,
as suggested in section 2. " ................ . ......
" We have already remarked tllat manufacturing industry has
a subst,’mtial eN~ort surplus. This does not Mter the fact that direct imports
of this sector amount to nearly one-third of output or to two-fifths when Food
etc (1) and Petroleum refining (5) (ml obviously exceptional case) are omitted..
.Note that tl]ese proportions relate only to direct impqrts: if, in the logic of
IO, indirect imports were allowed for, the latter might be nearly one-half.
Clearly there is much scope for non-food industrial material development.       " ......
..... Petroleum refining (5) can ¯scarcely be said to be an industry
at all with its some 8 per cent added value. Ireland’s future i’ndustrial
assoctatibn with petrolefim should clearly be in other petroleum industries,
!
T!m.country’s remarkable success in the chemical industry generally, all~eady
,.o ..
noted in section 1; seems a good augury ..... --     .     .
.’An ExpeHrnentaI S>,stem of Non-Stochastlc Linear Fquatlons
Our system is extremely simple m~d designed merely
as an iIlustration using the data in section 4.3. We shall have 11 variables
¯ pertainifig to manufacturing industry, of which 8 will be endos and 3 exos, the
8 determining equations or accounting identities being linear. ’ The variables
are all real per unit changes between consecutive years, we introduce price
changes in the theory but eliminate them in the ariflmletical application. The
brLse year is taken as 1974, per unit changes relating to 1974-75. We envisage
1974-75 refit changes not as they had been but as they would have been if manufacturing.
Industry were advtmcing on the scale required to attain national ends, the
principal of these being, hi our view, employment increasing on a scale required
to m,ake a sizable negative Impact on unemployment.
-88-
Variables and Equations
All variables are at the macro level, i.e. they relate to
mmmfacturing industry as a whole, except where otherwise indicated. Subscript
t, current time, ks omitted; superscript(-1) means previous year’value, hence
predeterminecl. The system is n onstochastic.
Vm:lables with Hel~-y’s 1974 I-O values for mamffacturing
as a whole are:
Output
Holue sales
i~xports
Home materials m~d services
Im.pc~rted materials and services
Employee compensation, disposable
Paid to government
Depreciation and saving
:Profit disposable
X8 +X9
Export9 excess
1.974 value
£m
1,913
934-
979
693
609
346
104
81
80
161
.370
be YI
9~he X1 are current values so that, according to our
convention, the fig~tres shown, will be dubbed X’~1. Let real current values
1
so that
’" XI "= PI Yi’
"’PI being price index, previous year unity. Introducing lower case letters
xl’ PI’ Yi for refit changes, taking natm:al logs and differentiating we have,
appro~mately
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f
and similarly for the other
Yl arc the variables in our
xl = Pi + Yi’ with
Yi : c~i - Yl-%/ Yi-l : A Yl/Y[l ’
I. XI.-1
variables. Obviously Y[ =
equations m~d identities.
X1 = X2 + X3, whence
~xi =Ax~ -,-/~x3 or       ..           "
X~-i        ,~J         -i(1)                  (Pl + Yl) = X " @2 + Y2) + X3 (1:)3 + Y3)"
This is thefirst’of 8 equations in the y’s. We elininate the terms in Pi later
for reasons given,
0Ii)
¯., e- ....
,-~T..5
..
The next two equations are ’also derived from identities
-I -i -I
xi0 (%0 + Yi0) = xs % + Y8) + x .(% .,- y9)
-I -i .-i -i
"’"" " . " X101 (Pl0 + 5’10) = X1 (Pl + Yl) - X4 (P4 + Y4) - X5
. ".-X6 ’(P6 + Y6) " XT. 0..:)7 "~: Y7):
"Thafourth equation says that real output increase depends on real
¯
¯ ¯
pro£i.t mid saving:- ..
(~v) Yl = b1.. 10 YlO
IIere and elsewh.ere the b’s ~-e coefficients to which values will be assigned; in
general they are to be regarded as of + sign. Note that with the Yl notation
Implying ~ in original linear equations in Yi one .c~ disi~ense with the
constant in the latter. Of course some of the equations (like (y’) originate in
the Yi and have a constant.
~954"
Equation (v) is the crucial relation between rates of increase in real
labour cost (= nmnber of labour hours with labour productivity unchanged) and
output.
LI
(v) Y6 -b += 6.0 b6.1Yl"
Rate of inerhase in real. annual cai:)ital charge exceeds that of labour
by a constant positive amount.
(vi) Y8 " Y6 = b8.6°
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(vii)
The ratio of Input to outlmt Is given, or
-1
recalling that the X
Y4 4- Y5 = b4.5 YI’ or
X4-1 Y4 + X;1 Y5 = b4.5 Xl-I YI’
told y-I are the sa,ne.
By definition
(viii)
There would,
Xll = X3 - X5, hence
XII’I (DII + Yll) = XII (P3 + Y3) - X-I5 0~5 + Y5)"
of course, be other elements in such a balance but we ignore them
for simplicity.
Prices
The p variables occur only In the identities (i), (ii), (ill)
and ([,iii’). If they’were all assumed equal, as they might be for this arithmetical
i,
exercise, it is clear that the p terms vanish from the equations: e.g. In (I)
X1-1 .’= X;1 + X8"1. But whlle equality of the p’s iS a stffficient condition it is
not a necessary one, since, e.g. in (i), we might define Pl as given by
X1-1 5 = x2-1 P2 + x31 P3"
For our.purpose it will stff.fiee to assume that approximately all p tcrms vanish.
Values of Coefficients
The values of the X-1 ,’u-e as glvefi above. As to the b’s.
the value of bl.10 in (iv) was derived from somewhat elaborate process, described
In the next paragraph. [In (v) the values of -b6.0 and b6.1 will be taken as -0.01
and 0.5 respectively from page 4 in Chapter 1",] For equation (vl) we rel.y on the
last column of Table 2.2, relating to 1960-68. With such varlable percentages we
take the median value which, on an annual basis is about 5 per cent. Accordingly
we takebs.6as 0.05, In 1974b4.5was 0.68.
Value of bl. 1O
It was decided to base this eoeffieleut value on the relatioffship
between changes, at constant prices, In output alid remainder of net output (i. e.
gross output less materials etc. less employee compensation), the latter as a
proxy for gross profit¯ The basic data was for transportable goods from CIP
during the period 1960-1973. Indexes for remainder of net output’at constant
prices were found by deducting values of employee compensation from values of
net output, The latter process Was In two ways (i) using 1960 weights, (il) using
1973 weigh[s, 1. e. those at the beghmlng and end of the estimation perlod. The
Indexes weye then averaged (to base 1960 as 100),
¯ ,°
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¯ We then regressed Ioge.X and loge Y, (X and Y being
indexes of output ,-md’i’emnlnder at constant prices) on time t to find
loge
loge
so that
X = const. + 0.0(~35t
Y = const. + 0.1201t
d logo X/dr = dX/X dt= 0.53 dY/Ydt
Experimentally we decided to give bl. 10 three values O. 3, O. 5 (corresponding
to O. 53 "actual 19GO - 1973" above) and O. 7. Such a wide variation seemed
desirable since the estimates of the two sets indexes of remainder of net output
(i. e. (i) and (ii)) above were widely dKferent.
Actual Equations
¯
°
The equations in arithmetical terms ~ter reduction in
some cases are as follows. Most of the coefficients are based on the 1974
values, l.’e. the X-I given at the begimfing of this sub-sectlon. Note that it is
necessary only the tile basic "1974" values should be merely proportioned to
the act]/al 197~" values shown, m~d not exactly equal to these.
~)
~v)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(vlii)
:Yl = 0. y9 0.51 Y3
Yl0 = 0.50 y8+ 0.50 Y9
Yl0 = 11.88 Yl - 4.30 y~ -
Y’1 =bl. lO YlO
Y"6 = -0. Ol + O. 5 0 Yl
Ys.- Y6 = o.
O. 6 8 Yl = O. 36 Y4- + 0’. 32 Y5
Yll = 2.64 Y3 - 1.65 Y5
3.78 Y5 - 2.15 Y6
- 0.65 y7
In these 8 linear equations there are 11 Yi’S, so that three
In all discussions about manufacturing, by CII in particular.
no hesitation in determining two of these Y7’ pertahflng to taxation etc. and Yll
to export excess from manufacturing. As to the third, exo, we decided on
J
variable No. 1, output, the macro policy variable recogni sed as fir st In importance
variables had to be selected as exogenous, or policy--oriented. There could be
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¯ Even for such a Shnple nonstochastic exercise as this,
we would have wished to have many more equations and variables. We did indeed
start with a much larger system including equations e.g. for home demand,
export demand, a Cobb-Douglas production function m~d two wage-price equations, the
famous ][(.eynes negative relationship between real wage increase mad employment increa~
m~d extra variables included explicit variables p mid such other y variables as business
optimism, home m~d export ,sale pressures. While we could have evolved statistical
series for some of these extra variables’there would have been too many unlmown,
coefficients for us to hm~dle. The foregoing series is designed.to adjudge the
feasibility of inqreasing mm~tffaeture to cope with unemployment and lessening, if
not eliminating the overall impor~ bal,’mee by lower t/xation and other government aerie1?,
¯ We are aware that there are several elaborate stochastic
simultaneous equation systems in preparation mid we wish them every success.
Implicit in tlleir methodologny is that the parmneter system that obtainhd in the
past is to continue into the future. We, on the contrary, while not denying the
relevance of the past in plmming the near future, consider a rdvolutionary
approach essential if a sizable lessening of unemployment is to be attained.
This renders .the parmneter system as a whole derived from past e’mperience
policy should be directed to,yards deliberate change
°
These remarks apply particul,~ly to equation (iv). It is
doubtful if m]y such relationslfip is ascertMnable from past experience at the macro
level we postulate, though we do use coefficient values very loosely based on the
past in our solutions. Profit, distributed and undistributed, is, of its nature,
a residual and per unit change in profit was not in fact closely related to unit
change in output. We suggest that in future such a relation should be sedulously
eu!tivated, as a matter of government and IDA policy.
as somewhat irrelevant:
of some parameters.
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¯ Oi~r incthod was to invert the 8 x 8 coefficicnt matrix (with
variables ordered 2,3, .... 11) three times, 1. e. for three values of the coefficient
We then gave the exos several sets of values and solved in the endos y’s
bl. I0’
for each set. There were sets of solutions based on the following e~])erimental
va].ue s.
(i) bl. lO=0.3, 0.5. 0.7
(ii) yl=o. 05, 0. I0, 0.15, 0.20
(ub Y7 = o, -0.10, -0.20,-0.30
(Iv) Yll = O, 0.50, 1. O0
The computer (with the invaluable cooperation of E.W. Henry) produced 144:
(= 3 x 4 x 4 x 3)osets of values of the eight endos, As to the three exos, the
variables numbered 1, 7 and 11, we sought what would transpire from every
’,
eombhmtion of increases of 5 to 20 per cent in volume 0 to 30 per cent reductions
in taxation and 0 to 100 per cent increases in net exports, all in construct price
terms in relation to maJmfacturing output.
The results can oiily be described as surprising. By the
test of what we may describe as "balanced change" we had ~io trouble in rejecting
at sight the vast majority of sets of endo values. Even though the foregoing sets
of exos proposed may have seemed reasonable as grounds for policy, most of the
".
~o
"a/iswers" were outre m the extreme.
...
............. Incomparably the b’est-behaved set is that We term Set .4, as
follows 4)i.i0 = 0.3)
o. Set 4
Exo%
Yl = 15.0
Y7 = -i0.0
Yll= 0.0
Endo%
Y2 = 13.5
Y3 = 16.4
y4= 5.0
Y5 = 26.2
Y6 = 6.5
Y8 = Ii. 5
Y9 = 88.5
Yl0= 50.0
¯ °
Policy involve’d, here imp].ics a 15% increase in output, which ks about eqtmlly
balm~ced bctweell i11crease iJ1 home sales aad exl~orts. There would be a rcduction
of 10% in t,~ation,. Less desirable features are no increase in export excess
(vat. 11), a much larger increase in imported materials (vat. 5) thm~. ill home
materials (vat. 4) and m~ increase of 11-} per cent in gross saving (var. 8) may
not be enough.
We are not concerned t:o argue that this approach of ours,
wl’~ich we believe to be new, will ever be a complete determinant of policy. We
do suggest that, suitably m~d considerably elaborated, i~ can be used to show
whether a general policy, at macro level,is feasible or not: we again stress
the element of sensitivity which shows immediately whether .a policy i s worth
pursuing or not. We even suggest that using the computer to produce vast
numbers of sets of m~swers may be more useful thm~ the more familiar linea_r
or h~ultiple programming which is subject to the objections float it produces only
a single ans%,¢er; one doubts if any socio-economic system behaves optimally
and the single objective function allows little flexibility. Of course there is no
need for ri.valry: try every approach, stochastic and non-stochastic as regards
the statistical aspects, and these may not be the most important.
As regards elaboration we may point out tha~ the pres.ent is a
simplified version of Geary’s experimental input-output model, also non-stochastic,"
*
which took the different economic, sectors into accoui~t. If the present approach
be found worthy of further investigation it is suggested that it be extended to full
Input-output treatment.
The present analysis gives good reason£or the adoption of a
policy of 15 per cent increase annually of manufacturlng output accompanied
We note that the January 1978 Government White Paper o~ {~e economy contemplates
ml increase in the import excess uati[ 1980.
i
12. C. Geary "Towards all Input-OuIput Dccision Model for ]!rclaud" ~_8~!~I_A 0_~_5_
ESRI llel)rint No. 8..
(and encouragcd) by ,~ i0 per cent dceline in taxation. II: is i.n~eres~ing to note that
the 15 per cent, increase has been advocated by CII which, no doubt, has its own
good rcaso~s. The present model takes no account of stimulus whieli a reduction
of 10 per cent in taxation (or an equivalent subsidy) would give to industry.
From equation (v) an annual increase in volume of manuf.aeture would
lead to a 0½ per cen~ increase in employment. With employment in mmmfact~ring
Industry at about 220,000 in 1974, this would amount to l~early 15,000, Induced
employmentmight be at least as much again. An mmual increase in employment
of 30,000, together with a lessening of the flow from agriculture must m~e a
sizable impacl: on unemployment and underemployment,
o°
R
It
,J
Fi
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5. Concluslon
We absolve ourselves of the customary task in a final chapter of
summa1"ising o~Ir findings, since the study is prefaced by such a summary. I~stea.d
we introduce a number of new topics, inclu(U.ng the crucial one of finance and we
end with recommendations, revoh~tionary in character, for aetl.on, m~nly by
G overnm ont.
5~1 Finance
This section is about the shortest in the study but we deem it the
most Important. It is based on the single Table 5. i. While in inflated £ million
i:erms government aid to industry seems impressive, the picture is different
when const,-~.t price figures are used. Section (3) shows that total grmlts Were
less thm~ 2 per~ cent of GNP or 4 per cent of general govermn.ent, expenditure in
o
1976; an improvement, it is tr.ue since 1974.    No aaeount has been t,.qken of
/                           "
govermnent aid in the form of tax remission, which has been subsfanfial.
I
We tak6 the view (often repeated’ ) throughout this study that the
success or failure of economic policy is to be adjudged by the effect on h~creasing
employment and. 6vhat is not the same thing) sizable reduction of the present LR total
of jobseekers. With this end in view we agree with the past and present policy
outlook that the main pmmeea is to be sought in industrial exp,-mslon...It seems
obvious to us from the table that aid to industry is inadequate, having regard
to the magnitude of the problem* We could clearly, afford far more from our own
resources (having regard to national priorities), the financial requirements of the
agricultural revolution we ask for and the massive additional extern~fl loans we
consider necessary, as we hope on. a once-for-all basis, to give the economy the
initial momentum it rather desperately needs.
We confidently leave to our diplomats the task of persuading EEC
acceptance of further flagrant recourse to subsidi.sation of home h’~dustry, even
to the point of special aid from EEC. As we showed elsewhere Irehmd is the
J
*We stress thai-we are parllcularly concernecl wilh ~nclustrles w~lh a high job conlenl.
**R. C. Gearyand M. DempseywilhonApl>endlx b), E. Cosla: "A Studyof Schemes
for Ihe Relict: o1: Unemployment in Ireland", I!SRI Broadshecl Iqo. 14., 1977.
Table 5, I Government Grants paid to organi.qations dif!,ctlX assisth~:gZi,,ldust~____’~2..
1970-76
1970-71. 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 19’74      1975    197G
AnCO i, 5
IDA 19, 3
IPC 0, 1
IMI ¯ 0, i
Coras Trachtala i, 6
Kilkem~.y Design Workshops
IIRS 0.8
SFADCO I. 2
NDA 0.0
(1) Total Govermnent Grmlts by Orgm~isagion (gin)
2,0 2,8 3,0 3,6 6,0 i0,0
29,.i 28, 9 26, 8 28, 9 44, 7 56, 8
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 O.a
1,8 2,0 2,4 2,3 3,1 3, G
- - - 0.3 0.3 0.3
0.9 1.3 2.0 2.3 3.0 3.2
i,l 1,5 1,4 1,6 1.6 2,2
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0. i 0.2
Total current prices 24, 5
Total constant 0.968) prices 21, 5
35,3 37,1 36,1 39,5 59,4 76,9
28, 3 27, 4 24, 0 22.4 27.9 30.6
New Illdustry 11.9
Adaptation " 0.9
Small industries 1.0
Re-equipment
- 3.7
Rese~’ch and development
Industrial estates i. 4.
.Joint ventures and service
Indu stries
(’2) IDA Grants by Object (£m)
18,4 14,2 9,4 11,5 20,4 33,0
0,9 0,4 0,2 0,0 0, i 0.1
1,0 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.5 2.~
5.5 6.0 7.9 5.1 9.0 10,2
0,0 0, i 0, i 0. i 0,3 0.4
1.8 2.9 6.2 i0. i 8.9 7. I
0.0 0,4 0.3
.... .--------.-’ ..........
Total current prices 18.9 27:6 24,4 24.7 28.0 40.6 " ,’o3.
Total constant (1968) prices 16,6 12, 2 18, 0 16, 4 15, 9 19, 0 21.2
(3) Total Government Grants (1.) a.s percentage of -
(a) Gross National Product 1.47 1,85 1.63
¯ (b) General Government 3.88 4.81 4.31
1,32 0,99 1,61 1, 73
3, 26 2, 14 2, 99 3.67
I
I
Basic sources: Estimates of the Public Services; IDA Annual Reports
Notes
1974 figmres are ~fine-monthly grossed to annual (i. e. x 4/3). For construct price series
the deflator was CPI (base November 1968 as 100). For section 0) (a) data for 1970-71
to 1973-74 was treated as if for calendar yea~cs 1970-73~
(
.... -4
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poor ,nan of EEC with ’no prospect of let-up in future if policies continue on
their present scale. As it happens, Irelm~d is tile least delinquent in point of
number of arraignments before tile European Court: we have been the most
law-abiding member of the Comnmnity as recent statistics show.
.~...~:.. ¯     We repeat that, from
every point of view, import substitution is as worthy of government support as
exports, as regards t.ax remission and/or subsidy. We commend this viewpoint
to IDA., if necessary for suasion of foreign fi.rms.
L
Tile principle of differential taxation is now firmly estsSlished.
In fact Irelaad used it long ago by reduction of rates on agnicuitural Imld in favour of
J
small farmers ,told the maintenauee of employment on larger f.arms... Indusfrles
that are good employers should be tax-favoured i,~ Ireland compared wilh capital
intenslve industries° -.- ’ ......
..
We are glad to note that the NI economy is to receive
additional subsidies of £600 - £i, 000 million, This gives some idea of the order
of magnitude of the ~uns re¢iuire(~ here for agriculture and industry.
Finally we would appeal to Government firmly to estab.hsh
orders of priority in its exzoendit~res from loans or taxation. Improvement of
the economy should come first, thus enabling far better provision later than
would otherwise be tile case for al__l worthy objects.
5.2 The A~zrl.eultural Situation
A~ several points in this study we have emphasised our vie~,-
point that public policy should be directed toward optimisation of employment
rather than of profit or enlployce income. While we deal primarily with
manufacturing indusl:ry, this cmploy’;flent viewpoint has forced us Increasingly
-98 - .,.
towards consideration of the agricultural aspect. In fact, the economy is indivisible.
That truism of Irish economic history that "agriculture is our principal industry"
Is as true today as ever, if some would llke the "is" in Hm quotation to be ch~mged
to "should be". Proportionately to the whole economy, in added value, qum~tum
output, exports and, most notably manpower, agriculture has receded in the past
half-century and in nearly every sub-period thereof.
\
It has always been taken for grm~ted, notably by l:lle Population
,
Commiss[oll of 194.8-1954, that future reduction in m,’mpower in agricu].ture was
inevitable. I~ was regarded as the only way to cure the chronically low income m~d
underemployment situations in the sector. Economic .salvation was to be found in
non-agrieul(,~re, industry in particular. Something very like tllis has happened in
the last quhrter-cenbary, if in lesser deg:ree than anticipated and hoped. Wl~ile
real incomes m~d labour prdductivity in aK~-iculture have improved, they az’e still
comparatively low and non-agriculture, while it has advm~eed Llotab]y, has been
unable to cope with thq lowering of manpower in agriculture, in increasing unemploymenl.,
exacerbated latterly by the lessening in emigration. We see no prospect of full
employment (with a n0n-agriculf~ural unemployme’nt rate not exceeding 4 per cent
mid low net emigration) in Ireland unless and until employment in’AFF can not
only be stabilised but appreciably increased.
Censoriousness towards agriculture is a common al~titude in
nonagrleulture. This is not conducive to improvement, for criticism, even if
constructive in intention, is prone to create its barriers amongst the putative
Improvees. It is alien to our social science philosophy which is that there are
reasons why things should be as they are; we must know these reasons before
presmning fo advise change. Most of them are well known, "including
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poverty, lles~1.1ting in low s{tvings .and go in under-capitalisation "
in t.]m industry mid a p1"opensity i:o leave the land for better-p,~d
employments away from it;
.
too many too small farms;
traditional acceptm~ce of a lowstandard of .living, in fact we~fl~ness
of demml.d on the par~ of agriculturists, for tm~gJ.ble ~ ..
capital, materials and consumption goods; .
low income elasticity of demand for most agricultural products.
There has been a marked improvement in all these respects in recent
years, particularly under the ilffluenee of CAP of EEC. And we must not exaggerate
"the labour shedding effect: in AFF in five years 1971-1976 this mnounted to
6,000 a year, despite the lowering of net emigration; the effect on the level of
total nonagricultural unemployment must have been sm’all. Of course, there is
no certainly that, with improvement in the world economy, emigration, particularly
affecting rural areas, will not be resumed.
The preference of agriculturists here and else)vhere for improvement in
income through prices rather thin{ increased quantity production is natural enougll,
dispensing, as it does; with increased labour, worry about increased expenditure

on producers’ goods and the risk Of inevitable fall in prices due to increased supply.
!
I
The Imtervention policy of Eli;C, so much eriticised, has at least the merit of
protecting farmers from the disastrous slumps in prices due to the bounty of
nature in the not so distant past, facts well entrenched in the folk memory of
- people on the lmld.
Yet the situation is anomalotis. The vast sums. expended by the State
’ specifically designed to improve agricultural technique have had disappointing
¯ results. In the past, most of the alumni of the agricultural schools aspired to
become inspectors of the Department of Agriculture or Agrieu]:tural Instructors
instead of actual parLicil?ation in agricultltral enterprises: we !rope there has
been a change In rids direction in rcdent years.
!
°’1 ID.
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l~m~y years ago Geary ~91i~ stressed the vast" rm~ge of output on Irish
farms of the same size, indicative of very low income and output on thousands of
farms and recent statistics published in regard to the national farm survey conducted
l)y the Agricultural Institute show that many incomes are still inidequate.. One wonders
why such farmers don’t "sell out" at the remarkably high prices ruling for. farms. "[he
D eparlmenf o[ Agricult-ure should be able so to ease off incompetent oPerators.and
"substitute therefor properly tr~ned farmers, iklaldng all due allowance for those
/
cliches like "agriculture is a way of life" and "farmers attach more importance to
ownership of land than to income from it," under modern conditions, many thousands
of farmers could obtain far larger incomes from interest on investment of sale money tlm~.
from operation of farms. Competence in operation should be a prime condition one
would think, in renting or selling land now vested in the La/~d Commissiol~. A far
more active role should be adopted in future thml in the past in Improving farming
efficiency. There is more to this than economics. The l,-md of the nation
Is sacred: no one has a right to misuse it. There ks, of course, no question of
compulsion. Improvement on the lines incUcated (and thcre are mm~y more) can be
shown to be in the interests of everyone, the dispossessed, tile farming community
generally, the State itself.
-]
7
[7
Fa~:mers are entitled to a reply to a question "Why pick on us ?" It is
p.erfc~tly true that wide variability in competence is a characteristic of every walk
of life in Ireland and elsewhere: in 1958 the effective range in net output per head
In most industries was 4:1 (1961). The difference bet~veen agriculture and other sectors
lies not only in the foregoing emotional (but real) consideration but on the fact that
market forces emmet be relied on to weed out incompetence in agriculture, which
now operates almost entirely under the condition of administered prices; in the
past when prices were market prices depending on .supply and demo_nd standards of
ltvlng were poor, in thousands of cases near subsistence level, so that low income
did not necessarily lead to elimination.
II "    ’ ’Varmb]lJty of agricuttural statistics on small and medium-sized farms,~, JSSISI,
.1956-57.
**
Contribulioa of 1l. C. Gcary to Discussion of T.P. Linehan’s paper "The S{:rueturc
of Irish Industry", JSSISf, 1961--(;2.
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We welcome the finding in a recent report of NESC (1977) that a rapid.
rate of growfll in agriculture, particulal.qy if. it could be augmented by more intensive
.processing, could provide up to 23,000 direct in-factory jobs by 1985. Our own
comment would be that the best forni of industrial ezpansion would be l:hat which
Is upstream or downstream to ma expanded agriculture.
lYe admit [llat to expect m~ increase or 6ven a maintenance of direct
employment in agrlcull~re savours of hope as well as experience° R. O’Connor and
.     ,-
P. Kelly argue that increasing the output of agriculture further w’ould ahnost certainly
, I
mean a greater rate of decline in such employment~ We might add that weeding out of
bad farmers and increaMng size of h91dings would, on past e:~erience, have the same
.effect, All this is btit mmther aspect of the .confl.ict between employment told income polick
5.3 The Uncertain Future of World Employ.inept.
. When we embarked on this enterprise, .we were
inclined toreg~’dthepresent employment situation as a temporary recession.
We never wavered in our oft-repeated view that the Irishproblem was prima_rily
to find jobs, an object wlfich might’ be in colffHct with maxhnisi]]g the real income
of the nation° If choice has to be made, our philosophy is a preference for a lower
gross national income with mmly jobs than a large income and fewer jobs, even
with the generous treatment of the unemployed which through taxation a large
national income would make possible. We have expressed a preference for .
emigration to jobs abroad on the part of persons who would be jobless at home.
A quarter century ago learned discussion centred on automation.
The age of leisure had arrived for all in advanced countries, with shorter hours,
electronically controlled machines doing most of the work, the only production
workers being machine minders, great material wealth for all
I
the mMn social
All:ernalive Growfl~ Rate__~s in Agriculture. "National Economic and Social Council
No. 34 1977.
¯ . h’ish Economic Policy: A Review of Major Issues, Edited by B. R.. Dowling and
J. Darken, ESI{]: (1978)
m
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l~roblem to bc how to use increased lcisure. As to leisure, it was scarcely ¯
a coincidence that th’ere imve been vast ad.vances in popular el~tcrtatnm.ent :-..
starting perhaps with the cinema, on to radio, then tele.vision, the whole range
of professional sport and the motor car a c’onventional necessity even among’st
lowex" income earners.
Then, up to abe/it three years ago, this prognosis for adwmoed
countries beg~1 to seem all wrong. Registered unemployment’ reached unprecedentedly
10w levels, e.g. under one per cent of the .insulted population in UK. The shortage
was in rear, power, particularly skilled manpower, and n[ot in tm]gible capital.
I~ention of mttomation m~d its problems ceased. \Vhen first the recession came
it was interpreted in traditional fashion as a normal phase in the business cycle:
there was even. mention of the I(ondratiev wave, to say nothing of shorter waves.
At first in the present recessionthere were some traditional
features, though output volume nevel" fell away as it did during the Great Depression.
of the 1930’s. Then, during the past twelve months, a quite new phenomenon
appeared: unmistakable recovery in output generally with little oi" no effect on
employment. From a recent article:- .
¯’[ In 1974. there were’3 million out of work in the Common
l~arket; a year later it was 5 million; now it:is Ill,ely to reach 6 "million. before
Christmas - 5.5 per cent of Europe’s working population.
"Young people are the.worst hit, accounting for between half
and quarter of the jobless. Complaints that modern youth does not want to work
or has not the skills ~re as common on the Continent as in" Britain - and as valid.
i", Immigrmlts are widely blamed for adding t;o the problem, but
measures to stop immigratio~Yin some countries and encourage them to ret.xtrn
home are not improving the situation.
i
-°
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""Nobody beli[eves any longer that tile problem can be put
right overni.gl)t if g6(,ernments would only get their economies moving. Higher
production will not b~qdge the gap. Production has been rising across Europe
for two years, with no effect. Indeed, industries that would benefit from more
orders are having trouble finding enough skilled workers.
¯ o
"In other words the present unemployment problem is
quite different from¯ what we have seen before." The ,~ticle also quotes the
comment of Germ.an ikffini,~er l-I~s Ape].: "Our worry is not the 960,000 out
of work to}lay but the millions who will be if we don’t get productivity up. " At
first sight this viewpoint might seem p~-adoxical, assuming that by ,,productivity,"
Is meant ’,].~our productivity", for the latter is associated with capital intensRy.
]3utincreased productivity implies a greater increase in production, hence some
(if a lesser) increase in.employment: we have seen that in Ireland. .~x percentage
In year-to-yeza" increase in output of manufacturing industry occasions (x/2 - I)
per cent in employment. Also increased labour produellvity, for its. lowering
effect on pricesl increases demand.
We must be on our guarct agains.t. "insippatcd gloom"
oven in this, the poorest EEC country wi.th the highest Unemployment rate.
Thomas Carlyle’s dismal science is invariably at its most dismal in depressions
or, as they are now more politely called,"recessions". Humm~ ingenuity
seems to be at its best in bad times (to make them better) and, oven if the
present recession, is "different", so have many been in the past from which
countries have recovered, to an always increasing gradient of .. .
material prosperity. We must also avoid fatuous optimism. What may have
Improved, compared with the past, is that, drawing on past e~perienee,
recovery hmvitable in the long run can be speeded up in the short, by cooperation
and sacrifice within nations and internationally. Oar own oft-repeated and
i
Indeed fairly obvious suggesti.on that unemployment be regarded as a specific
P
K, Richardson: "The dole queues I,h~’d. stretchaez’ "o.,,_os Europe" "1’he Suncb~y.
T Jn3es, 23 Octo!0er 1977
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.Ircland, to be given priority over the general cconomic problem: may bel)t’ob|cm In
found worthy of examination by other countrics.
We confine our recommendations to those affecting ma.nufactxtring
industry, thougll we ventured to commend to the authorities our earlier remarks
in this chapter on agriculhlre.which, on the whole in our opinion, is more in. need
of attention than is the rest of the economy. Having regard to Chapter 1 we do not
claim originality for mW of our suggestions except as regards emphasis on (i)
manpower as distinct from income and profit (ii)priority in Governmeni expenditure
mid taxai:ion-subsidy policy adapted, if necessary differentially, I:o specific national
ends; 0n particular such policies should be directed towarc.ls the reduction of unemploymc.~
(ill) import ~bstitution as a policy equal to that on expbrts in the interest of
employment and balance of payment. We stress that throughout we have been more
concerned with methodology them with detMled findings, which will require far more
m,~ert .specificity than we could presume to give them. Without any repetition of
our fah:ly elaborate statistical mmlyses we are confident about the following:-
¯
Fundb.~g of IDA should be on a vastly increased scale, one hopes
once-for-all, after which industry should increase on its own.
¯ morn entum.
, Foreign policy should be more strongly directed towards the reduct.[on
¯ of import excess countrywise,so formidable in some cases.
-: ---:i.. " - ’ ---’.’-1..." " ’. ’
.T1}esearch, on a worldbasis commoditywise, sliould be systematic for
industries it) with a futurepotentialbased on performance in the recent past
and othm~ very detailed analyses and (ii) labour intensive.
-
At SITC two-digit level there shouid be greater equality in imports
and e~ err s.
O Concomitantly with increase in output volume in agriculture there should
be great development in industries using materials for, and products of,
agr.icu].ture.
Exam.tnation of the recent foreign trade statistics of advanced economies
shows that h:eland should aspire to strong and rapid development in
(1) petroleum industries other than refining       (ii) vehicle and other
heavy industry, most likely as parts therefor,, mainly for export.
Admittedly these are capital in{ensive industries but they should be
developed bec au se of their m agnitude and henee their likely c ontribution
to reducing the trade balance.
Study of the ].974 IO table strongly ’endorses policiqs of. qu’,’mtum agriculture
(levelopment of materials for processing by Irish industry, import
substitution of mate.rial.~ for home non-food industry m~d for development
,. ¯
,    ,
of petroleum industries. . . ,~. ": " .. ’.’:
¯ ’ , ,’ ¯ . . , ’" ¯ . . .. I’ . , ¯ ...... ’ ’ ; ,’
!L-F"
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A friendly critic has pointed out that our recommendations
do not follow from oul- statistical analyses, a major point we readily concede,
w
m~d in a deeper sense thm~ that "nothh~g is ever proved by statistics", Statistics
hclp in ]?o]icy m.:d.dng told we have usually to be content with the negative version:
the statistics we have (~nd usually there are lacunae) do not invalidate the
policies proposed; or where there is conflict of interest amongst secE[ons
of the public (as there ahvays is) "the greater good of the greater number," with
mitigati.on of the loss to the/ninority.
There are principles enshrined in the recomm’endations
m~d principles (the most importm~t - oft repeated - being that economic policy
should be based on maximisati0n of employment),~’o not susgeptible of proof,
statistical or other.
Except for the first two sections of chapter 1 the m~alysis
Is heavily statistical, with comment ,’u~d policy inference reduced to a minimum.
Truth to say, we were more concerned with statistical methodol6gy than with
comment .(other than explanatory or cautionary)for the analyses being avaih~ble,
comments ,nay be made and comments, especiaily as regards 15olicy inferences,
may differ. Very much a case in point is the demonstration, qucmtum-wise for
UK m~d Ireland of the phenomenon of ~,mtllal output percentage increases being
several thnes greater than increases e’xq~ected from factor input. We argue that
this phe/~ome/~on, might be exploited to lower capital inputs and increase labour
Inputs. Ckn" critic cogently remarks that tIHs excess phenomenon would be
non-exlstent without input of capital. We think the viewpoints cm~ be reconciled
but do not insist.
.
Another critic has questioned our argument that it is not
necessarily true that Ireland shou].cl always sell in the dearest and buy in the
cheapest markets \vithout regard to the necessity for the reduction of ].report
i
e~c, ess’ In our         t~"admg’ ’with some twenty countries, Thecontra argument made
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by our critic is that cou’ntry balances arc n.ot on the whole "l;hat im]?ortant". He
4
comments "The criteria of projected growth of market, harmless or softness of
l:he cur~:onoy and ea so of access l+vith ml eye.to cost competitiveness are probably
Ino]:e importm~t to native and foreign ontreproJlours in Ireland f;han correcting an
imbalai~ce in yon or drachmas° 1’
We would agrce wil;h our critic in general principle, but regard
mu st be had to Irelmld’s special situation at present: a visible import excess of
£500m wh[ch shows no sign of abatement -until economic catastrophe: We
have shown that in this regard we compare unfavourably with our smaller EEC
partners m~d al_~l our EEC partners have better balances with other com,.tries than
we have° If we emmet prove I:hat the policy we advocate ks the best, how ks the
latter. ~-g-umcnt to be answered? The principle ks valid but °nly when we have
brought our trade into better balance.
Oar hope is that our statistics and o~hers like them will help in
the formulation of prudent policy.
hi this paper.
Itowever inadequately, we dell with hnmcnsities
We have had very many valuable inlernal (to ESRI) and external
criticisms, to all of which we have given close attention, resulting in useful
additions or other alterations to the original text. Without exception these criticisms
related to our pollcy recommendations or other treatment, our comment being based
largely on the statislics. I1 is notorious that different policies can validly be
based on the same set of statistics and elher facts. Our hope is thai we have raised
the principal problems which require decision and that our statistics will narrow
the field of argument. We followed where the statistics led and we realiso that this
has not led to tidiness of treatment of the many topics dealt with.
,,
